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INTRODUCTION
Eleven years ago, in a stark departure from centuries of legal tra-
dition, Congress enacted federal evidence rules permitting the prose-
cution to introduce evidence of prior sexual offenses committed by
defendants charged with rape and child molestation.1  Federal Rule of
Evidence 413, concerning sexual assault,2 and Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 414, concerning child molestation,3 allow evidence of the ac-
cused’s prior sexual misconduct to be “considered for its bearing on
any matter to which it is relevant,” most notably propensity.4  This
1 Congress passed Federal Rules of Evidence 413–415 as part of the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994)—
bypassing the regular rulemaking process.  For a history of the process, see 23 CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5411 (2005
Supp.), David P. Leonard, The Federal Rules of Evidence and the Political Process, 22 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 305 (1995), and infra note 60.
2 FED. R. EVID. 413.  In relevant part, Rule 413—Evidence of Similar Crimes in Sex-
ual Assault Cases—provides: “In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an
offense of sexual assault, evidence of the defendant’s commission of another offense or
offenses of sexual assault is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any mat-
ter to which it is relevant.” FED. R. EVID. 413(a).
3 FED. R. EVID. 414. Rule 414—Evidence of Similar Crimes in Child Molestation
Cases—provides in relevant part: “In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of
an offense of child molestation, evidence of the defendant’s commission of another of-
fense or offenses of child molestation is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing
on any matter to which it is relevant.” FED. R. EVID. 414(a).  Rule 415 applies Rules 413
and 414 to civil actions. FED. R. EVID. 415.  I focus almost exclusively on the criminal rules.
Except where directly relevant, I leave civil cases (which concern mostly sexual harass-
ment) for others to consider.
4 FED. R. EVID. 413(a), 414(a); see also United States v. Tyndall, 263 F.3d 848, 850 (8th
Cir. 2001) (“Although Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) generally excludes the admission
of evidence of other crimes to show the propensity to commit a particular crime, Congress
excepted sexual assault cases from this rule when it enacted Federal Rule of Evidence
413.”); United States v. Gabe, 237 F.3d 954, 959 (8th Cir. 2001) (“Evidence of prior bad
acts is generally not admissible to prove a defendant’s character or propensity to commit
crime.  However, Congress altered this rule in sex offense cases when it adopted Rules 413
\\server05\productn\C\CRN\90-6\CRN603.txt unknown Seq: 3 13-SEP-05 12:03
2005] FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 403 1489
means that the prosecution may introduce evidence of past sexual of-
fenses to show that the accused has the character and predatory ten-
dencies of a sexual offender.  Jurors are invited to use the prior sexual
misconduct evidence circumstantially, inferring that because the ac-
cused acted as a sexual predator on a previous occasion, the accused
might have done so again and was therefore more likely to have com-
mitted the crime charged.5  The prior offenses prosecutors may intro-
duce need not have resulted in convictions, or even arrests, and in
some cases prosecutors have even introduced previously acquitted
conduct.6  The standard for proving the prior offense is whether a jury
could believe by a preponderance of the evidence that the offense
occurred.7  Rules 413 and 414 also require timely notice, and failure
to so provide may lead to exclusion of the evidence.8  As a practical
and 414 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.” (citation omitted)). See generally GLEN WEIS-
SENBERGER & JAMES J. DUANE, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: RULES, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
COMMENTARY AND AUTHORITY 187 (quoting Rep. Susan Molinari, the principal sponsor of
Rules 414 and 415 in the House, as stating that the new rules make admissible “‘the defen-
dant’s propensity to commit sexual assault or child molestation offenses’”).
To apply Rules 413 and 414, the prosecutor must demonstrate that (1) the defendant
is accused of an offense of sexual assault or molestation, (2) the proffered evidence per-
tains to the accused’s commission of another sexual assault or child molestation, and (3)
the evidence is relevant. See United States v. Stamper, 106 Fed. Appx. 833, 835 (4th Cir.
2004); United States v. Fitzgerald, 80 Fed. Appx. 857, 863 (4th Cir. 2003); Doe v. Glanzer,
232 F.3d 1258, 1268 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Guardia, 135 F.3d 1326, 1328 (10th
Cir. 1998).
I refer to these rules as the “new rules” (although with the passage of time this moni-
ker becomes increasingly less apt) or as the “sexual offense rules” or as the “propensity
rules.”  Also, I frequently refer to prior sexual offenses, but it is clear from the plain text of
the rules, and the few cases that have considered the issue, that uncharged offenses that
occurred after the charged conduct are also admissible under these rules. See United States
v. Sioux, 362 F.3d 1241, 1244–47 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that the language and logic of
the rules apply to post-charged conduct); United States v. James, 60 M.J. 870, 873 (A.F. Ct.
Crim. App. 2005) (“[T]he fact that propensity evidence occurs after the dates of the
charged offenses is not a barrier to its admission.”); United States v. Wright, 53 M.J. 476,
486 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (Sullivan, J., concurring) (questioning the majority’s admission of con-
duct that occurred nearly six months after the charged offense as inconsistent with Military
Rules of Evidence).
5 This notion of “once a rapist, always a rapist” serves as the title to an influential
feminist critique of Rule 413.  Katharine K. Baker, Once a Rapist? Motivational Evidence and
Relevancy in Rape Law, 110 HARV. L. REV.  563 (1997).
6 A few cases, involving state versions of the new rules, admit as propensity evidence
conduct that resulted in an acquittal for the accused. See Hess v. State, 20 P.3d 1121, 1124,
1129 (Alaska 2001) (admitting evidence of the defendant’s prior sexual assault, but hold-
ing “that it was error not to inform the jury of [the accused’s] acquittal”); People v. Mul-
lens, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 534, 549–50 (Ct. App. 2004) (holding that it was error to exclude
evidence of acquittal of other sexual molestation offenses used for propensity purposes).
7 See, e.g., United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1433 (10th Cir. 1998) (“The district
court must make a preliminary finding that a jury could reasonably find by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the ‘other act’ occurred.”); Wright, 53 M.J. at 483 (explaining that
Rule 413 requires “the judge to conclude that the jury could find by preponderance of the
evidence that the offenses occurred”). But see infra Part IV.B.1 (criticizing the standard).
8 Section (b) of both Rules 413 and 414 provides:
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matter, given that rape and child abuse are usually prosecuted as state
crimes, almost all of the nonmilitary federal cases interpreting these
Rules arise in Indian Country.9
By focusing on past behavior and allowing the admission of past
sexual offenses as propensity evidence, Rules 413 and 414 represent a
doctrinal and theoretical departure from traditional evidence rules—
although precisely how much of a departure is debatable.  Rules 413
and 414 contravene limitations on character evidence that were until
now considered axiomatic.  Traditionally, propensity evidence was dis-
favored on the grounds that people should be tried for their charged
acts and not for their past deeds or personalities.  Admitting evidence
of the prior bad acts was feared to encourage the worst in jurors, al-
lowing jurors to convict based on a perception that the accused is bad
or dangerous, rather than because the jurors were convinced beyond
a reasonable doubt that the accused actually committed the charged
offense.  Additionally, information about prior bad acts has tradition-
ally been seen as confusing and distracting to the jury, undermining
jurors’ already precarious allegiance to the presumption of inno-
cence.  This concern seems particularly true when the prior bad acts
are of a sexually predatory nature.
In Part I, I briefly review the landscape of the Federal Evidence
Rules, discussing how character evidence works generally and illustrat-
ing the changes wrought in sex offense cases by the new rules.  Part I
also briefly outlines the philosophical, constitutional, procedural, and
rule-based concerns surrounding Rules 413 and 414.  Others have ably
done this work, so I only summarize the rich debate.
Part II focuses on two linked doctrinal issues regarding Rules 413
and 414: (1) the new rules’ potential violation of due process, and (2)
the role of Federal Rule of Evidence 403 in limiting the unfairness of
propensity evidence admitted under Rules 413 and 414.  Courts, in
some cases angst-ridden and in others cavalier, have rejected due pro-
cess challenges to the new rules.  Rule 403, which provides a balancing
test whereby a trial judge may exclude evidence when the probative
In a case in which the Government intends to offer evidence under this
rule, the attorney for the Government shall disclose the evidence to the
defendant, including statements of witnesses or a summary of the substance
of any testimony that is expected to be offered, at least fifteen days before
the scheduled date of trial or at such later time as the court may allow for
good cause.
FED. R. EVID. 413(b), 414(b); see United States v. LeCompte, 99 F.3d 274, 276 (8th Cir.
1996) (rejecting government admission of evidence under Rule 414 where notice was pro-
vided only “[o]n the eve of trial”).
9 The significance of the fact that the Federal Rules of Evidence has disproportion-
ately affected American Indians is the subject of my separate essay entitled Lustful Jurisdic-
tion: Indian Country as an Unseemly Choice for an Evidence Experiment (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the author).
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value of that evidence is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice,
confusion, distraction, or waste of time,10 is touted as a remedy for any
due process or fairness concerns.11  According to the courts, Rule 403
serves as a bulwark against any fundamental unfairness presented by
Rules 413 and 414.12
Part III examines the role of Rule 403 in recent case law from the
Eighth and Tenth Circuits.  Overwhelmingly, these cases demonstrate
that the courts’ process of applying Rule 403 to the new sexual pro-
pensity rules is markedly different from the way courts apply (or at
least ought to apply) Rule 403 to the admissibility of uncharged con-
duct admitted for impeachment or for other nonpropensity purposes.
The balancing test of Rule 403, upon which the constitutionality of
these sexual propensity rules purportedly rests, is a shadow of its true
self in these instances.  The Eighth Circuit, in particular, has rendered
Rule 403 toothless and ineffectual.  To those who might argue that
Rule 403 was already defanged,13 I would concede that the courts’
application of Rule 403 has been uneven, but would nevertheless
point to many instances in which Rule 403 has shielded the accused
from unfair prejudice.14  Also, in Part III, I examine the application of
both sides of the Rule 403 balance and argue that courts systematically
10 FED. R. EVID. 403  (providing that “[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confu-
sion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence”).
11 See, e.g., Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1433 (asserting that “without the safeguards embodied
in Rule 403 we would hold the rule [413] unconstitutional”).
12 When Rules 413 and 414 were first proposed, there was serious debate whether
Rule 403 applied to them at all.  In Part II.A, I outline the various textual and legislative
history arguments about Rule 403’s continued role in admitting evidence under the sexual
propensity rules.  The bottom line, however, is clear: Every court that has considered the
problem has decided that 403 does indeed apply to evidence admitted pursuant to Rules
413 and 414. See infra Part II.A.
13 Courts and commentators emphasize that the Rule 403 balance favors admissibility
and sometimes stress Rule 403’s limited reach. See, e.g., United States v. Fallen, 256 F.3d
1082, 1091 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that “Rule 403 is an extraordinary remedy . . . ‘which
should be used only sparingly since it permits the trial court to exclude concededly proba-
tive evidence’” (quoting United States v. Fortenberry, 971 F.2d 717, 721 (11th Cir. 1992)));
Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 51 MERCER L. REV. 1165, 1172 (observing that although “Rule
403 was once frequently used by the Eleventh Circuit to reverse criminal convictions . . .
Rule 403 is now rarely a factor in appellate decisions”).
14 Within the context of 404(b), the balancing test of Rule 403 has served as a mean-
ingful check on the erroneous introduction of prior bad acts evidence, even in the child
abuse context. See, e.g., State v. Aakre, 2002 MT 101, ¶¶ 31–38, 46 P.3d 648, 649–50,
655–56 (affirming a district court decision granting Aakre’s motion for a new trial on the
grounds that evidence of sexual assaults over a two-year period against two stepdaughters
from a previous marriage, sixteen years earlier, was erroneously admitted where a Rule 403
balance was incorporated in the Rule 404(b) analysis); see also Major Bruce D. Landrum,
Military Rule of Evidence 404(b): Toothless Giant of the Evidence World, 150 MIL. L. REV. 271
(1995) (arguing that Military Courts have abandoned the application of Rule 404(b) to
exclude evidence and that any exclusion will come under Rule 403).
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overvalue the probative value of the propensity evidence, while disre-
garding serious dangers of unfair prejudice, confusion, distraction,
and waste of time.
By relying on the legislative history of the new rules and announc-
ing a presumption of admissibility, courts have forsaken the tradi-
tional operation of Rule 403.  They have thereby limited, and in some
cases abandoned, their traditional role as gatekeepers.  Ironically, and
seemingly oblivious to the irony, these same courts nevertheless tout
Rule 403 as the guarantor of due process.  This guarantee is hollow,
given the acontextual and rote application of Rule 403 in many of the
cases involving the new sexual propensity rules.
Many judges, lawyers, and law professors have expressed serious
and well-founded reservations about Rules 413 and 414.15  However,
the academy and the evidence establishment cannot just sit back and
enjoy the cold comfort of having correctly predicted a criminal rights
disaster.  Rather than decry the current rules, it is essential that we
find ways to reinvigorate Rule 403.  We must advocate concrete solu-
tions to deflect the prejudice, avoid the confusion, limit the distrac-
tions, and curtail the waste of time, all triggered by the admission of
prior sexual offenses. Therefore, Part IV proposes new ways for courts
to consider and apply Rule 403 in the context of Rules 413 and 414, so
that Rule 403 will serve as a meaningful check on the admission of
unfair evidence.  Confronting the reality that the sexual propensity
rules are here to stay, I designed my proposals as realistic guides for
trial and appellate courts.  The proposals permit courts to follow the
new course charted by Congress—in allowing sexual propensity evi-
dence—without entirely abandoning the basic evidentiary guarantees
of fairness built into Rule 403, and without derogating the vital discre-
tionary powers of the trial judge in determining admissibility on a
case-by-case basis.
In Part IV, I reject the approach of the Eighth Circuit, which has
applied what I call “403-lite,” an uncritical standard that it believes is
15 See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ON AD-
MISSION OF CHARACTER EVIDENCE IN CERTAIN SEXUAL MISCONDUCT CASES (1995) [hereinaf-
ter JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT] (urging the rejection of Rules 413–15), reprinted in 56
CRIM. L. REP. 2139, 2140 (1995); see also MYRNA S. RAEDER, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (reporting the basis for the
American Bar Association’s opposition to Rules 413–15), reprinted in 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
343, 347–52 (1995); Michael S. Ellis, The Politics Behind Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414,
and 415, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 961, 962 (1998) (noting “the inappropriate means
through which the rules were enacted”); Dale A. Nance, Foreword: Do We Really Want to
Know the Defendant?, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 10–14 (1994) (summarizing various arguments
against the sexual propensity rules). See generally 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 1,
§ 5411 (listing law reviews); Eileen A. Scallen, Analyzing “The Politics of [Evidence] Rulemak-
ing,” 53 HASTINGS L.J. 843, 856 (2002) (noting opposition to the new rules on the part of
the Judicial Conference and the American Bar Association).
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commanded by the legislative history of Rules 413 and 414.  I suggest
concrete ways to limit the dangers of sexual propensity evidence by
intelligent and meaningful application of Rule 403.16  Specifically, I
suggest that courts analyze the probative value and the prejudice in
context, focusing on the least prejudicial means to introduce the evi-
dence, screening more carefully for juror confusion and distraction,
and avoiding waste of time.  Additionally, I recommend rethinking
the standard of proof for admitting such evidence, which, particularly
under the increased admissibility of sexual propensity evidence,
presents too easy a hurdle for prosecutors.  Finally, I propose specific
ways in which trial courts can adhere to the new rules while still limit-
ing some of the unfair prejudice.
I
NEW CHARACTER RULES FOR THOSE
ACCUSED OF SEX CRIMES
A. A Challenge to the Old Regime
To understand the significance of the new rules, compare the fol-
lowing two examples.  The first example illustrates the traditional ap-
proach to evidence of similar bad acts by the accused.  I have chosen a
drug charge as the template, but this first example would have applied
to sexual crimes as well until Rules 413 and 414 were enacted.  The
second example illustrates the stark difference between the traditional
approach and the special sexual propensity rules.
Example #1: Smith is on trial for illegal drug use, a highly recidi-
vistic crime.  His past drug use, however, is not admissible if the theory
for introducing the past drug use is that Smith has a propensity for
using drugs.  In fact, the first line of Rule 404(b) specifically com-
mands that “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissi-
ble to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith.”17
16 I support such an application of Rule 403 generally, but think it is especially neces-
sary when applying Rules 413 and 414.
17 FED. R. EVID. 404(b).  Rule 404(b) provides in full:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.  It
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prose-
cution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial,
or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of
the general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
Id.
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Rule 404(b) allows the accused’s uncharged misconduct18 to be
admissible for a purpose other than propensity, such as to show absence
of mistake.19  But the need for the other purpose would have to be
strong, such as Smith’s claiming that he thought he was smoking oreg-
ano when, in fact, the substance was marijuana.  Given such a defense,
the ostensible reason for introducing the evidence is not propensity
(once a drug user always a drug user), but proof of some element of
the offense, in this case, knowledge or absence of mistake (past drug
use indicates that Smith would not mistake oregano for marijuana).
Articulating a nonpropensity purpose is not in itself sufficient for
the admission of other purposes under Rule 404(b), because the ac-
cused could raise a Rule 403 objection.  Applying Rule 403, the trial
court would have to find that unfair prejudice in allowing the jury to
hear about Smith’s prior bad acts outweighs the probative value.20
Thus, Rule 403 guards against the danger of impermissible propensity
arguments unfairly influencing the jury.21  Under limited circum-
stances, therefore, the prosecutor may introduce evidence of prior
wrongs, but such evidence would not be automatically admissible and
the court may instruct the jury not to use the prior bad acts as circum-
stantial evidence of the accused’s character or proclivities.22
18 The term “uncharged misconduct” is often used to describe the “other crimes,
wrongs, or acts” admissible under Rule 404(b) and under impeachment Rules 608 and
609. See generally 1 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE § 1:01
(rev. ed. 2004) (referring to “uncharged misconduct” as offenses that are not actually
charged in the case for which the accused is on trial).  The term “uncharged misconduct”
is apt in our context, too,  where it means any sexual offense committed by the accused
that is not the subject of his current prosecution.  That prior misconduct could have been
charged in another case and could have, but need not have, resulted in a conviction.
19 Absence of mistake is one of the “other purposes” listed in Rule 404(b). See supra
note 17.  There is no finite list for other purposes, so proving modus operandi and demon-
strating capacity also fall under Rule 404(b)’s permissible use of other wrongs or acts.
Occasionally, courts mistakenly call Rule 404(b) evidence an exception to the propensity
rule. See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 48 M.J. 896, 900 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1998) (“[A]
number of exceptions [to the ban on propensity evidence], such as those contained in
Mil.R.Evid. 404(b) and its federal equivalent, Fed.R.Evid. 404(b), have developed.”).  How-
ever, it is crucial to emphasize that such other purposes are not exceptions to the propen-
sity rules, but rather examples where the evidence is being used for purposes other than
propensity (even if jurors may, in fact, misuse the evidence for propensity).
20 FED. R. EVID. 403.
21 In other words, the court could conclude that the evidence is admissible despite
the possibility of unfair prejudice. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (setting out
Rule 403); see also United States v. Best, 250 F.3d 1084, 1090 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in “concluding that the evidence [of prior
drug activity] was probative of [defendant’s] intent, knowledge, and absence of mistake
with respect to the charged offense, and that the probative value of the evidence was not
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice”).
22 If Smith was convicted of a felony related to drugs, past drug use may be admitted
to impeach Smith’s credibility if he takes the stand.  However, it is unlikely that a prior
similar activity not related to honesty would be admitted for impeachment purposes.  Fur-
thermore, such evidence must be of a conviction (not merely arrests or other bad acts),
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Example #2: Jones is accused of rape.  Under Rule 413, any prior
sexual offenses (not necessarily convictions or arrests), including
twenty-year old offenses23 and offenses committed as a juvenile,24
would be admitted into evidence for any relevant purpose.25  Rule
413, therefore, allows the prosecution to demonstrate Jones’ propen-
sity to sexually attack women, and to argue that Jones acted in con-
formity with this character trait and committed the rape for which he
is being tried.26  This is true even if Jones never takes the stand, and
even if Jones had been acquitted of the prior sexual offense.27  These
two examples illustrate the tremendous changes that the new rules—
with their overt rejection of the ban on propensity evidence—intro-
duced into the theory and application of the evidence rules.
B. The Debates over Rules 413 and 414
Rules 413 and 414, drafted by Congress, rejected by the Federal
Judicial Center, and excoriated by the evidence establishment, have
generated much discussion.  Most of the reaction, but certainly not
and must be a felony.  Rule 609 admits evidence that an accused has been convicted of a
crime “punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year . . . if the court deter-
mines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to
the accused.” FED. R. EVID. 609(a).  This standard reverses the presumption of Rule 403
and allows admission only when the prosecution can demonstrate that probativeness out-
weighs unfair prejudice. See generally 28 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6134 (1993 & Supp. 2005).  Smith can avoid entirely
the issue of his drug use for impeachment purposes if he decides not to take the witness
stand.
If Smith were to raise the issue of his character and, for instance, argue that he is not
the type of person who could ever use drugs, only then could the government rebut the
same, and also ask questions on cross-examination pertaining to Smith’s specific acts of
prior drug use. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(a)(1) (permitting the accused to raise pertinent char-
acter traits and allowing prosecution to rebut the same), 405(a) (delineating how such
exceptions to character evidence may be admitted as reputation or opinion evidence).
23 See, e.g., United States v. Drewry, 365 F.3d 957, 960 (10th Cir. 2004) (concluding
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting testimony concerning a
prior act of child molestation from twenty-five years earlier); United States v. Gabe, 237
F.3d 954, 959–60 (8th Cir. 2001) (permitting evidence of a prior uncharged sexual assault
that was over twenty years old, where the witness was seven years old at the time of the
alleged assault).
24 See, e.g., United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2001) (admitting evidence
relating to the defendant’s prior juvenile rape conviction).
25 FED. R. EVID. 413(a).
26 As I argue later in the Article, Rule 403, though still applicable, plays a different
role in sexual propensity cases. See infra Parts II.C, III.A.
27 See supra note 6; infra note 228.
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all, has been critical.28  This Article briefly outlines below the argu-
ments in favor of and opposed to the new rules.29
1. Arguments in Favor of the New Rules
Rules 413 and 414 seem to be an appealing solution to the horror
of sexual offenses and the difficulty of proving such offenses in
court.30  The increasing adoption by states of similar rules, or their
28 See Norman M. Garland, Some Thoughts on the Sexual Misconduct Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 355, 357 (1995) (“The current version of
proposed FRE 413-15, has some very troubling drafting deficiencies.”). But see United
States v. Wright, 53 M.J. 476, 480 n.5 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (inexplicably claiming that the recep-
tion to Rules 413 and 414 has been generally positive and citing ROGER C. PARK ET AL.,
EVIDENCE LAW 150 n.96 (1998), which describes the response to the rules as mostly criti-
cal); Karen M. Fingar, And Justice for All: The Admissibility of Uncharged Sexual Misconduct
Evidence Under the Recent Amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WO-
MEN’S STUD. 501, 510 (1996) (arguing for the incorporation of the new rules into state
evidence codes).
29 Throughout this Article, I consider Rules 413 and 414 together.  Courts have barely
differentiated them, and their language and legislative histories are almost identical.  To
the extent that Congress intended both rules to shore up the credibility of individual vic-
tims who tend to be disbelieved and make their stories seem more credible, the theories
behind Rules 413 and 414 seem similar.  I note with some dismay that I am following this
tendency to lump rape and child molestation together.  Elsewhere, however, I have
dubbed this the “lifeboat syndrome,” wherein women and children are herded together to
be rescued, in this case from sexual predators. See Aviva Orenstein, No Bad Men!: A Feminist
Analysis of Character Evidence in Rape Trials, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 663, 695 (1999).  I am re-
minded of the famous line in A Passage to India: “They had started speaking of ‘women and
children’—that phrase that exempts the male from sanity when it has been repeated a few
times.” E.M. FORSTER, A PASSAGE TO INDIA 183 (1924).
Making special rules just for women and children seems to signal their membership in
the club of vulnerability and victimhood, and arguably disempowers adult women by imply-
ing that they need special protection.  The notion that “our” women and children are in
jeopardy suggests that women and children are objects, or at least that they are the respon-
sibility of those in power, and not the powerful ones themselves.  This argument is valid
even if women, such as Rep. Susan Molinari, participate in the process.  Patriarchy as a
controlling ideology is capable of expression and enforcement even by those whom it pre-
sumably controls. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON
26–27 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977) (asserting that the effect of power “is manifested and
sometimes extended by the position of those who are dominated”).
There are several obvious and important differences between women and children as
witnesses, which the new federal rules ignore.  One difference arises because children,
given their age, language skills, perception, memory, and experience, tend to make easy-to-
discredit witnesses.  Another difference is that there is no consent defense to child molesta-
tion, so the credibility contest is one that surrounds the identity of the perpetrator, his or
her capacity or inclination to be sexual with a child, and the motive and accuracy of the
child’s testimony.  This is different from the he-said/she-said nature of acquaintance rape
cases, in which the issue is consent.  One consequence of this difference is that some states
have adopted a special propensity rule only for child sexual abuse.  Similarly, other states
have special common-law rules or special applications of 404(b) for child molestation cases
only.
30 I am on record as a critic of Rules 413 and 414, albeit for slightly unusual reasons,
having argued that despite their feminist patina, the rules are subtly antifeminist in philos-
ophy and potentially unhelpful in protecting women and children. See generally Orenstein,
supra note 29 (discussing these concerns).
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retention of common-law doctrines making a special exception for
propensity in sexual cases, indicates the popularity of such rules.31  An
appreciation of the good that these rules will sometimes accomplish is
necessary to any critique.  This appreciation is  particularly necessary
here, where I hope to suggest a means of tailoring the rules’ applica-
tion to where they are most needed and least likely to cause unfairness
to the accused.
A sophisticated argument in favor of the new rules acknowledges
the potential unfair prejudice of propensity evidence,32 but focuses on
its probative value.  If the probativeness is indeed high, then to sup-
port the admission of the evidence one need not scuttle all of the
presumptions and traditions of evidence law.  Rather, one should
31 Some states have adopted versions of Rules 413 and 414, while other state courts
are considering doing the same. Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Louisiana, and Illi-
nois have adopted statutes similar to Rules 413 and 414. See, e.g., ALASKA R. EVID. 404(b)
(1994); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1420 (1996); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1108 (1995); FLA. STAT. ch.
90.404 (1990); LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 412.2 (West 2001); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-7.3
(1998). In addition, West Virginia has adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence, including
Rules 413 and 414.  There have been calls for other states to join suit. See, e.g., Paul G.
Cassell & Evan S. Strassberg, Evidence of Repeated Acts of Rape and Child Molestation: Reforming
Utah Law to Permit the Propensity Inference, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 145; John David Collins, Com-
mentary, Character Evidence and Sex Crimes in Alabama: Moving Toward the Adoption of New
Federal Rules 413, 414 & 415, 51 Ala. L. Rev. 1651 (2000); Michelle Harper Lawson, Note,
Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414: A Guide for Massachusetts Evidentiary Law, 37 SUFFOLK U.
L. REV. 1175 (2004); Lisa M. Segal, Note, The Admissibility of Uncharged Misconduct Evidence
in Sex Offense Cases: New Federal Rules of Evidence Codify the Lustful Disposition Exception, 29
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 515 (1995) (advocating that Rhode Island adopt Rules 413–15).
States which have acknowledged a “lustful disposition” exception to 404(b) include
Rhode Island and Washington. See, e.g., State v. Greene, 823 A.2d 1129 (R.I. 2003); State v.
Rice, 755 A.2d 137 (R.I. 2000); State v. Kilgore, 53 P.3d 974 (Wash. 2002).  States that
affirmatively exercise a liberal extension of state counterparts to 404(b) or offer wider
“latitude” in sexual assault cases include Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia,
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin.  (Research on file
with author.)  I only include in this list states where there are more than three cases in the
past five years demonstrating a strong trend towards relaxing propensity thinking, and
where an appellate-level court has expressed this standard.  Some states do not affirma-
tively acknowledge a liberalized standard, but clearly engage in one. See Jill C. Legg, Note,
State v. Ondricek: Admission of Prior Bad Acts, the Exception or the Rule?, 42 S.D. L. REV. 165,
165 (1997) (discussing a South Dakota Supreme Court case in which a twenty-year-old rape
was admitted to prove intent and common scheme or plan, and arguing that the broad
admission under South Dakota’s version of Rule 404(b) creates a “danger of overwhelming
the general rule of exclusion”).  Even among the states that appear to retain a prohibition
on propensity evidence, the new federal rules have been influential. See, e.g., Hart v. State,
57 P.3d 348, 353 n.3 (Wyo. 2002) (admitting prior uncharged misconduct not to show
propensity, but for plan, modus operandi, and identity, and specifically citing Federal Rules
of Evidence 413–15 to substantiate the decision).
32 Some supporters of the new rules argue that the potential unfair prejudice of the
rules is exaggerated.  David Karp, chief architect and defender of the new rules, maintains
that the concern about unfair prejudice reflects the antijury assumption “that the ordinary
people who serve on juries will behave unreasonably, if they are allowed to have this type of
information and to accord it its natural probative value.” See David J. Karp, Evidence of
Propensity and Probability in Sex Offense Cases and Other Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 15, 27
(1994).
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treat this as a special case in which propensity evidence of the charac-
ter of the accused is uniquely probative and the 403 balancing test
(which only excludes evidence when the unfair prejudice substantially
outweighs the probative value) should not operate to exclude that
evidence.
The contention that prior sexual offenses are particularly proba-
tive stems from three related arguments.  First, and most persuasive,
women and children often suffer a credibility gap in our society.33
Women are sometimes perceived as hysterical and vindictive, children
as fanciful and manipulative.  Evidence of prior misconduct by the
accused allows the triers of fact to be less dismissive of the victims’
claims in a trial that often becomes a credibility contest between the
accused and the victims.34  Therefore, the prior sexual offenses of the
accused should be admissible to address this credibility gap.
Admitting evidence of the accused’s prior acquaintance rapes ad-
dresses the vexing problem of a sexual predator’s serial attempts to
discredit each individual victim by creating reasonable doubt as to
consent,35 or in the case of a child victim, to create doubt as to the
perception, memory, and credibility of the child.  Focusing on the fact
that women tend to be disbelieved in charging rape, some feminists
argue that these propensity rules level the playing field between the
victim and the accused.36
33 This credibility gap is premised on the supposed psychological difference of wo-
men from men, and can be traced in its modern lineage from classical psychoanalysis. In
this context of prejudice and stereotype, women are more prone to psychological disease,
hysteria, and practical failure. See, e.g., SANDER L. GILMAN ET AL., HYSTERIA BEYOND FREUD
286 (1993) (“Throughout its history, of course, hysteria has always been constructed as a
‘woman’s disease,’ a feminine disorder, or a disturbance of femininity, [and] this construc-
tion has usually been hostile.”).  As transposed onto the new evidence rules, woman can be
seen as needing a “corrective”—a “talking cure”—in order to substantiate and level the
“inherently” uneven playing field of life and law.  A paternalism similar to that reflected in
the works of Freud and Breuer is thus evidenced in the promulgation of these new rules
and demonstrates a continuing “credibility gap” in the stories women tell.
34 The private nature of these crimes evokes the (false) dichotomy of public and pri-
vate behavior that implicates the realms of women and children and their power within
them. See, e.g., Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re)torts: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass Torts,
Power, and Responsibilities, 1990 DUKE L.J. 848, 872 (“For the legal system to deal appropri-
ately . . . we must abandon the false dichotomies of public/private . . . . We must create
feminist (re)torts.”); Frances Olsen, Comment, Unraveling Compromise, 103 HARV. L. REV.
105, 113 (1989) (“[T]he public/private dichotomy is false—the state is implicated in the
‘private’ sphere.  Created by the ‘public,’ the ‘private’ suffers from a serious power
imbalance.”).
35 The power of women testifying together is undeniable.  For instance, in 1987 Alex
Kelly fled to Europe after the judge had ruled that both of Kelly’s rape charges would be
tried together.  Kelly’s attorney told him that a joint trial would surely result in his convic-
tion.  See George Judson, New Image Is Sought in a Trial: Ex-Fugitive Wants to Control Content,
N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1996, at B5.
36 See Debra Sherman Tedeschi, Federal Rule of Evidence 413: Redistributing “The Credibil-
ity Quotient,” 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 107, 124–27 (1995).  While I acknowledge the force of this
argument and its appeal, the opposite inference is also possible: That Rules 413 and Rule
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Second, supporters of the new rules claim that sex offenders are
notoriously recidivistic.37  Therefore, prior similar acts are highly pro-
bative of the likelihood that the accused committed the offense
charged.38
Third, even without relying on recidivism per se, supporters of
Rules 413 and 414 argue that the probative value of the prior sex
crimes is high because the sexual aggressiveness and proclivities of the
defendants are unique.39  Few people, the argument contends, have
the inclination and utter baseness to be sexual predators.  The fact
that someone has committed such a crime once, crossing that line of
decency, indicates that he or she is morally and temperamentally ca-
pable of such activity—thus, prior sex crime evidence is highly
probative.40
414 reinforce the notion that one woman or one child is not to be believed and that each
needs a cohort to support his or her claims.  See Orenstein, supra note 29, at 694 (“Rule 413
provides an opportunity for this type of vouching, which may make an individual woman
seem more credible, but it operates at the cost of reinforcing our suspicion of all
women.”).
Rule 413 seems particularly appealing in adult consent defense rape cases, though it is
clearly not so limited.  Consent cases seem to be an especially appropriate forum for offer-
ing evidence of the propensity of the accused, because the personality and tendencies of
the accused may inform the swearing contest between the alleged perpetrator and the
alleged victim.  Professor Roger Park has argued that where identification is not the issue,
but rather sexual contact is admitted and the question is consent, there is a strong policy
argument in favor of admitting prior similar sexual attacks. See Roger C. Park, The Crime
Bill of 1994 and the Law of Character Evidence: Congress Was Right About Consent Defense Cases,
22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 271, 271–72 (1995).
37 See Karp, supra note 32, at 25 (noting with no substantive support that “rapists and
child molesters frequently commit numerous crimes before being apprehended and prose-
cuted”). But see R. KARL HANSON & MONIQUE T. BUSSIERE, PREDICTORS OF SEXUAL OFFENDER
RECIDIVISM: A META-ANALYSIS (Ottawa Dep’t of the Solicitor Gen. of Can., Rep. No. 1996-
04, 1996) (reporting, cautiously, an average rate of 13.4% for sexual recidivism and 36.3%
rate for general recidivism); Robert A. Prentky et al., Risk Factors Associated with Recidivism
Among Extrafamilial Child Molesters, 65 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 141, 148 (1997)
(reporting that known recidivism rates for child molesters tend to be very low); RAEDER,
supra note 15, at 350 (noting that recidivism rates are not particularly high for sex offenses
and that “the relevant question is not simply whether sexual offenders have high recidivism
rates, but is character evidence of sexual crimes more predictive than character evidence of
other crimes?”).
38 See id.
39 See R. Karl Hanson et al., A Comparison of Child Molesters and Nonsexual Criminals:
Risk Predictors and Long-Term Recidivism, 32 J. RES. IN CRIME & DELINQ. 325, 335–36 (1995)
(concluding that it is possible to isolate distinct groups of child molesters who tend to
recidivate).
40 Rep. Molinari, a principal sponsor of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforce-
ment Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994), explained: “In child molesta-
tion cases, for example, a history of similar acts tends to be exceptionally probative because
it shows an unusual disposition of the defendant—a sexual or sado-sexual interest in chil-
dren—that simply does not exist in ordinary people.” 140 CONG. REC. H8991 (daily ed.
Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari).  David Karp argued that the “common sense
ground” for propensity is that “[o]rdinary people do not commit outrages against others.”
See Karp, supra note 32, at 20.  Karp emphasized the probative value of character evidence
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Proponents also justify the rules on the basis of a raw need for the
evidence.41  Pragmatic arguments, based on feminist and crime pre-
vention concerns, include the importance of keeping potential victims
safe and encouraging those who have suffered sexual offenses to tes-
tify.42  Rape and child molestation are notoriously hard to prove be-
cause the crimes often occur in secret, under circumstances with no
witnesses and little physical evidence; the victim, due to shame and
fear, may be reluctant to report them.43  Therefore, without prior act
evidence, juries will not believe victims and prosecutors cannot win
concerning an accused who committed similar acts, contending that “evidence showing
that the defendant has committed sexual assaults on other occasions places him in a small
class of depraved criminals, and is likely to be highly probative in relation to the pending
charge.” Id. at 24 (emphasis added); see also People v. Falsetta, 986 P.2d 182, 186 (Cal.
1999) (“The Legislature ‘declared that the willingness to commit a sexual offense is not
common to most individuals; thus, evidence of any prior sexual offenses is particularly
probative and necessary for determining the credibility of the witness.’” (quoting Pamela J.
Keeler, Review of Selected 1995 California Legislation, 27 PAC. L.J. 761, 762 (1996))).
41 See Falsetta, 986 P.2d at 188 (“As the legislative history indicates, the Legislature’s
principal justification for adopting section 1108 was a practical one: . . . [S]ex crimes are
usually committed in seclusion without third party witnesses or substantial corroborating
evidence.”).
42 Relying on social policy is in itself not antithetical to the structure of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.  Other evidence rules are clearly based on extrinsic values. See, e.g., FED.
R. EVID. 407 (excluding remedial measures to prove negligence in order to achieve the
social policy of encouraging repair), 408 (excluding evidence of offers to compromise to
prove liability in order to encourage negotiated settlements), 412 (exempting prior sexual
history of the victim in order to encourage reporting and prosecutions of rape).
43 See Falsetta, 986 P.2d at 186 (“‘[T]he need for this evidence is ‘critical’ given the
serious and secretive nature of sex crimes and the often resulting credibility contest at
trial.’” (quoting People v. Fitch, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 753, 759 (Ct. App. 1997))).  Because of
the way these crimes are perpetrated, rape and child molestation rarely have corroboration
in the form of eye witnesses or physical evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Charley, 189
F.3d 1251, 1256 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting that a lack of evidence of anal or vaginal inter-
course or any disruption to the hymen of two girls is not inconsistent with child molesta-
tion because children’s tissues repair quickly); United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1431
(10th Cir. 1998) (noting that in sexual assault cases, “[p]rosecutors often have only the
victim’s testimony, with perhaps some physical evidence”).  In fact, when passing Rule 413,
Congress believed it was necessary to lower the obstacles for admission of propensity evi-
dence in a defined class of cases.  Congress’s rationale for doing so in sexual assault cases
includes the assistance such evidence provides in assessing credibility. See 140 CONG. REC.
S12990 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1994) (statement of Sen. Dole).
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convictions.44  Consequently, women will be unsafe and sexual
predators will go free.45
In addition, allowing testimony about prior sexual offenses might
sensitize our society to the prevalence of rape and child abuse.  In-
creased conviction rates, and even the increased prosecution rates,
would assist in general deterrence, alert society to the widespread na-
ture of the sexual violence problem, and signal our seriousness about
prosecuting these crimes.46
Furthermore, the new rules arguably empower women by al-
lowing victims to speak out with confidence, knowing that they will be
supported in their assertions and treated with respect by the jury.
Representative (now Senator) Jon Kyl, a supporter of Rule 413, ar-
gued that the rules would “go a long way toward neutralizing the psy-
chological damage a rape victim often experiences going through the
judicial process.”47  In applying Rule 413 against a serviceman accused
of rape, the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces ob-
served: “This is the type of case in which [prior sexual misconduct]
evidence was designed to be admitted.  The victim was too trauma-
tized, intimidated, and humiliated to file a complaint in the first in-
stance.  It was not until [the complainant] filed her complaint that
[another victim] followed with hers.”48
44 See Fingar, supra note 28, at 510 (arguing that “every state in the United States
should incorporate the recent legislation into its evidence code in order to achieve in-
creased consistency and intellectual honesty in the law regarding the admissibility of un-
charged sexual misconduct evidence, and provide greater justice for victims of sex
crimes”).  Senator Robert Dole justified the new rules as follows: “[E]vidence of this type is
frequently of critical importance in establishing the guilt of a rapist or child molester, and
. . . concealing it from the jury often carries a grave risk that such a criminal will be turned
loose to claim other victims.”  137 CONG. REC. S4927-28 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 1991) (state-
ment of Sen. Dole) (quoting a letter from W. Lee Rawls, Assistant Attorney General for
Legislative Affairs).
45 It is unquestionable that this anticrime rationale was a crucial impetus for the pas-
sage of the rules. See 140 CONG. REC. H8991 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep.
Molinari)  (stating that the new rules are crucial in protecting the public from sexual
predators: “The enactment of this reform is first and foremost a triumph for the public—
for the women who will not be raped and the children who will not be molested because
we have strengthened the legal system’s tools for bringing the perpetrators of these atro-
cious crimes to justice”); 140 CONG. REC. S10276 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1994) (statement of
Sen. Dole) (“Ask any prosecutor, and he or she will tell you how important similar-offense
evidence can be.”); 140 CONG. REC. H5437–38 (daily ed. June 29, 1994) (statement of Rep.
Kyl) (stating that the new rules will secure more convictions).
46 See Orenstein, supra note 29, at 687–88.
47 140 CONG. REC. H2246 (daily ed. Apr. 13, 1994) (statement of Rep. Kyl) (noting
that even when victims are “too traumatized intimidated or humiliated to file a complaint
and go through the full procedure of a criminal prosecution,” such victims “are often
willing to bear the burden of testifying when they find out that the person who marred
their lives has also victimized others”).
48 United States v. Wright, 53 M.J. 476, 483 (C.A.A.F. 2000).
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One could argue that the sexual propensity rules respect jurors’
common sense and enrich the context in which the jury makes deci-
sions.49  A related argument in favor of the propensity rules is that
they imbue verdicts with popular support.  As one military court ex-
plained, “The new rules allow the public to accept jury verdicts and
controls [sic] to some extent the legitimacy and acceptability of ac-
quittals in criminal cases.”50
Finally, and with some justification, supporters argue that the
courts have never strictly applied the rules of propensity in cases of
sexual violence.51  Historically, the common-law doctrine of “lustful
disposition” provided a formal exception to the rules against propen-
sity.52  Even without such a doctrine, courts sometimes have stretched
Rule 404(b)’s nonpropensity use beyond recognition by allowing the
admission of prior bad act evidence, especially in child molestation
cases.53
As a practical matter, the extension of Rule 404(b)’s other pur-
poses (such as providing evidence of motive, identity, and plan) often
leads to greater admissibility of prior bad acts in sexual misconduct
crimes.54  Therefore, a more honest, direct, and predictable approach
49 Elsewhere, I have made that argument from a feminist perspective. See Orenstein,
supra note 29, at 688–89.  One might also rely on the Supreme Court’s dicta in Old Chief v.
United States, which argues that a “syllogism is not a story,” and that evidence, to be be-
lieved, needs “evidentiary depth.”  519 U.S. 172, 189–90 (1997).  However, courts repeat-
edly reiterate their commitment to avoid unfair prejudice under Rule 403 and to limit the
full story in order to avoid the dangers of propensity evidence. See infra Part III.A.
50 Wright, 53 M.J. at 480.
51 See People v. Falsetta, 986 P.2d 182, 188 (Cal. 1999) (“[S]ome authorities have ob-
served that courts have been considerably more ‘ambivalent’ about prohibiting admission
of defendants’ other sex crimes in sex offense cases.”).
52 See Lannan v. State, 600 N.E.2d 1334, 1335–36 (Ind. 1992) (discussing common-law
exceptions to the propensity evidence rule in child molestation cases, including the com-
mon-law doctrine of “lustful disposition”); see also United States v. Wright, 48 M.J. 896, 900
(A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1998) (“By the early 1920’s, twenty-three states had ‘lustful disposi-
tion,’ ‘sexual proclivity’ or ‘depraved sexual instinct’ exceptions for use in cases of statutory
rape. . . . Today even more states permit evidence of ‘lustful dispositions’ in cases involving
sex offenses against children.”); Jeffrey G. Pickett, The Presumption of Innocence Imperiled: The
New Federal Rules of Evidence 413–415 and the Use of Other Sexual-Offense Evidence in Washing-
ton, 70 WASH. L. REV. 883, 888–90 (discussing the “lustful disposition” exception); Thomas
J. Reed, Reading Goal Revisited: Admission of Uncharged Misconduct Evidence in Sex Offender
Cases, 21 AM. J. CRIM. L. 127, 171 (1993) (noting that by the 1920’s over twenty states had
“lustful disposition” rules).
53 See Landrum, supra note 14, at 307 (pointing out that “[m]any commentators have
noted that courts tend to be less strict in prohibiting propensity evidence in sex offense
cases, particularly when the victims are children” and observing the same tendency in mili-
tary cases). See generally JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, 1A EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW
§ 62.2, at 1334–35 (Tillers rev. ed. 1983) (“Do such decisions show that the general rule
against the use of propensity evidence against an accused is not honored in sex offense
prosecutions?  We think so.”).
54 Critics and supporters of the new rules have observed that courts apply Rule 404(b)
more expansively in sex offense cases, particularly in cases involving children. See, e.g.,
Miguel A. Mendez & Edward J. Imwinkelried, People v. Ewolt: The California Supreme Court’s
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would be to make a specific exception for propensity in those types of
crimes.55  The new rules admit evidence that is possibly admissible by
stretching rule 404(b), but dispense with the “protracted legal bat-
tle”56 involved in admitting evidence by that route.
There is certainly truth in the allegation that some courts extend
404(b) too far in order to admit some prior act evidence in sexual
offense cases.57  However, there is also ample counterevidence that
some courts strictly apply Rule 404(b) and do not use it as a back door
to admit propensity evidence in sex offense cases.58
About-Face on the Plan Theory for Admitting Evidence of an Accused’s Uncharged Misconduct, 28
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 473, 478–80 (1995) (criticizing the expansion of Rule 404(b) in a case
charging child molestation); see also State v. Weatherbee, 762 P.2d 590, 591 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1988) (admitting acts of child molestation that occurred nineteen to twenty-two years ear-
lier to show “common scheme” and “ongoing emotional propensity for sexual aberra-
tion”); State v. Cotton, 351 S.E.2d 277, 279 (N.C. 1987) (noting that North Carolina’s
appellate courts have been “markedly liberal in admitting evidence of similar sex offenses
by a defendant for the purposes now enumerated in Rule 404(b)”).
55 See Landrum, supra note 14, at 315 (“One of the arguments in favor of the new
rules was that they allow more intellectual honesty in admitting this type of evidence,
rather than expecting judges to stretch or twist Rule 404(b) to admit the evidence.”); see
also Karp, supra note 32, at 23 (asserting that “the same practical result is often achieved by
stretching the existing rules”); Orenstein, supra note 29, at 690 (“[A]dvocates of the new
rules argue that the stretching of current doctrine proves the inadequacy of the character
rules in dealing with the unique principles of rape and child molestation.”).
56 Louis M. Natali, Jr. & R. Stephen Stigall, “Are You Going to Arraign His Whole Life?”:
How Sexual Propensity Evidence Violates the Due Process Clause, 28 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 5 n.34
(1996) (quoting 140 CONG. REC. S10,276 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1994) (statement of Sen.
Dole)).
57 Cf. supra note 14.
58 See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 58 F.3d 1318, 1321 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating that if,
with “sufficient clarity,” a defendant mounts a defense that consists “solely of a denial of
the criminal act rather than a denial of the criminal intent,” Rule 404(b) evidence on the
issue of intent is not admissible); United States v. Fawbush, 900 F.2d 150, 151–52 (8th Cir.
1990) (holding that prior acts of child sexual abuse were inadmissible to show propensity
under Rule 404(b)); Craun v. State, 762 N.E.2d 230, 237–38 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (revers-
ing the accused’s convictions for two counts of child molestation, and holding that the trial
court erred in admitting evidence of prior bad acts under Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b)
since the evidence, “‘if relevant at all, shows a propensity for [child molesting], which is
precisely what is prohibited by the Rules of Evidence’” (quoting Ortiz v. State, 741 N.E.2d
1203, 1208 (Ind. 2001))); State v. Aakre, 2002 MT 101, ¶31 & n.2, 46 P.3d 648, 655 & n.2,
656 (affirming a district court decision granting the defendant a new trial, and holding
that evidence the defendant had earlier pled guilty to continuous sexual assaults against
his two stepdaughters was inadmissible as evidence of common scheme, plan, absence of
mistake, or accident, and noting that if Montana wished to admit such evidence, it could
pass state versions of Rules 413 and 414).
Another indication of the restrictiveness of Rule 404(b) is the fact that some states
passed their own versions of Rule 413 and 414 to avoid the limitations of Rule 404(b) and
openly admitted to this purpose. See Warlow v. State, 2 P.3d 1238, 1246 (Alaska Ct. App.
2000) (noting that the new state rules in Alaska were adopted “in direct response to deci-
sions of this court that limited the State’s ability to introduce evidence of a defendant’s
prior sexual crimes”); State v. Williams, 02-1030 (La. 10/15/02), 830 So. 2d 984, 986 (re-
counting that the Louisiana rule
was prompted primarily by two decisions of this Court . . . involv[ing] prose-
cutions for aggravated rape in which the state sought to introduce evidence
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2. Arguments Opposed to the New Rules
Scholarly and judicial opposition to the sexual propensity rules
was—and continues to be—widespread.59  One set of criticisms dealt
with the political manner in which Congress adopted the rules in cir-
cumvention of the procedures set forth in the Rules Enabling Act.60
This procedural circumvention made the rules’ adoption seem politi-
cally motivated—designed to serve a subset of victims with political
and popular appeal.61
of other sexual offenses committed by the defendants . . . [where the]
Court refused to recognize the so-called “lustful disposition” exception to
Article 404’s other crimes prohibition, but, in doing so, noted that the evi-
dence sought to be introduced would be admissible if Louisiana had a rule
similar to Federal Rule of Evidence 413.  The enactment of Article 412.2
was apparently the legislature’s response to this Court’s statements . . . .
(citations omitted)).
59 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
60 The history of the sexual propensity rules dates back to 1991.  The sexual propen-
sity rules were included in the proposed “Women’s Equal Opportunity Act,” and again in
1993 as part of a larger crime bill.  The measures eventually made their way into the Vio-
lent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, with the caveat that the new rules
would not become law for 150 days, thereby allowing the Judicial Conference to respond to
the new rules. See 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 1, § 5411, at 360–61.  Ultimately, the
Judicial Conference urged Congress not to adopt Rules 413–15. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE RE-
PORT, supra note 15, at 2140.  Moreover, the American Bar Association House of Delegates
also passed a resolution opposing Rules 413–15. See RAEDER, supra note 15.  Congress ig-
nored both these recommendations.
There was also much criticism of the manner in which Rules 413–15 came to Con-
gress, “bypassing” the normal Rules Enabling Act procedure and thereby “evading the
longstanding process deigned to promulgate rules only after extensive thoughtful review
by the entire legal community.”  See id. at 344; see also WEISSENBERGER & DUANE, supra note
4, at 186 n.1 (“‘[The] existing rule-making process involves a minimum of six levels of
scrutiny or stages of formal review.  This has gone through none.  This is an amendment
offered on the floor of the Senate after about 20 minutes’ debate, without very much
thought, and it is procedurally and substantively flawed.’” (quoting 113 CONG. REC. H5439
(statement of Rep. Hughes))).
Particularly, there was hostility to the role of David Karp, a senior counsel for the
United States Department of Justice, Office of Policy Development, in writing and promot-
ing the rules, and scripting comments for the legislative sponsors.  The ideas for the new
rules originated in the Department of Justice, and Karp was one of the original drafters.
Karp packaged the rules as necessary and logical boons to fighting dreadful crimes.  Sena-
tors and Representatives then championed the new rules under the banner of crime con-
trol and protection of women.  Therefore, according to the sponsors of Rule 413, David
Karp’s law review article has the force of legal history. See Karp, supra note 32. For a scath-
ing description of Karp’s role, see 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 1, § 5411.
The criticisms of Congress’s adoption of the new rules, and of Karp’s role in the pro-
cess, are not merely sour grapes on the part of evidence professors who feel left out of the
rulemaking loop.  It is absolutely reasonable to argue that the circuitous method by which
Congress formed the rules should influence the courts’ use of the legislative history.
Therefore, to the extent that one believes that one man in the Justice Department scripted
the rules and their legislative history, one might be willing to look at the value of that
legislative history with a more jaundiced eye. See infra Part IV.C.
61 See supra note 53.
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Commentators leveled a second set of criticisms at the parochial
nature of the rules, questioning the wisdom of having special evidence
rules for certain types of cases.  The fear driving this criticism was that
crime-specific rules of evidence would undermine the unified and
transsubstantive nature of the Federal Rules of Evidence.62
Judges and scholars raised a third criticism concerning constitu-
tional questions of due process and equal protection.  These critics
argued that the new rules disrupt the basic presumption of innocence
by making defendants answer for prior acts in addition to the crime
charged.63  Part II considers the courts’ treatment of the due process
issue, arguing that courts too readily dismiss due process concerns by
relying unrealistically and, in some cases, disingenuously on the saving
grace of Rule 403.64
A fourth and related set of criticisms dealt with the wisdom and
fairness of departing from the ban on propensity evidence.  Critics
fretted that the new rules were a foot in the door to allowing propen-
sity evidence generally.65  Even outside of strictly constitutional argu-
ments, critics challenged the rules as dangerous and radical
departures from traditional evidence law axioms, as being without em-
pirical support,66 and as wildly unfair and potentially disruptive to the
course of trials.67
62 Cf. Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 166 (1995) (acknowledging that courts
must be sensitive to the special challenges of prosecuting child abuse cases, but noting that
“‘[t]his Court cannot alter evidentiary rules merely because litigants might prefer different
rules in a particular class of cases’” (quoting United States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317, 322
(1992))).
63 See, e.g., Margaret C. Livnah, Branding the Sexual Predator: Constitutional Ramifications
of Federal Rules of Evidence 413 Through 415, 44 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 169, 181 (1996) (noting
that “[t]he risk of due process violation is increased by the potential that a jury will be
prejudiced by explicit reference to prior bad sexual acts”); Natali & Stigall, supra note 56
(arguing that Federal Rules of Evidence 413–15 violate the constitutional due process pro-
tection); Mark A. Sheft, Federal Rule of Evidence 413: A Dangerous New Frontier, 33 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 57, 82 (1995) (concluding that “Rule 413 erodes the presumption of innocence in
violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause”); Jason L. McCandless, Note, Prior
Bad Acts and Two Bad Rules: The Fundamental Unfairness of Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and
414, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 689 (1997).
64 See infra Part II.C.
65 See 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 1, at 83; RAEDER, supra note 15, at 351 (“If
Rules 413–415 are promulgated, they may become the first volley in a larger attempt to
reject the ban against character evidence.”).
66 See James Joseph Duane, The New Federal Rules of Evidence on Prior Acts of Accused Sex
Offenders: A Poorly Drafted Version of a Very Bad Idea, 157 F.R.D. 95, 126 (1994) (criticizing the
new rules as “largely unnecessary[,] . . . carry[ing] a number of serious and potentially
constitutional dangers[,] . . . [and] rest[ing] largely upon a collection of dubious and
unsupported assumptions about recidivism and other variables, most of which assumptions
are called into serious question by the best available data”).
67 The California Supreme Court presented some of these arguments in considering
the constitutionality of California’s version of Rules 413 and 414:
What reasons underlie a rule aimed at excluding relevant evidence?  We
discern three separate reasons supporting the general rule against admis-
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Fifth, and finally, commentators criticized actual drafting of the
sexual propensity rules, raising questions about how the new rules
would apply and interact with the rest of the evidence rules.  Specifi-
cally, critics raised unanswered questions concerning the interrelation
of the new rules and the courts’ use of the Rule 403 balancing test, the
application of the hearsay rule, and the standard by which other acts
must be proven.68
II
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE NEW RULES
A review of cases that have applied the new rules indicates that
these sexual propensity rules raise interesting problems, many of
which the bench and the bar anticipated before the rules’ passage.
This review focuses on the Eighth and Tenth Circuits, the two main
federal courts that have considered Rules 413 and 414.  Where help-
ful, this analysis also considers military court cases69 and other circuit
cases.70
The new rules are clearly affecting some verdicts.  A stark exam-
ple of this effect is United States v. LeCompte, where a case on retrial
resulted in a conviction.71  The sole difference between the original
case and the retrial was the admission, pursuant to Rule 414, of prior
sexual offenses by the accused.72  Additionally, defendants charged
sion of propensity evidence.  The rule of exclusion (1) relieves the defen-
dant of the often unfair burden of defending against both the charged
offense and the other uncharged offenses, (2) promotes judicial efficiency
by avoiding protracted “mini-trials” to determine the truth or falsity of the
prior charge, and (3) guards against undue prejudice arising from the ad-
mission of the defendant’s other offenses.
People v. Falsetta, 986 P.2d 182, 189 (Cal. 1999).
68 In a letter to Judge Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Chair of the Advisory Committee on Evi-
dence Rules, a group of law professors expressed concern over ambiguities regarding the
new rules, including questions regarding the discretion of the trial judge and the interac-
tion with other rules concerning hearsay, best evidence, and limitations on impeachment
of witnesses. See Leonard, supra note 1, at 334 n.140 (noting the rules’ “numerous ambigui-
ties” and quoting and discussing the letter to Judge Winter).
69 Any change in the Federal Rules of Evidence changes the Military Rules of Evi-
dence as well. See Landrum, supra note 14, at 313 (“Military Rule of Evidence 1102 auto-
matically incorporates changes to the Federal Rules of Evidence into the Military Rules of
Evidence 180 days after their effective date, absent contrary presidential action.”).  As the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces noted: “Both . . . Federal Rule [413] and the
Military Rule are virtually the same.”  United States v. Wright, 53 M.J. 476, 480 n.4
(C.A.A.F. 2000).
70 Circuits other than the Eighth and Tenth have also grappled with the problems
raised by the new rules. See, e.g., United States v. Breitweiser, 357 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir.
2004); Johnson v. Elk Lake Sch. Dist., 283 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. LeMay,
260 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Angle, 234 F.3d 326 (7th Cir. 2000); United
States v. Larson, 112 F.3d 600 (2d Cir. 1997).
71 131 F.3d 767 (8th Cir. 1997).
72 The appeal of LeCompte’s first trial occurred before Rule 414 came into effect.  In
hearing that appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed the admission of the accused’s prior
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with sexual offenses certainly understand that the new rules make a
difference.  For instance, in United States v. Curry, after a mistrial for
failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, the accused opposed the
prosecution’s motion for a new trial, arguing that the court did not
consider the advantage the prosecution would have in a second trial
“including the government’s opportunity to introduce additional Rule
413 evidence.”73
crimes admitted under Rule 404(b). See United States v. LeCompte, 99 F.3d 274, 277–79
(8th Cir. 1996).  On retrial, Rule 414 applied.
On retrial, the district court, following the Eighth Circuit’s opinion in the first rever-
sal, granted the accused’s motion in limine to exclude the evidence of the prior uncharged
conduct on Rule 403 grounds, determining that the evidence’s unfair prejudicial effect
substantially outweighed its probative value.  In reaching this decision, and following the
Eighth Circuit’s guidance, the district court noted some small differences in the charged
acts and the prior offenses and found that the probative value of the prior misconduct was
therefore somewhat limited.  Additionally, the trial court held that under Rule 403 the risk
of unfair prejudice was very high because of the stigma against child abuse in American
society. See LeCompte, 131 F.3d at 768–69.
Again, this time on a special appeal of the motion in limine in the second trial, the
Eighth Circuit reversed the trial court decision for excluding the very same uncharged
sexual offenses. See LeCompte, 131 F.3d at 770.  In round two, the court of appeals ruled
that the trial judge wrongfully excluded the very same evidence which it had held should
not have been admitted in the first trial.  In deeming the trial court’s exclusion of the prior
bad act evidence to be an abuse of discretion, the court noted the significant differences
between the old regime and the new propensity rules. See id. at 769.  The court cited the
legislative history of Rules 413 and 414 and quoted Rep. Molinari, who asserted that the
“new rules will supersede in sex offense cases the restrictive aspects of Federal Rule of
Evidence 404(b).” Id. (quoting 140 CONG. REC. H8992 (daily ed. Aug 21, 1994) (statement
of Rep. Molinari)).
In light of the highly deferential standard of review granted to trial courts in making
such discretionary decisions, these differences in the evidence regimes are startling and
widespread. See United States v. Sumner, 119 F.3d 658, 660–62 (8th Cir. 1997) (rejecting
the 404(b) argument of the district court and noting the weakness of the evidence, but
remanding for consideration under Rule 414); People v. Frazier, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 100, 108
(Ct. App. 2001) (“The charged and uncharged crimes need not be sufficiently similar that
evidence of the latter would be admissible under section 1101 [California’s equivalent to
404(b)], otherwise Evidence Code section 1108 would serve no purpose.”).
73 328 F.3d 970, 973 (8th Cir. 2003).  According to the accused, “[T]he mistrial af-
forded the government a significant advantage from which improper prosecutorial intent
should be inferred.” Id.  The court was unconvinced by the accused’s arguments, noting
that “[a]lthough the government’s case may well be strengthened by the additional Rule
413 evidence, a new trial may also expose significant weaknesses in the government’s
proof.  The district court determined that the government violated Brady by failing to dis-
close impeachment evidence relating to the credibility of a witness.” Id.
Another set of circumstances where the new rules disadvantage defendants involves
situations where the court failed to sever separate claims with potentially prejudicial over-
lap.  The courts have rejected the arguments for severance because, under the new rules,
the jury would get to hear about all related claims anyway under Rules 413 and 414. See,
e.g., United States v. Fox, No. C4-03-90, 2004 WL 115003, at *2 (D.N.D. Jan. 21, 2004)
(denying severance in a case involving three separate assaults because the prior acts would
be admissible in all three cases under Rule 413 anyway); Bear Stops v. United States, 204 F.
Supp. 2d 1209, 1213 n.1 (D.S.D. 2002) (holding trial counsel’s failure to sever harmless, in
part because Rule 414 applies on retrial so the jury would hear the prior bad acts evidence
anyway).
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Juries today often convict defendants of sexual offenses on thin
evidence, and the defendants’ prior sexual criminal behavior is the
key to these convictions.74  Although this development is not news and
is entirely in line with the dire predictions of many of the rules’ critics,
it is nevertheless of concern.
In many cases, it is hard to argue that the additional character
evidence admitted under Rules 413 and 414 changes a trial’s result—
prior victims’ testimony of the accused’s propensities are often just
icing on the cake of a conviction.75  However, even in such cases, in
which noncharacter evidence alone is enough to prove an accused’s
guilt, there is still reason to be suspicious about the breadth and con-
sequences of the new character rules.  The new rules depart from set-
tled principles of evidence, and may subtly reinforce and perpetuate
biases and stereotypes about rapists and child molesters, affecting fu-
ture cases and the quality of justice outside the courtroom.  Applying
the new rules in easy cases, in which guilt is not hard to prove, paves
the way for their application in closer cases. These factors reinforce
the importance of a judge’s performing a Rule 403 balance seriously.
If nothing else, these new rules provide an interesting opportu-
nity to observe how evidence law changes and is assimilated by the
courts.  This is especially true here, where the rules in question and
their promulgation—bypassing the normal rulemaking procedure—
represent a serious departure from tradition.
Both the substance and tone of the courts’ application of the new
rules indicate some underlying hostility, balanced by a resigned com-
74 See, e.g., United States v. Charley, 189 F.3d 1251, 1257–59 (10th Cir. 1999) (uphold-
ing conviction on six of seven counts despite accused’s presentation of credible alibi and
that
[n]one of the law enforcement officers were able to discover any direct
evidence of the reported incidents.  There were no eyewitnesses; there was
no physical evidence; and Defendant denied the accusations.  However,
from the outset of the girls’ disclosures, everyone involved, including those
providing treatment, was aware that Defendant had been convicted in 1994
for sexually abusing his five-year-old granddaughter.
); R. Wade King, Comment, Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414: By Answering the Public’s
Call for Increased Protection from Sexual Predators, Did Congress Move Too Far Toward Encouraging
Conviction Based on Character Rather than Guilt?, 33 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 1167, 1188–89 (citing
United States v. Mann, 193 F.3d 1172 (10th Cir. 1999), as a “frightening example” of the
potentially dangerous impact of the new rules).
75 See, e.g., People v. Falsetta, 986 P.2d 182, 195 (Cal. 2000) (noting that the victim
“accurately described” the accused and his car to the police and pointed out the accused in
a lineup).  In such situations, there is little incentive to pay close attention to the process or
effect of Rules 413 and 414 evidence.  The overwhelming evidence of guilt indicates that
any admission of the propensity evidence was harmless error. See, e.g., Darn v. Knowles,
No. C 02-2892 SI (PR), 2003 WL 21148412, at *10 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 2003) (noting that
compelling circumstantial evidence and the defendant’s confession that he committed
forceful rape “all persuasively established that the sex was nonconsensual.  Therefore, even
if there was an error in the admission of Darn’s prior sexual assault, the error was
harmless.”).
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mitment to congressional intent.  Evidence of judicial leeriness of the
new rules is apparent from some courts’ long and remarkably unflat-
tering presentations of Rules 413 and 414’s history, and the courts’
emphasis on the rules’ political nature.76  One court refused to apply
the rules retroactively.77  Most importantly, courts have seriously con-
sidered constitutional objections to the sexual propensity rules.78
Initially, the courts’ application of Rules 413 and 414 created con-
fusion, which is understandable, particularly given the complicated
nature of character rules and the abandonment of the traditional pro-
pensity ban.79  During this initial period, as the courts shaped the new
rules’ application while deciding real cases with real people (not just
some abstract caricature of sexual predators envisioned by legislators),
the courts revealed not only problems with the rules, but with their
own interpretive processes, biases, and allegiances.  In applying Rules
413 and 414, the courts also relinquished too much of their discre-
tionary and supervisory roles.80
Ultimately, Rules 413 and 414 entered the evidence canon not
only as statutorily mandated evidence rules, but also as products of
court interpretation.  Increasingly, the system has adapted, and fewer
76 See, e.g., United States v. Meacham, 115 F.3d 1488, 1492 (10th Cir. 1997) (“The rule
[414], however, was not developed through the usual Judicial Conference rulemaking pro-
cess, but by Congress itself.”); United States v. Wright, 53 M.J. 476, 481 (C.A.A.F. 2000)
(“The new Rules reflect a political decision that there should be a greater range of admissi-
ble evidence in criminal and civil actions involving specific sexual assault crimes.”).  For
further discussion, see United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1431–32 (10th Cir. 1998);
United States v. Sumner, 119 F.3d 658, 661–62 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Larson, 112
F.3d 600, 604 (2d  Cir. 1997).
77 The rules caused a skirmish between Congress and the courts concerning timing
and applicability.  Initially, Congress provided that Rules 413–15 would apply “to proceed-
ings commenced on or after the effective date” of the new rules.  Violent Crime Control
and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, § 320935(e), Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 2136
(1994).  The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the new rules would apply
only to trials initiated after the effective date of the rules. See United States v. Roberts, 88
F.3d 872, 878–79 (10th Cir. 1996).  In response, in September 1996, Congress amended
the rules, clarifying that the rules applied even if the case had commenced before the new
rules had become law. See Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110
Stat. 30009-25 (1996).  Because the new rules are rules of pleading and proof they can be
applied at any point in the trial before final judgment has been entered. See Enjady, 134
F.3d at 1429–30 (holding that the application of the new rules to such cases is
constitutional).
78 See, e.g., Johnson v. Elk Lake Sch. Dist., 283 F.3d 138, 155 & n.12 (3d Cir. 2002)
(taking note of the JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 15, and the possible constitu-
tional due process issue raised by the new rules); Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1430  (“We agree that
Rule 413 raises a serious constitutional due process issue.”); Wright, 53 M.J. at 481  (“The
Rule [413] would be fundamentally unfair if it undermines the presumption of innocence
and the requirement that the prosecution prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
79 See, e.g., Meacham, 115 F.3d at 1491 (noting that “there is some confusion whether
the [district] court admitted [the stepdaughters’ evidence of similar uncharged sexual mis-
conduct] under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) or 414, and, indeed, concerning which rule should
apply”).
80 See infra Part III.A.
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courts publish opinions because the initial constitutional and rule-
based questions have been resolved.  As the case law develops, a sec-
ond body of unpublished opinions has emerged, purporting not to
create any new law, but merely to apply established law.81  These opin-
ions tend to be shorter and less policy-based, reciting precedent with-
out offering extensive reasoning.  In their own way, however, these
unpublished opinions paint a revealing picture of how courts apply
Rules 413 and 414 and how defendants are faring under these rules.
In analyzing the jurisprudence, I focus on two crucial and related
issues: (1) whether Rule 403 applies to Rules 413 and 414, and (2)
whether Rules 413 and 414 violate due process.
A. Does Rule 403 Apply?
A recurrent and vehement criticism of the sexual propensity rules
focuses on the poor draftsmanship of the rules’ language.  Most im-
portantly, scholars and judges have decried the ambiguity of the new
rules in relation to Rule 403.  Specifically, critics were concerned with
whether Rule 403 modifies the new rules or whether the new rules
override Rule 403.82  While some commentators predicted that Rule
403 did not apply at all,83 others raised the question seriously but did
not opine one way or the other.84
In considering the facial challenges to the sexual propensity rules
and finding the new rules constitutional, appellate courts, including
military courts, have uniformly held that Rule 403 does indeed ap-
ply.85  As will be seen below, the existence and application of Rule 403
81 See generally Lauren Robel, The Practice of Precedent: Anastasoff, Noncitation Rules, and
the Meaning of Precedent in an Interpretive Community, 35 IND. L. REV. 399 (2002) (discussing
the precedential value of unpublished opinions).
82 See, e.g., United States v. Guardia, 955 F. Supp. 115, 117–18 (D.N.M. 1997) (discuss-
ing the scholarly debate about the new rules and their interaction with Rule 403).
83 See, e.g., Natali & Stigall, supra note 56, at 2 (“The rules are mandatory in that they
state without qualification that propensity evidence is admissible.  Thus, the rules require
admission of propensity evidence without regard to other rules of evidence, particularly
the prejudice/probativeness balancing test set forth in Rule 403.” (emphasis added)).
84 See, e.g., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 15 (noting that advisory commit-
tee believed the above position—that propensity evidence must be admitted—to be “argu-
able”); David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, “Other Crimes” Evidence in Sex Offense Cases, 78
Minn. L. Rev. 529, 566 (1994) (“Whether exclusion under Rule 403 would still be available
to an accused seeking to challenge the admissibility of this evidence is unclear.” (footnote
omitted)); Tedeschi, supra note 36, at 122 (explaining that the new rules do not indicate
whether their broad language trumps the judge’s Rule 403 discretion to exclude evidence
that is substantially more prejudicial than probative).
85 See, e.g., United States v.  Fool Bull, 32 Fed. Appx. 778, 779 (8th Cir. 2002) (“Rule
413 reflects Congress’s decision to relax the standard of admissibility for propensity evi-
dence in sex offense cases, but the evidence remains subject to the requirements of Rule
403.” (citing United States v. Mound, 149 F.3d 799, 802 (8th Cir. 1998))); United States v.
Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1431 (10th Cir. 1998) (“Even without reference to the legislative
history, we agree . . . that adoption of this rule without any exclusion of or amendment to
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(which measures probative value against unfair prejudice, confusion,
distraction, and waste of time) is crucial in assuring fundamental fair-
ness, thereby allowing the new rules to pass constitutional muster.  In
fact, one district court opinion, later reversed on appeal, actually held
Rule 414 unconstitutional because the court believed that Rule 403
did not apply.86
Technically, there is a nonfrivolous textual interpretation of
Rules 413 and 414 that the trial judge lacks discretion to use Rule 403
to exclude evidence under the new rules.  Arguably, the language, “is
admissible,” referring to evidence of prior offenses, represents an un-
modified command to admit the evidence, thereby prohibiting judges
from exercising their discretion to balance between probative value
and unfair prejudice.87  One strong argument for the notion that Rule
403 does not apply to the sexual propensity rules stems from Rule
609(a)(2), which contains a similar (though not identical) command.
Rule 609(a)(2) provides that impeachment evidence regarding con-
victions for crimes of dishonesty shall be admitted.88  Most courts and
commentators have said that the absolutist language of Rule
609(a)(2) deprives the trial judge of the discretion to conduct a Rule
403 balance.89  However, the argument in the context of Rule
609(a)(2) is strengthened by the fact that Rule 609(a)(1) refers to
Rule 403 makes Rule 403 applicable, as it is to others of the rules of evidence.”); United
States v. LeCompte, 131 F.3d 767, 769 (8th Cir. 1997) (“Evidence offered under Rule 414 is
still subject to the requirements of Rule 403.  This Court has recognized that evidence
otherwise admissible under Rule 414 may be excluded under Rule 403’s balancing test.
However, Rule 403 must be applied to allow Rule 414 its intended effect.” (citation omit-
ted)); United States v. Sumner, 119 F.3d 658, 661–62 (8th Cir. 1997) (concluding that
Rule 403 applies to Rule 414); United States v. Larson, 112 F.3d 600, 604–05 (2d Cir. 1997)
(same); United States v. Wright, 53 M.J. 476, 482 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (same); Johnson v. State,
No. A-7867, 2003 WL 1070324, at *4  (Alaska Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2003) (noting Rule 403
applies to Alaska Evidence Rule 404(b)(2)—Alaska’s prior sexual misconduct evidence
rule); Feld v. Gerst, 66 P.3d 1268, 1272 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (subsequently withdrawn and
depublished) (“[C]ase law made it clear that even after the State had established the pro-
bative value of propensity evidence, the trial judge still had to balance its probative value
against the danger of unfair prejudice before admitting it.”).
86 See Sumner, 119 F.3d at 661 (discussing and reversing the district court’s opinion
that Rule 414 is unconstitutional because it “allows ‘any kind of evidence to show propen-
sity’ without allowing for the application of the Rule 403 balancing test”).
87 In fact, the state of Louisiana adopted a version of Rules 413 and 414 with the
deliberate modification of the “is admissible” language.  As the Louisiana Supreme Court
explained, “Federal Rule of Evidence 413 provides that the ‘defendant’s commission of
another offense or offenses of sexual assault is admissible, and may be considered for its
bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.’  Conversely, Louisiana’s counterpart, Article
412.2 provides that the evidence ‘may be admissible . . . subject to the balancing test provided
in Article 403.’”  State v. Williams, 02-1030 (La. 10/15/02), 830 So.2d 984, 986–87.
88 FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2) (“For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
. . . evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted it if involved
dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.”).
89 See, e.g., United States v. Guardia, 135 F.3d 1326, 1329 (10th Cir. 1998) (arguing
that “Rule 403 applies to all evidence admitted in federal court, except in those rare in-
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Rule 403 and includes a variation on the Rule 403 balancing test.90
The absence of reference to any type of Rule 403 balancing is there-
fore conspicuous in Rule 609(a)(2), especially after its amendment in
1990.91  However, there is no analogous context for such a reading of
Rules 413 and 414, both of which fail to mention Rule 403.
A comparison of the new rules with Rule 412, the rape shield
rule, provides another argument that Rule 403 does not apply to
Rules 413 and 414.  In some very limited circumstances, Rule 412 al-
lows evidence of prior sexual behavior and states that such evidence
“is admissible, if otherwise admissible under these rules.”92  One can
argue that because Rules 413 and 414 do not include the “if otherwise
admissible” clause, the rules are mandatory and are not subject to any
Rule 403 balancing.93
However, both tradition and legislative history support the notion
that Rule 403 applies to Rules 413 and 414.  Rule 403 represents a key
organizing principle for understanding the practical application and
ethos of the Federal Rules of Evidence.94  Rule 403’s centrality to evi-
dence law derives from the fact that it modifies almost every rule, with
stances when other rules make an exception to it,” and citing Rule 609(a)(2) as an
example).
90 FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1) provides:
(a) General rule.  For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
(1) evidence that a witness other than the accused has been convicted of a
crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403 . . . [and] if the court deter-
mines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prej-
udicial effect to the accused. . . .
91 See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 525–26 (1989) (interpreting
prior version of Rule 609, and explaining that “Rule 609(a) states that impeaching convic-
tions evidence ‘shall be admitted.’  With regard to subpart (2), which governs impeach-
ment by crimen falsi convictions, it is widely agreed that this imperative, coupled with the
absence of any balancing language, bars exercise of judicial discretion pursuant to Rule
403.” (footnote omitted)).
92 FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1).
93 This argument is presented in Guardia, 135 F.3d at 1329.  In Guardia, the court
made an additional flawed argument, stating that “[m]ost importantly, Rule 402, the rule
allowing admission of all relevant evidence and a rule to which the 403 balancing test
undoubtedly applies, contains language no more explicit than that in Rule 413.  The rule
states simply that ‘[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible.’  Fed.R.Evid. 402 (emphasis added).”
Id.  However, because Rule 402 is modified by the phrase “except as otherwise provided by
. . . these rules,” the court’s analogy is inapposite.  Fed. R. Evid. 402.
The court in United States v. Sumner made a similarly unpersuasive argument that Rule
403 does apply to Rules 413 and 414. See 119 F.3d 658, 661–62 (8th Cir. 1997).  In Sumner,
the court argued that the phrase “is admissible,” found in Rules 413 and 414, is the “same
language used in Federal Rule of Evidence 402, (‘[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible’)
and is similar to the language used in Rule 404(b) (‘may . . . be admissible’).  [Therefore,
e]vidence admitted under both of these rules is subject to Rule 403.” Id. (first alteration in
original).  There are serious problems with each of the court’s analogies.  As for Rule 402,
and as noted above, it specifically incorporates Rule 403.  As to Rule 404(b), its language,
“may be admissible,” is distinct from “is admissible,” and hence the analogy fails.
94 See Richard A. Posner, Clinical and Theoretical Approaches to the Teaching of Evidence
and Trial Advocacy, 21 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 731, 736 (2003).
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the exception of Rule 609(a)(2), and it epitomizes the trial judge’s
vast discretion in admitting or excluding evidence, a hallmark of our
judicial system.
As to legislative history, comments from the new rules’ sponsors,
Representatives Susan Molinari and Jon Kyl and Senator Robert Dole,
specifically recognize the applicability of Rule 403 to Rules 413 and
414.  Rep. Kyl explicitly noted “that the trial court retains the total
discretion to include or exclude this type of evidence.”95  Further-
more, Rep. Molinari explained: “In other respects, the general stan-
dards of the rules of evidence will continue to apply, including . . . the
court’s authority under evidence rule 403 to exclude evidence whose
probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.”96
In addition to the structure of the rules and the legislative history,
perhaps the most compelling argument that Rule 403 balancing ap-
plies to Rules 413 and 414, as noted above, is that the constitutionality
of the new rules seems to depend on it.97  One important theory of
statutory interpretation commands that when one interpretation of a
statute would vouchsafe it as constitutional, but another would render
If it is true that the law of evidence is, and rightly so, increasingly focused
on the issues of probative value and cost flagged by Rule 403, which are
issues of fact on which the theoretical literature bears centrally, that litera-
ture deserves a central place in a course on evidence.
Id.; see also 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 1, §§ 5417–5417A  (suggesting that Rule 413
does not alter the power of courts to exclude evidence when on the facts of the case such
exclusion is justifiable under Rule 403); cf. Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S.
579, 595 (1993) (explaining the crucial role of Rule 403 in decisions on admissibility).
95 United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1431 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting 140 CONG.
REC. H5437-03, H5438 (daily ed. June 29, 1994) (statement of Rep. Kyl)); see also United
States v. Larson, 112 F.3d 600, 604 (2d Cir. 1997) (discussing congressional intent to apply
Rule 403); Sumner, 119 F.3d at 662 (“The sponsors’ statements about the congressional
presumption favoring admissibility is further evidence that the applicability of the Rule 403
balancing test was intended . . . .”).
There is a huge debate in evidence scholarship and among the Supreme Court Jus-
tices about the extent to which advisory committee notes and legislative history should
influence interpretation of the plain meaning of evidence rules. See, e.g., Tome v. United
States, 513 U.S. 150, 168 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment) (arguing that “[l]ike a judicial opinion and like a statute, the promulgated Rule says
what it says, regardless of the intent of its drafters”); Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein,
The Federal Rules of Evidence After Sixteen Years—The Effect of “Plain Meaning” Jurisprudence, the
Need for an Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for Selective Revisions of
the Rules, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 857, 866–67 (1992) (discussing the Court’s failure to
“adopt[ ] a monolithic approach” to plain meaning interpretation); Edward J. Im-
winkelried,  Using the Evidence Course as a Vehicle for Teaching Legisprudential Skills, 21 QUIN-
NIPIAC L. REV. 907, 908 (2003) (discussing the “ongoing, sharp controversy over the proper
approach to statutory interpretation” in the context of evidence rules); Eileen A. Scallen,
Interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence: The Use and Abuse of the Advisory Committee Notes, 28
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1283, 1284–87 (1995) (examining Justice Scalia’s opposition to legislative
history).
96 103 CONG. REC. H8991 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari).
97 See infra Part II.C.
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it unconstitutional, the interpretation that preserves the statute’s con-
stitutionality must prevail.98
B. Due Process Challenges
Defendants who challenged the new rules raised due process ar-
guments, claiming that reliance on prior acts to prove propensity is so
out of step with evidence norms that by doing so, the new rules violate
principles of fundamental fairness.99  In United States v. Enjady, the de-
fendant argued that “the Due Process Clause safeguards the ‘right to a
fair trial in a fair tribunal,’”100 that fundamental fairness is measured
by “‘[h]istory and widely shared practice,’”101 and that Rules 413 and
414 undermine courts’ historical aversion to propensity evidence.102
Quoting the Supreme Court’s famous language in Michelson v. United
States, the accused argued that propensity evidence has historically
been rejected despite its relevance because “it is said to weigh too
much with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudice one
with a bad general record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend
against a particular charge.”103  According to defendants assailing the
98 See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 524 (1989).
99 Courts have uniformly dismissed the argument that the new rules violate principles
of equal protection because they provide different treatment to people accused of sexual
crimes. See, e.g., United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1030–31 (9th Cir. 2001) (explain-
ing that because “[s]ex offenders are not a suspect class” and the introduction of prior bad
sex acts does not burden a fundamental right, a rational basis for treating evidence of such
crimes differently exists, and therefore Rule 414 does not violate equal protection); United
States v. Mound, 149 F.3d 799, 801 (8th Cir. 1998) (“Because Rule 413 does not ‘burden[ ]
a fundamental right,’ and because sex-offense defendants are not a ‘suspect class,’ we must
‘uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears a rational relation to some legiti-
mate end.’” (alteration in original)); United States v. Wright, 48 M.J. 896, 901 (A.F. Ct.
Crim. App. 1998) (“The appellant has not identified, nor are we aware of any holding by
the Supreme Court, or any other court for that matter, which identifies sex offenders as a
‘suspect class.’”); cf. Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1433–34 (applying a rational basis standard for
upholding the constitutionality of Rule 413).
100 Brief for Appellant at 27, Enjady (No. 96-2285) (on file with author) (citations
omitted).
101 Id.
102 The ban on propensity evidence can be traced back to the seventeenth century.  See
Landrum, supra note 14, at 274 (tracing the principle of no prior act evidence back to
Charles I era reforms limiting the prosecution to crimes charged and not other acts).  In
the United States, the principle has been traced back to an 1810 case, Rex v. Cole, which
held that “in a prosecution for an infamous crime, an admission by the prisoner that he
had committed such an offence at another time and with another person, and that he had
a tendency to such practices, ought not to be admitted.” Id.  at 276 (citing Julius Stone,
The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: England, 46 HARV. L. REV. 954, 959 (1933)); see
also People v. Falsetta, 986 P.2d 182, 187 (Cal. 1999) (“From the standpoint of historical
practice, unquestionably the general rule against admitting such evidence is one of long-
standing application. . . . ‘The rule excluding evidence of criminal propensity is nearly
three centuries old in the common law.’” (quoting People v. Alcala, 36 Cal. 3d 604, 630–31
(1984))).
103 Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1430 (quoting Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475–76
(1948)).
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new rules, this traditional ban on propensity, grounded in protection
of the accused, rises to constitutional magnitude.  Quoting Dowling v.
United States, the accused in Enjady alleged that the new rules deprive
the trial of fundamental fairness by violating those “‘fundamental con-
ceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political
institutions.’”104
Although entertaining the argument, courts have uniformly re-
jected such due process challenges to Rules 413 and 414.105  In Enjady,
the Tenth Circuit responded to the historical argument opposing the
new rules by countering that just because “the practice is ancient does
not mean it is embodied in the Constitution.”106  The Eighth Circuit
in United States v. Mound quoted Enjady extensively and held: “We too
believe that it was within Congress’s power to create exceptions to the
longstanding practice of excluding prior-bad-acts evidence.”107
One indication of the closeness of the due process fairness ques-
tion regarding the propensity rules is Judge Morris Arnold’s dissent—
joined by three other judges on the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit—to the denial of rehearing en banc in Mound.108 Judge Morris
104 See id. (quoting 493 U.S. 342, 352–53 (1990), and summarizing the accused’s argu-
ment); see also LeMay, 260 F.3d at 1024–25 (discussing fundamental fairness and citing
Dowling).
105 See, e.g., United States v. Mound, 149 F.3d 799, 801 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v.
Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 881–83 (10th Cir. 1998); Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1430–31; Falsetta,  986
P.2d at 187–88; Darn v. Knowles, No. C 02-2892 SI (PR), 2003 WL 21148412, at *8  (N.D.
Cal. May 14, 2003).
106 Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1432.  One may trace the hostility to propensity evidence much
further.  The inspiration for the title of an article opposing the sexual propensity rules,
“Are You Going to Arraign His Whole Life?”: How Sexual Propensity Evidence Violates the Due
Process Clause, comes from a statement made in Harrison’s Trial, 12 HOW. ST. TR. 834, 864
(Old Bailey 1692), presumably challenging an attempt to use propensity-based evidence.
See Natali & Stigall, supra note 56, at 14–15.
107 See Mound, 149 F.3d at 801.  The Ninth Circuit in LeMay observed that evidence of
the historical practice of admitting propensity evidence was decidedly mixed. See 260 F.3d
at 1025.  While acknowledging that “the general ban on propensity evidence has the requi-
site historical pedigree to qualify for constitutional status,” the court noted the historical
countertrend of allowing propensity evidence in sex offense cases under the common-law
doctrine of “lustful disposition.” See id. at 1025–26.
The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces similarly rejected the due process argu-
ment, noting that there is a strong presumption against the unconstitutionality of the evi-
dence rules, and that fundamental fairness, outside of those rights specifically
incorporated, should be read to include a very narrow group of rights. See United States v.
Wright, 53 M.J. 476, 481 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (“The presumption is that a rule of evidence is
constitutional unless lack of constitutionality is clearly and unmistakably shown.”).  The
Wright court further explained that admission of the evidence would only violate funda-
mental fairness “if it undermines the presumption of innocence and the requirement that
the prosecution prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.
108 157 F.3d 1153, 1153 (8th Cir. 1998) (Arnold, Morris, J., dissenting, joined by
Judges McMillian, Wollman, and Beam).  I use Judge Arnold’s full name to distinguish him
from his brother on the bench (literally and figuratively), Richard Arnold, who wrote the
majority opinion in Mound.
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Arnold argued that the full court needed to look carefully at the con-
stitutionality of the new rules.109  He observed:
Fed R. Evid. 413 runs counter to a centuries-old legal tradition that
views propensity evidence with a particularly skeptical eye.  The
common law, of course, is not embodied in the Constitution, but
the fact that a rule has recommended itself to generations of lawyers
and judges is at least some indication that it embodies “‘fundamen-
tal conceptions of justice.’”110
Furthermore, Judge Morris Arnold believed that the full court should
hear the case because the Eighth Circuit “might well conclude that
the common-law rule against propensity evidence has as distinguished
a legal pedigree as, say, the rule that guilt must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.”111
Plenty of dicta discusses the dangers of propensity evidence.112
The Supreme Court, however, has never squarely addressed this is-
sue.113  Nevertheless, the Court has cautioned that it is rare that un-
fairness rises to the level of a due process violation.114
109 See id. at 1153–54.
110 Id. at 1153 (quoting Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342 (1990) (quoting
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935))).  Judge Morris Arnold’s disenchantment
with the new rules could not be clearer.  He wrote:
It also cannot be irrelevant that the members of two committees, consisting
of 40 persons in all, and appointed by the Judicial Conference of the
United States to examine Fed. R. Evid. 413 before its passage, all but unani-
mously urged that Congress not adopt the rule because of deep concerns
about its fundamental fairness.
Id.
111 See id. at 1153–54; see also Charles William Hendricks, Note, 100 Years of Double Jeop-
ardy Erosion: Criminal Collateral Estoppel Made Extinct, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 379, 396–97 (2000)
(discussing Dowling and the court’s reluctance to find a violation of fundamental fairness).
112 See, e.g., Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 181–82 (1997).  The Ninth Cir-
cuit has found that propensity evidence violates fundamental fairness when it comes under
the guise of “other purposes” in Rule 404(b). See McKinney v. Rees, 993 F.2d 1378, 1380
(9th Cir. 1993) (“The use of ‘other acts’ evidence as character evidence is not only imper-
missible under the theory of evidence codified in . . . the Federal Rules of Evidence
(Fed.R.Evid. 404(b)), but is contrary to firmly established principles of Anglo-American
jurisprudence.”).
113 In Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 75 (1991), the Court found that a California
instruction did not violate due process because it was similar to Rule 404(b).  But, in a
footnote, the Court left the propensity question open: “Because we need not reach the
issue, we express no opinion on whether a state law would violate the Due Process Clause if
it permitted the use of ‘prior crimes’ evidence to show propensity to commit a charged
crime.” Id. at 75 n.5.  In Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 564 (1967), one reason the majority
upheld the validity of Texas statutes admitting prior offenses was that “it has never been
thought that [the Court’s Due Process Clause fundamental fairness] cases establish this
Court as a rule-making organ for the promulgation of state rules of criminal procedure.”
Obviously, Rules 413 and 414 do not raise the federalism concerns of Spencer, in that the
Court would not be called upon to overrule state procedure.
114 See Dowling, 493 U.S. at 352 (“Beyond the specific guarantees enumerated in the
Bill of Rights, the Due Process Clause has limited operation.  We, therefore, have defined
the category of infractions that violate ‘fundamental fairness’ very narrowly.”).
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I am in great sympathy with the due process arguments raised in
opposition to Rules 413 and 414.  I believe that it is beyond the capac-
ity of even the most open-minded juror to hear propensity evidence
without being overly influenced by it.  As Justice Cardozo wrote more
than seventy years ago, “It is for ordinary minds, and not for psychoan-
alysts, that our rules of evidence are framed.”115  This observation is
particularly true when the prior conduct involves a sexual attack that
will offend and disturb the jury.  Yet Congress swept aside these con-
cerns in its anticrime agenda.  Courts, though perhaps less cavalierly,
have also rejected these arguments.  However, it is still possible that
some brave judges, such as Judge Morris Arnold in his dissent in
Mound, may raise the constitutional fairness issue.  But it would be
foolish for those who are concerned about the reach of these rules,
and the copycat state rules they have inspired, to count on a successful
due process challenge.116
Rather than expect to successfully challenge propensity evidence
as constitutionally suspect, those concerned about the reach of these
new rules must address the rules’ application.  Having lost the major
point of constitutionality, civil libertarians and scholars concerned
about the new rules must attack them as applied, creating a legal cul-
ture of skepticism with regard to the fairness and utility of propensity
evidence.  The only possible vehicle for accomplishing this goal is
Rule 403.
C. Rule 403 as Due Process Guarantor
In considering the due process challenges, all courts have recog-
nized the potential unfairness of propensity evidence, but they have
concluded that such potential does not rise to the level of fundamen-
tal unfairness.117  Rule 403, which courts cite as a means of assuring
due process, has significantly eased the courts’ struggle with the new
rules’ constitutionality.  Without exception, courts assert that Rule 403
will preclude the admittance of fundamentally unfair evidence.118  Ac-
115 Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 104 (1933).
116 There is some evidence that certain members of the Supreme Court are hostile to
the special constitutional compromises that seem to be made in order to convict child
molesters.  For instance, in Maryland v. Craig, Justice Scalia, in a blistering dissent, chided
the Court for limiting the Sixth Amendment confrontation right when children are the
victims.  497 U.S. 836, 860 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  He decried the subordination of
explicit constitutional text to currently favored public policy. Id. Although it is probable
that Justice Scalia would not perceive due process rights to be as clear as the confrontation
right was in Craig, such open scorn for bending constitutional rules because of the “hyste-
ria” over child abuse or the status of children as victims de jour might conceivably tempt
Court members to take the due process challenges to Rules 413–15 more seriously.
117 See, e.g., United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1432 (10th Cir. 1998).
118 See, e.g., id. at 1434; accord United States v. Mound, 149 F.3d 799, 800–02 (8th Cir.
1998) (holding that Rule 413 does not violate fundamental fairness so long as it is modi-
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cording to every federal appellate court that has considered the issue,
and all the state courts applying analogous state evidence legislation,
Rule 403 (or its state equivalent) provides the mechanism for han-
dling due process concerns.  As long as that mechanism remains in
place, the argument goes, on a case-by-case basis judges can eliminate
any unfairness introduced by Rules 413 and 414.119  As the Tenth Cir-
cuit explained: “Rule 414 is not unconstitutional on its face, ‘because
Rule 403 applies to Rule 414 evidence,’ and ‘[a]pplication of Rule 403
. . . should always result in the exclusion of evidence that’ is so prejudi-
cial that it violates a defendant’s due process right to a fair trial.”120
Courts have anointed Rule 403 as a guardian of fairness, a defender
against prejudice, and the obvious retort to any due process objection.
III
CONDUCTING THE 403 BALANCE IN THE CONTEXT OF
RULES 413 AND 414
Rule 403 thus emerges as a crucial factor in the new rules’ appli-
cation—a guarantor of their constitutionality.  Yet, because of the rad-
ical departure presented by the new rules, it is reasonable to question
whether Rule 403, even while technically still in force, has the power
to exclude unfair Rule 413 and 414 propensity evidence and to pro-
tect the rights of the accused.
Before the advent of these new rules, the bold and unapologetic
use of the accused’s former similar offenses for propensity would have
constituted unfair prejudice.  Use of evidence solely for propensity
simply violated the rules, and even nonpropensity use of prior bad
acts was prohibited if the unfair prejudice of the propensity evidence
substantially outweighed the probative value of the nonpropensity
fied by 403); United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 883 (10th Cir. 1998) (“[A]pplication of
Rule 403 to Rule 414 evidence eliminates the due process concerns posed by Rule 414.”);
United States v. Wright, 53 M.J. 476, 482 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (“The Federal courts examining
the new rules have uniformly upheld the rules while emphasizing the importance of a Rule
403 balancing test.”).
119 Cf., e.g., People v. Falsetta, 986 P.2d 182, 189–90 (Cal. 1999).  The Falsetta court
stated, “[W]e think the trial court’s discretion to exclude propensity evidence under sec-
tion 352 [California Rule 403 analog] saves section 1108 [California Rule 413 analog] from
defendant’s due process challenge.” Id. at 190.  The court “believe[d] section 352  pro-
vides a safeguard that strongly supports the constitutionality of section 1108.  By reason of
section 1108, trial courts may no longer deem ‘propensity’ evidence unduly prejudicial per
se, but must engage in a careful weighing process under section 352.” Id. at 189.
120 United States v. Charley, 189 F.3d 1251, 1259 (10th Cir. 1999) (alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting Castillo, 140 F.3d at 883–84); see also United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018,
1026 (9th Cir. 2001) (“We conclude that there is nothing fundamentally unfair about the
allowance of propensity evidence under Rule 414.  As long as the protections of Rule 403
remain in place[,] . . . the right to a fair trial remains adequately safeguarded.”).
\\server05\productn\C\CRN\90-6\CRN603.txt unknown Seq: 33 13-SEP-05 12:03
2005] FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 403 1519
use.121  By passing Rules 413 and 414, Congress announced that
henceforth, in rape and child molestation cases, propensity thinking
would be encouraged as a form of circumstantial reasoning.  Propen-
sity shifted from being the quintessential example of unfair prejudice
to being a permissible—and indeed officially endorsed—method of
proving guilt.  Consequently, it became unclear what exactly was left
of Rule 403 and what exactly trial judges were expected to do with
regard to unfair prejudice.
A. The Advent of “403-lite”
Under the new regime, Rule 403 is applied in odd and troubling
ways to Rules 413 and 414.122  In the face of the “sea change in the
federal rules’ approach to character evidence,” the Tenth Circuit in
United States v. Guardia aptly described the interpretive dilemma it
faced in attempting to avoid what it rightly perceived to be two poten-
tial misapplications of the Rule 403 balancing test.123  On the one
hand, the Guardia court tried to avoid the temptation of “exclud[ing]
the Rule 413 evidence simply because character evidence traditionally
has been considered too prejudicial for admission.”124  On the other
hand, it strove to resist performing “a restrained 403 analysis because
of the belief that Rule 413 embodies a legislative judgment that pro-
121 Propensity evidence has traditionally been considered to possess only slight proba-
tive value.  Past specific instances do not shed much light on what the accused did on the
occasion in question.  Whatever probative value was attributed to propensity evidence,
courts traditionally saw it as substantially outweighed by the intolerable level of unfair
prejudice caused by that evidence.  The Court in Old Chief summarized the impropriety of
propensity evidence under Rule 404(b) by explaining the danger of the jury’s
generalizing a defendant’s earlier bad act into bad character and taking
that as raising the odds that he did the later bad act now charged (or,
worse, as calling for preventative conviction even if he should happen to be
innocent momentarily).  As then-Judge Breyer put it, “Although . . . ‘pro-
pensity evidence’ is relevant, the risk that a jury will convict for crimes other
than those charged—or that, uncertain of guilt, it will convict anyway be-
cause a bad person deserves punishment—creates a prejudicial effect that
outweighs ordinary evidence.
Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180–81 (1997) (alteration in original) (quoting
United States v. Moccia, 681 F.2d 61, 63 (1st Cir. 1982)).
122 In discussing the unfair prejudice of allowing a jury to hear about an accused’s
prior convictions and rebutting the argument that the prosecutor should be allowed to
prove a predicate felony even when the accused has agreed to stipulate felon status, the
Court observed: “This would be a strange rule.  It would be very odd for the law of evidence
to recognize the danger of unfair prejudice only to confer such a degree of autonomy on
the party subject to temptation, and the Rules of Evidence are not so odd.” Id. at 183–84.
Old Chief  concerned 404(b) evidence and its potential propensity use, but did not involve
sexual crimes.  The case is interesting on many levels, not the least of which is its outspo-
ken concern about the dangers of propensity evidence.  The use of “odd,” however, stands
on its own as a reminder that rules of evidence must make not only internal sense, but
must comport with real-world wisdom and experience.
123 See 135 F.3d 1326, 1330–31.
124 Id. at 1330.
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pensity evidence regarding sexual assaults is never too prejudicial or
confusing and generally should be admitted.”125
In practice, despite their dicta to the contrary, the courts have
weakened Rule 403 by tending to admit evidence of prior sexual of-
fenses automatically under a pro forma approach to Rule 403.  Thus,
the courts discuss Rule 403, but in the same breath undermine its
applicability.
The early cases set the trend.  The most extreme examples
emerge from the Eighth Circuit.  In United States v. LeCompte, the court
held that Rule 403 must be read “to give effect to the decision of Con-
gress, expressed in recently enacted Rule 414, to loosen to a substan-
tial degree the restrictions of prior law on the admissibility of such
evidence.”126  The Eighth Circuit conceded that Rule 403 applied, but
instructed that “Rule 403 must be applied to allow Rule 414 its in-
tended effect.”127  Ultimately, Le Compte reversed the district court’s
exclusion of the accused’s prior sexual offenses, explaining that “[i]n
light of the strong legislative judgment that evidence of prior sexual
offenses should ordinarily be admissible, we think the District Court
erred in its [Rule 403] assessment that the probative value of [other
sexual offense] testimony was substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice.”128
125 Id.
126 131 F.3d 767, 768 (8th Cir. 1997); see United States v. Meacham, 115 F.3d 1488,
1492 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that “clearly under Rule 414 the courts are to “liberally”
admit evidence of prior uncharged sex offenses”); see also United States v. Koruh, No. 99-
2138, 2000 WL 342252, at *4 (10th Cir. Apr. 3, 2000) (unpublished opinion) (quoting
Meacham).
127 See LeCompte, 131 F.3d at 769. This language has been very influential and has been
quoted often. See, e.g., United States v. Tyndall, 263 F.3d 848, 850 (8th Cir. 2001) (“‘In
considering evidence offered under Rule[ ] 413 . . . , a trial court must still apply Rule 403,
though in such a way as “to allow [Rule 413 its] intended effect.”’” (quoting United States
v. Mound, 149 F.3d 799, 800 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting LeCompte))); United States v.
Withorn, 204 F.3d 790, 794 (8th Cir. 2000) (“[C]ourts must balance probative value against
potential for unfair prejudice ‘in such a way as to allow the new rules their intended ef-
fect.’” (quoting Mound, 149 F.3d at 800)).
128 131 F.3d at 769 (citations omitted).  This language is frequently cited. See, e.g.,
United States v. Tyndall, 263 F.3d 848, 850  (8th Cir. 2001) (“There is in this kind of case a
‘strong legislative judgment’ that evidence of prior sexual crimes ‘should ordinarily be
admissible,’ and we see no reason to hold that such evidence was not admissible here.”
(citation omitted) (quoting LeCompte)); United States v. Gabe, 237 F.3d 954, 959 (8th Cir.
2001) (“A court considering the admissibility of Rule 414 evidence must first determine
whether the evidence has probative value, recognizing the ‘strong legislative judgment that
evidence of prior sexual offenses should ordinarily be admissible.’” (quoting LeCompte));
United States v. Withorn, 204 F.3d 790, 794 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that the district court
was obligated to take into account Congress’s “ ‘strong legislative judgment that evidence
of prior sexual offenses should ordinarily be admissible’” (quoting LeCompte)); United
States v. Walker, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1157 (D.N.D. 2003) (“A court considering the
admissibility of Rule 414 evidence must first determine whether the evidence has probative
value, recognizing ‘the strong legislative judgment that evidence of prior sexual offenses
should ordinarily be admissible.’” (quoting LeCompte)).
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In United States v. Sumner, the Eighth Circuit explained that “[t]he
presumption is in favor of admission.  The underlying legislative judg-
ment is that the evidence admissible pursuant to the proposed rules is
typically relevant and probative, and that its probative value is nor-
mally not outweighed by any risk of prejudice or other adverse ef-
fects.”129  The Eighth Circuit has also provided that prior sexual
offense evidence is admissible under Rules 413 and 414 so long as the
evidence does not present “‘any danger of unfair prejudice beyond
that which all propensity evidence in such trials presents.’”130
Similarly, in United States v. Meacham, the Tenth Circuit explained
that “the courts are to ‘liberally’ admit evidence of prior uncharged
sex offenses” under Rule 414.131  In Enjady, another Tenth Circuit
case, the court cautioned that “the exclusion of relevant evidence
under Rule 403 should be used infrequently, reflecting Congress’ leg-
islative judgment that the evidence ‘normally’ should be admitted.”132
The court further remarked that although courts must engage in Rule
403 balancing, “the district court must recognize the congressional
judgment that Rule 413 evidence is ‘normally’ to be admitted.”133
Only in United States v. Guardia,134 the same court that identified
the interpretive dilemma,135 did the Tenth Circuit resist applying a
weakened Rule 403 balancing and specifically eschewed special pre-
sumptions of admissibility.  The Tenth Circuit panel in Guardia held
129 119 F.3d 658, 662 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting 140 CONG. REC. H8992 (daily ed. Aug.
21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari)); see also 140 CONG. REC. S12990 (daily ed. Sept. 20,
1994) (statement of Sen. Dole) (“The presumption is that the evidence admissible pursu-
ant to these rules is typically relevant and probative, and that its probative value is not
outweighed by any risk of prejudice.”).
130 See Withorn, 204 F.3d at 794–95 (8th Cir. 2000) (quoting Mound, 149 F.3d at 802).
131 115 F.3d 1488, 1492 (10th Cir. 1997).  Courts in the Tenth Circuit have followed
this doctrine of “liberal admission.” See, e.g., United States v. Mann, 193 F.3d 1172, 1173
(10th Cir. 1999) (“‘[C]ourts are to “liberally” admit evidence of prior uncharged sex of-
fenses,’ but cannot ignore the balancing requirement of Rule 403.” (alteration in original)
(quoting Meacham)); United States v. McHorse, 179 F.3d 889, 898 (10th Cir. 1999) (quot-
ing Meacham); United States v. Peters,  No. 96-2286, 1998 WL 17750, at *2 (10th Cir. Jan.
20, 1998) (“We review decisions to admit evidence of prior acts for abuse of discretion,
mindful that Rule 413 evidence should be liberally admitted.” (citation omitted) (citing
Meacham)); see also King, supra note 74, at 1191–92 (arguing that “courts’ almost complete
deference to legislative intent” resulted in “[e]ffectively [r]emov[ing] Rule 403’s
[a]pplication”).
132 134 F.3d 1427, 1433 (10th Cir. 1998).
133 Id. at 1434. The military courts, after some uncertainty, have applied a Rule 403
balancing test similar to the Tenth Circuit’s approach.  See United States v. Wright, 53 M.J.
476, 482–83 (C.A.A.F. 2000).  The military courts have explained that in “reviewing a deci-
sion to admit evidence under [Rule] 413, ‘the [Rule] 403 balancing test is to be applied in
a broad manner which favors admission.’”  United States v. Valentin-Nieves, 57 M.J. 691,
694 (N.M. Ct. Crim. App. 2002) (quoting United States v. Dewrell, 52 M.J. 601, 609 (A.F.
Ct. Crim. App. 1999)).
134 135 F.3d 1326 (10th Cir. 1998).
135 See supra notes 123–25 and accompanying text.
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that “a court must perform the same Rule 403 analysis that it does in
any other context,” albeit “with careful attention to both the signifi-
cant probative value and the strong prejudicial qualities inherent in
all evidence submitted under 413.”136  The Guardia court noted that
Rule 413 “contains no language that supports an especially lenient
application of Rule 403,” and instructed that “[w]hen balancing Rule
413 evidence under 403, then, the district court should not alter its
normal process of weighing the probative value of the evidence
against the danger of unfair prejudice.”137 Guardia rejected “a lenient
403 balancing test,” noting that “courts apply Rule 403 in undiluted
form to Rules 404(a)(1)-(3), the other exceptions to the ban on pro-
pensity evidence,” so there is no reason to do otherwise for Rules 413
and 414.138
It is worth observing that Guardia is unique even in the Tenth
Circuit.139 Guardia involved a civilian gynecologist on a military base,
charged with unprofessional and impermissible touching of the wo-
men he examined.140  Given the policies behind the new rules—such
as shoring up victims’ credibility by allowing prior bad acts to illustrate
the propensities of the accused and demonstrate that the victim did
not just imagine the harm or maliciously lie about it—Guardia seems
like an odd case in which to decide that Rule 413 evidence should not
be admitted.  The stature of a doctor in an inherently ambiguous situ-
ation such as a gynecological exam would seem to cry out for the ad-
mission of other similar acts.  Perhaps one woman could have
mistaken an appropriate medical procedure for an impermissible
touching, but six?  And yet, Guardia, one of the two non-Indian cases
in the Tenth Circuit,141 is the only Tenth Circuit case to hold that
Rule 403 excludes sexual propensity evidence because of lack of simi-
larity and waste of time.
136 135 F.3d at 1330.
137 Id. at 1331.
138 Id.  The argument based on Rules 404(a)(1)–(3) is not as strong as it appears, in
part because Rule 403 is rarely used to exclude propensity evidence introduced under
Rules 404(a)(1) and 404(a)(2), and because the latter rules are both triggered by the
accused’s initiation of character evidence, rather than by the prosecution.  Furthermore,
Rule 404(a)(3) incorporates Rule 609(a)(2), which precludes a Rule 403 balance.
139 Guardia is one of the few non-Indian cases in the Tenth Circuit and one of only
three appellate cases to employ Rule 403 to reject sexual propensity evidence.  The other
cases are United States v. Blue Bird, 372 F.3d 989 (8th Cir. 2004), and United States v. Berry, 61
M.J. 91 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (reversing a conviction for forcible sodomy and holding that that
evidence of defendant’s sexual offense as a thirteen year old had not been subject to
proper Rule 403 balancing and would in any case fail the balance because of distraction,
intervening circumstances, and the passage of time).
140 See Guardia, 135 F.3d at 1327–28.
141 The other case is United States v. Meacham, 115 F.3d 1488 (10th Cir. 1997) (involv-
ing a defendant charged with transporting a minor in interstate commerce with the intent
that she engage in sexual activity).
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Many circuit courts list a series of factors for district courts to con-
sider in conducting a Rule 403 balancing test for prior sexual of-
fenses.142  On the probative value side of the balancing scale, courts
include the following factors: (1) “‘the similarity of the prior acts to
the acts charged,’”143 (2) “temporal proximity,”144 (3) “the ‘presence
or lack of intervening circumstances,’”145 (4) “‘the frequency of the
prior acts,’”146 (5) the strength of proof of the prior act,147 (6) the
“relationship between the parties,”148 (7) the need for the evi-
dence,149 and, relatedly, (8) the potential for less prejudicial evi-
dence.150  Looking to the “probative dangers”151 enumerated in Rule
403, courts list the following factors to balance against the probative
value of the evidence: (1) the likelihood such evidence “will contrib-
ute to an improperly-based jury verdict,”152 (2) “the extent to which
such evidence will distract the jury from the central issues of the
142 See Guardia, 135 F.3d at 1331 (“Propensity evidence, however, has indisputable pro-
bative value.  That value in a given case will depend on innumerable considerations . . . .”);
see also People v. Falsetta, 986 P.2d 182, 189–90 (Cal. 1999) (considering remoteness in
time and explaining that courts should consider various factors “[r]ather than admit or
exclude every sex offense a defendant commits”); United States v. Wright, 53 M.J. 476, 482
(C.A.A.F. 2000) (providing a list of factors).
143 United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1028 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Doe ex rel.
Rudy-Glanzer v. Glanzer, 232 F.3d 1258, 1268 (9th Cir. 2000)); Guardia, 135 F.3d at 1331;
Falsetta, 986 P.2d at 190.  Sometimes courts denote this similarity factor as the probative
value of the evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Mann, 193 F.3d 1172, 1174 (10th Cir. 1999)
(explaining that the Enjady factor of “‘how probative the evidence is of the material fact it
is admitted to prove’” is a question of similarity); United States v. LeCompte, 131 F.3d 767,
769 (8th Cir. 1997).
144 United States v. Wright, 53 M.J. 476, 482 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (citing Guardia, 135 F.3d
at 1331).  All courts that set out factors for the Rule 403 balance mention the timing issue.
See, e.g., LeMay, 260 F.3d at 1028 (“‘closeness in time of the prior acts to the acts charged’”
(quoting Glanzer, 232 F.3d at 1268)); Guardia, 135 F.3d at 1331; Falsetta, 986 P.2d at 190
(“possible remoteness”).
145 LeMay, 260 F.3d at 1028 (quoting Glanzer, 232 F.3d at 1268); Wright, 53 M.J. at 482.
146 LeMay, 260 F.3d at 1028 (quoting Glanzer, 232 F.3d at 1268); Guardia, 135 F.3d at
1331; Wright, 53 M.J. at 482.  Although many courts mention this factor, I have yet to see it
come into play. Cf. People v. Sullivan, Nos. H023715, H025386, 2003 WL 1785921, at *6
(Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2003) (noting that the fact of only one prior sexual offense does not
affect admissibility under California’s section 1108).
147 See, e.g., Mann, 193 F.3d at 1174 (“‘how clearly the prior act has been proved’”
(quoting Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1433)); Wright, 53 M.J. at 482 (distinguishing “conviction ver-
sus gossip” (citing Guardia, 135 F.3d at 1331)); Falsetta, 986 P.2d at 190 (“the degree of
certainty of its commission”).
148 Wright, 53 M.J. at 482 (citing Guardia, 135 F.3d at 1331).
149 See, e.g., LeMay, 260 F.3d at 1028 (“‘the necessity of the evidence beyond the testi-
monies already offered at trial’” (quoting Glanzer, 252 F.3d at 1268)); Guardia, 135 F.3d at
1331 (“the need for evidence beyond the testimony of the defendant and alleged victim”).
150 See, e.g., Mann, 193 F.3d at 1174 (“‘whether the government can avail itself of any
less prejudicial evidence’” (quoting Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1433)); Wright, 53 M.J. at 482.
151 Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1433.
152 Id.; accord Mann, 193 F.3d at 1174 (quoting Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1433).
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trial,”153 (3) “how time consuming it will be to prove the prior con-
duct,”154 (4) “its likely prejudicial impact on the jurors,”155 and (5)
“the burden on the defendant in defending against the uncharged
offense.”156
In adopting a balancing test for its state versions of Rules 413 and
414, the California Supreme Court also included as a factor the “avail-
ability of less prejudicial alternatives to its outright admission, such as
admitting some but not all of the defendant’s other sex offenses, or
excluding irrelevant though inflammatory details surrounding the of-
fense.”157  Interestingly, the Eighth Circuit, which performs the most
cursory, admission-happy Rule 403 balance, has not even set out the
elements of a balancing test and instead stresses the presumption of
admissibility.  However, even when courts, such as the Tenth Circuit,
have delineated an extensive checklist for a Rule 403 balance and
have required that the district courts apply that balance, the message
has clearly been that “Rule 403 should be used infrequently, reflecting
Congress’ legislative judgment that the evidence ‘normally’ should be
admitted.”158
B. Assessing the Probative Value of Prior Uncharged Acts
In discussing the probative value of the past offense evidence,
courts tend to rely on the legislative history of Rules 413 and 414 ex-
tensively.  In United States v. Charley, the court quoted a statement by
Representative Molinari that “ ‘a history of similar acts tends to be excep-
tionally probative because it shows an unusual disposition of the defen-
dant—a sexual or sadosexual interest in children—that simply does
not exist in ordinary people.’”159  Besides the legislative history, courts
rely on the inherent nature of sexual crimes to show the probativeness
of prior sexual offenses.  As the Tenth Circuit opined in Guardia, “Pro-
pensity evidence has a unique probative value in sexual assault trials,”
in part because of the “lack of any relevant evidence beyond the testi-
153 Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1433; accord Mann, 193 F.3d at 1174 (quoting Enjady, 134 F.3d at
1433); see also Wright, 53 M.J. at 482; People v. Falsetta, 986 P.2d 182, 190  (Cal. 1999)
(“likelihood of confusing, misleading, or distracting the jurors from their main inquiry”).
154 Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1433; see also Wright, 53 M.J. at 482 (“time needed for proof of
prior conduct”).
155 Falsetta, 986 P.2d at 190.
156 Id.
157 See id.
158 See Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1433 (quoting Rep. Molinari); see also United States v.
Meacham, 115 F.3d 1488, 1492 (10th Cir. 1997) (stating that Rule 414 favors liberal admis-
sion, despite Rule 403, in order “[t]o implement the legislative intent”); United States v.
Wright, 48 M.J. 896, 899 n.1 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1998) (stating that military trial judges
“should recognize that the presumption is in favor of admission”).
159 See 189 F.3d 1251, 1260 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 413 advisory com-
mittee’s note (statement of Rep. Molinari)).
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mony of the alleged victim.”160  When viewed in context, however, not
all such evidence is “exceptionally” or “uniquely” probative, and I next
examine prior sexual offenses in light of some of the factors men-
tioned (but rarely grappled with) by the courts.
1. Time Lag and Intervening Circumstances
The probative value of prior sexual offenses is affected by the
length of elapsed time between the current charges and the prior bad
acts.  Some evidence rules have built-in time limits.  For instance, im-
peachment of a witness by evidence of a prior conviction is generally
available only within ten years of the conviction or release, whichever
is later.161  Evidence of any staler convictions must pass a very high,
nearly insuperable, barrier.162  However, Rule 404(b), which allows
prosecutors to introduce crimes, wrongs, and acts for purposes other
than propensity, has no time limit.  Neither does Rule 608, which, in
the discretion of the trial judge, admits prior bad acts for impeach-
ment of a witness’s honesty.163  Rule 403, however, limits both Rule
404(b) and Rule 608, and the lapse in time between the current ac-
tion and prior uncharged conduct is a factor that courts use to assess
the probative value of prior conduct those rules cover.
Courts considering past sexual misconduct under Rules 413 and
414 have allowed evidence of offenses occurring more than twenty
years before the charged conduct.164  Courts repeatedly have noted
160 United States v. Guardia, 135 F.3d 1326, 1330 (10th Cir. 1998).
161 FED. R. EVID. 609(b).
162 The test for impeaching with a conviction more than ten years old is a “reverse”
Rule 403 balancing test.  Rather than being a rule of exclusion requiring the party opposed
to admission of the evidence to prove that the unfair prejudice, distraction, confusion, or
waste of time substantially outweighs the probative value, Rule 609(b) puts the affirmative
burden on the party proposing to use the impeachment evidence.  The proposing party
must demonstrate in “the interests of justice, that the probative value of the [impeachment
evidence] supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudi-
cial effect.” See id.  Not surprisingly, very few cases meet this high standard for admission.
163 Rule 608 allows all witnesses, at the discretion of the trial judge, to be impeached
on specific acts (other than convictions, which are covered by Rule 609) that reflect on
their honesty. FED. R. EVID. 608.  Rule 608 originally contained a reference to passage of
time, which was deleted in favor of a phrase emphasizing judicial discretion.  It was clear,
however, that staleness of the prior act would be a factor for the judge to weigh. See H.R.
REP. NO. 93-650, at 10 (1973).
164 See United States v. Drewry, 365 F.3d 957, 959–60 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting twenty-five-year-old acts of molesta-
tion under Rule 414), vacated on other grounds, 125 S. Ct. 987 (2005); United States v. Gabe,
237 F.3d 954, 959–60 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion by admitting evidence of child molestation occurring over twenty years before the trial
under either Rule 404(b) or Rule 414); United States v. Larson, 112 F.3d 600, 602 (2d Cir.
1997) (admitting uncharged sex abuse evidence occurring sixteen to twenty years before
trial under Rule 414). But see People v. Harris, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 689, 697 (Ct. App. 1998)
(excluding a twenty-three-year-old, violent incident proven by graphic testimony).
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that the legislative history supports admitting evidence without a time
limit.165
Two potential problems exist with an extensive time lag: (1) vic-
tims’ memories can grow stale, making it difficult to prove or disprove
facts from long ago,166 and (2) perpetrators who evolve into different,
less predatory people, will not receive credit for their rehabilitation.
Meacham illustrates both of these concerns.167  Meacham was con-
victed of transporting a minor in interstate commerce with the intent
that she engage in sexual activity.168  On appeal, Meacham asserted
that the court erred in admitting evidence that he molested two of his
stepdaughters more than thirty years before.169  During the trial,
Meacham’s attorney argued:
This is so long ago, and it’s so unlike the events that we’ve been
talking about that it ought to be excluded for both those reasons.
There’s absolutely no way that I can go back and now have a mini-
trial and dredge up witnesses to say what the ladies are saying isn’t
the case, for something that happened before maybe many of these
jurors were even born.170
To be fair, sometimes the time lag includes jail time, when the accused had no oppor-
tunity to engage in such offenses. See United States  v. Eagle, 137 F.3d 1011, 1016 (8th Cir.
1998) (“Eagle’s claim that the conviction had little probative value because it occurred ten
years before is seriously weakened by the fact that he had spent six of those years incarcer-
ated for that crime.”); United States v. LeCompte, 131 F.3d 767, 769–70 (8th Cir. 1997)
(noting that the time lapse between incidents “‘may not be as significant as it appears at
first glance, because defendant was imprisoned for a portion of the time between 1987 and
1995, which deprived defendant of the opportunity to abuse any children’” (quoting the
district court’s order)); see also People v. Robins, No. B158439, 2003 WL 103609, at *4 (Cal.
Ct. App.  Jan. 13, 2003) (“Defendant was incarcerated for a number of the intervening
years.  Therefore, the eight-year period between offenses does not reflect a change in de-
fendant’s character, but rather a lack of access to women.”).  There is, of course, the irony
that by serving their sentences, the accused unwittingly undermine any argument that they
have changed or are rehabilitated.
165 Gabe, 237 F.3d at 960 n.4 (“‘[E]vidence of other sex offenses by the defendant is
often probative and admitted, notwithstanding very substantial lapses of time in relation to
the charged offense or offenses.’” (quoting 140 CONG. REC. H8992 (daily ed. Aug. 21,
1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari))); United States v. Meacham, 115 F.3d 1488, 1492
(10th Cir. 1997) (noting that the “language of Rule 414 does not address the question of
staleness,” but that “the historical notes to the rules and congressional history indicate
there is no time limit beyond which prior sex offenses by a defendant are inadmissible” in
relation to the charged offense or offenses).
166 See United States v. Koruh, No. 99-2138, 2000 WL 342252, at *4 (10th Cir. Apr. 3,
2000) (“[T]he defendant argues under the Rule 403 balancing test, the evidence concern-
ing his daughter was not probative because it involved events which allegedly occurred 16
to 19 years ago, was only recently disclosed, was not investigated, and was not sufficient to
prove the prior acts.”).  Issues of fading memories and lost evidence do not present a prob-
lem where the prior offenses are convictions. See infra Part IV.A.1.
167 See 115 F.3d 1488.
168 Id. at 1490.
169 Id.
170 Id. at 1493.  The court observed, however, that “[n]o time limit is imposed on the
uncharged offenses for which evidence may be admitted; as a practical matter, evidence of
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In response to the first concern, regarding the staleness of the
evidence, courts have emphasized that a sexual offense is the kind of
event a victim “is not likely to forget.”171  With regard to the argument
that the accused has reformed and is no longer the person he was
thirty years ago, courts have found that given the “special” nature of
sexual crimes, prior similar acts are especially probative.  In justifying
the admission of a twenty-nine-year-old prior incident of molestation,
the prosecutor in Meacham explained: “ ‘[P]eople that have an aber-
rant sexual behavior, such as the defendant does, you don’t get over
that. . . . [W]ith things like sexual orientation towards children, a sex-
ual interest in children, that doesn’t change unless you get some
intervention.’”172
Courts give lip service to the notion of change, but in no case
could I find “intervening circumstances” (such as getting counseling
or finding religion) that influenced a court’s assessment of the evi-
dence.  In fact, in Meacham, the court conceded that the prosecutor’s
assertion that “ ‘a sexual interest in children . . . doesn’t change unless
you get some intervention,’”173 coupled with the prosecutor’s asser-
tion that “ ‘I don’t think there’s any indication that the defendant ever
had any intervention after his first incidents,’”174 may have been par-
ticularly misleading.175  Meacham’s pre-sentence report indicated that
he did receive counseling in connection with the earlier incident in-
volving his stepdaughters.176  The court noted, however, that “[n]o
evidence of intervention or counseling was introduced at trial.”177
2. Similarity to Crime Charged
Obviously, the closer in kind the prior offense is to the charged
offense, the more probative the evidence.178  For example, in the case
of an alleged child molester, evidence that the accused encourages his
nieces to fondle him when he is babysitting them or when he is play-
ing hide-and-seek with them is much more probative than evidence
other sex offenses by the defendant is often probative and properly admitted, notwith-
standing very substantial lapses of time in relation to the charged offense or offenses.”  Id.
at 1492.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 1492 (quoting from the transcript in the district court).
173 Id.
174 Id. at 1493 (quoting from the transcript in the district court).
175 Id. at 1493 n.2.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 See People v. Banjo,  No. B147527, 2002 WL 1752829, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. July 30,
2002) (“In balancing the equities under section 352, ‘the probative value of “other crimes”
evidence is increased by the relative similarity between the charged and uncharged of-
fenses . . . .’”).
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that merely demonstrates that the accused attacks children.179 The
specificity of the prior bad acts makes it seem more likely that the
accused possesses a particular trait of character.  This is true even if
the similarity between the two offenses would not qualify as indepen-
dent evidence of identity or modus operandi under Rule 404(b).180  In
addition, when the prior sexual offense is substantially similar to the
charged offense, there is less chance that the evidence of the prior
bad act will prejudice the jury.181  Because the prosecution will have
already exposed the jury to the heinousness of the charged conduct,
the jury will be less horrified when learning the details of the prior
similar offense.182
Not all cases involve prior bad acts that are very similar to the
presently charged offense.  In fact, some courts have admitted evi-
dence of prior bad acts even though the prior acts seem markedly
different from the charged offense.183  For instance, in United States v.
Eagle, the defendant was accused of abusing his eight-year-old niece,
and the government introduced evidence that the accused had
“pleaded guilty in May of 1987 to a federal crime of ‘carnal knowl-
179 See United States v. LeCompte, 131 F.3d 767, 768–69 (8th Cir. 1997) (admitting
evidence based on these facts); see also United States v. Gabe, 237 F.3d 954, 959 (8th Cir.
2001) (admitting prior act evidence when “[b]oth [victims] were young girls of six or seven
years at the time of the offenses; both were related to Gabe; and the sexual nature of the
offenses was similar”); United States v. Withorn, 204 F.3d 790, 794 (8th Cir. 2000) (“The
victims were approximately the same age at the time of the rapes, and both assaults in-
volved force and occurred after Withorn had isolated the victims from others.  Both victims
also testified that immediately after the incident Withorn threatened them not to inform
anyone what had occurred . . . .”); United States v. Walker, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1157
(D.N.D. 2003) (admitting evidence and noting “striking similarities” in the age of the vic-
tims and the nature of the attacks); People v. Sullivan, Nos. H023715, H025286, 2003 WL
1785921, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2003)  (admitting prior bad acts when “[b]oth chil-
dren were both very young when defendant assaulted them; defendant was in a parental
relationship to both, and they both lived in defendant’s household and their mother was
out of the house when the touchings occurred”); Banjo,  2002 WL 1752829, at *9 (
The [sexual offenses] were all similar to the charged offense.  Each inci-
dent involved an initially consensual encounter that escalated into a sexual
assault.  [The sodomy incident used for propensity] was almost identical to
the charged offense in that defendant encountered both women walking
on Sunset Boulevard, offered them a ride, then drove them into the
Hollywood Hills and sexually assaulted them.
).
180 Compare LeCompte, 131 F.3d at 768–70 (holding that the prior bad act was admissi-
ble as propensity evidence under Rule 414), with United States v. LeCompte, 99 F.3d 274,
278–79 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that the prior bad act was not admissible to show modus
operandi under rule 404(b)).
181 See Gabe, 237 F.3d at 960.
182 Id. (noting that “‘[b]ecause the evidence [of prior abuse] was so similar to [one of]
the acts charged, it would not be so facially inflammatory as to unduly divert attention from
the issues of the case’” (second and third alterations in original) (quoting United States v.
Butler, 56 F.3d 941, 944 (8th Cir. 1995))).
183 See, e.g., United States, v. Eagle, 137 F.3d 1011 (8th Cir. 1988).
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edge,’ or ‘engaging in sex with a child under sixteen.’”184  The four-
teen-year-old victim of the prior offense was actually the defendant’s
common-law wife at the time of the trial.185  Although the court al-
lowed the jury to learn about the subsequent marriage,186 it is still
debatable whether the two crimes were sufficiently similar.
Some courts exercise caution when determining whether to ad-
mit a defendant’s prior sexual offenses, making sure that the prior
offenses are substantially similar to the charged offense.  These courts
admit only some of the uncharged misconduct and exclude acts which
they deem to be too dissimilar from the charged conduct.187
Focusing on the similarity between the offenses makes sense up
to a point.  Courts’ careful parsing of the various prior offenses dem-
onstrates that they are at least trying to draw lines and imbue Rule 403
with some consequence.  Certainly, differences of degree, such as be-
tween exhibitionism and unpermitted touching, or differences of
kind, such as between rape of an adult woman and sodomy of a young
boy, raise questions of the probative value of the evidence.  Occasion-
ally, however, the focus on the similarity of facts seems macabre and
dismissive of the pain of prior victims.188  Such extensive dissections
184 Id. at 1013.
185 Id. at 1016.
186 Id. at 1015–16.
187 For instance, in United States v. McHorse, the Tenth Circuit approved the district
court’s admission of similar acts by the accused against other children, but it did not admit
the evidence of acts involving the accused’s half-sister because they were deemed too dis-
similar, remote, and potentially confusing. 179 F.3d 889, 899 (10th Cir. 1999); see also
Carpentino v. State, 38 P.3d 547, 553–54 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002) (holding that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded the accused’s prior sexual assault on
the victim’s older brother because the sexual abuse of the eleven-year-old brother lacked
sufficient similarity to the abuse of the eight-year-old sister).
Similarly, in Mound, although the Eighth Circuit’s opinion seemed to routinize the
balancing process and favor admissibility, the court did not reverse the district court, which
distinguished between two types of prior sexual offense evidence. See United States v.
Mound, 149 F.3d 799, 801–02 (8th Cir. 1998).  The first concerned a prior similar offense
for which there had been a conviction and about which an FBI agent testified as to the
facts of the offense. Id. at 800–02.  The second offense was less similar to the facts of the
crime charged, and the charges had been dropped. Id. at 800, 802.  The district court did
not allow evidence of the second count on the grounds that it did not pass the Rule 403
balancing test, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 800.
188 For instance, in United States v. Dewrell, a military case, the court permitted evidence
that the accused had forced two girls between the ages of ten and fifteen to touch his penis
and manually stimulate him, but did not admit evidence that he had forced one of the girls
into a bathroom in order to attack her in the same way.  52 M.J. 601, 606 (A.F. Ct. Crim.
App. 1999).  Similarly, in Guardia, the court found that the testimony of the alleged victims
“differs significantly in some respects from the testimony of the Rule 413 witnesses.  For
instance, one of the witnesses complains that Dr. Guardia improperly touched her breasts,
not her pelvic area.  Another complains of the defendant’s use of a medical instrument,
not his hands.”  135 F.3d 1326, 1327–28 (10th Cir. 1998).  Although I admire any attempt
to limit the evidence to only the most probative, these limitations seem (1) nonsensical
within the scheme of the new rules, (2) vaguely disrespectful to the victims, and (3) at odds
with congressional intent.  Surely the probative value lies in the fact that the accused is
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seem pointless.  Although, admittedly, I do not favor the new rules, I
believe that some of  the dissections of prior acts are troubling be-
cause they seem to trivialize the experiences of the victims.
3. The Need for the Evidence
Assessing the need for the evidence of the prior offense, that is,
determining how crucial it is to the case, uncovers an interesting co-
nundrum.  On the one hand, if there is no need for evidence of prior
sexual molestation because the other evidence in the case is so strong,
the probative value of the prior sexual molestation evidence de-
creases.  For instance, if the victim is sure of her identification of the
assailant, there is DNA evidence, or the act was videotaped, little is
gained by admitting evidence that the accused has raped children
before.  Yet, if admitted, it will probably be harmless error because
conviction seems likely anyway.  On the other hand, if the evidence in
the case seems particularly weak (e.g., a self-contradicting, tentative-
sounding victim with no corroborating evidence), the evidence of the
accused’s prior rape of a child may be crucial for conviction.  There-
fore, this evidence will seem both more necessary and more probative.
Yet, evidence of a prior offense in the latter case also seems more
troublesome, particularly when the issue is one of identity.  If the
child is unsure who molested him, suggestible, unreliable, or con-
fused, the prior act evidence could be instrumental in securing a con-
viction.  If the accused was identified by rounding up the usual
suspects,189 that is, people with previous molestation accusations
against them, a potentially innocent person with little hard evidence
against him, but with a damning past, might be convicted.  When the
evidence is weak, the prior offenses take on increased significance,
and the jury may be more likely to convict the accused merely to keep
him off the streets or to punish him for past deeds, both impermissi-
ble reasons for conviction.
willing to attack young girls, not in precisely how he attacked them, or that a doctor takes
liberties in a medical exam, not precisely which body part he assaulted.  Courts that overdo
the need for similarity may be resisting the rules themselves (a sentiment I can admire),
but I am hesitant to adopt this approach for limiting evidence that is dissimilar in trivial
and vaguely sexist ways.  The courts’ contrast-and-compare approach sometimes reads like
a review of a porno film.  Although anything that limits prior bad acts evidence seems
desirable, requiring a repeat molester or serial rapist to replicate each move precisely
seems pointless and almost announces to the victims that if the accused did not follow the
exact pattern, it does not count—or worse, it did not happen.
189 The idea of rounding up the usual suspects is most provocatively expressed in the
classic film Casablanca.  See RICHARD O. LEMPERT ET AL., A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE
327 (3d ed. 2000) (“Like Claude Rains in the closing scene of Casablanca, the police may,
for good and obvious reasons, focus their attention on ‘the usual suspects’—people who
have prior records or known ‘bad character.’”).
\\server05\productn\C\CRN\90-6\CRN603.txt unknown Seq: 45 13-SEP-05 12:03
2005] FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 403 1531
Hence, evidence under Rules 413 and 414 is best introduced and
most faithful to the intent of bolstering witnesses’ credibility when
there is strong evidence that the accused committed the crime
charged, but because of secrecy, embarrassment, fear, misogyny, or
the poor demeanor of witnesses, the evidence looks less credible to
the fact-finder than it should.  If, however, the evidence is needed be-
cause there is no other credible evidence in the case, admission under
Rules 413 and 414 is very troubling.
C. Assessing the Dangers of Uncharged Sexual Offenses
Rule 403 always requires a balance.  Even when evidence is
deemed highly probative, it can still be excluded under Rule 403 if
the probative value is nevertheless substantially outweighed by unfair
prejudice, distraction of the jury, confusion of the issues, or waste of
time.190  The advisory committee’s notes to Rule 403 explain: “ ‘“Un-
fair prejudice” within its context means an undue tendency to suggest
decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an
emotional one.’”191  The tricky question in applying Rules 413 and
414 is this: What actually counts as unfair prejudice when the rules of
the game have been altered so much, and the jury learns the highly
prejudicial and emotional information that the accused has raped or
molested a child before?
The new rules alter basic precepts about both sides of the Rule
403 equation, but they especially change the understanding of what
constitutes unfair prejudice.  The Eighth Circuit in United States v.
Gabe emphasized that “[b]ecause propensity evidence is admissible
under Rule 414, this is not unfair prejudice.”192  What used to be con-
sidered the ultimate danger under the previous interpretation of Rule
403 is now a perfectly permissible inference.193  Even if one acknowl-
190 FED. R. EVID. 403.
191 FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee’s note, cited with approval in Old Chief v.
United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180 (1997).
192 See United States v. Gabe, 237 F.3d 954, 960 (8th Cir. 2000) (“[The] testimony is
prejudicial to Gabe for the same reason it is probative—it tends to prove his propensity to
molest young children in his family when presented with an opportunity to do so unde-
tected.”); United States v. Guardia, 135 F.3d 1326, 1330 (10th Cir. 1998) (“If Rule 413
evidence were always too prejudicial under 403, Rule 413 would never lead to the introduc-
tion of evidence.  Therefore, Rule 413 only has effect if we interpret it in a way that leaves
open the possibility of admission.”); United States v. LeCompte, 131 F.3d 767, 769–70 (8th
Cir. 1997) (reversing the decision of the trial court, which excluded the prior sexual of-
fense evidence because “‘child sexual abuse deservedly carries a unique stigma in our soci-
ety; such highly prejudicial evidence should therefore carry a very high degree of probative
value if it is to be admitted,’” and explaining that such “danger is one that all propensity
evidence in such trials presents.  It is for this reason that the evidence was previously ex-
cluded, and it is precisely such holdings that Congress intended to overrule.”).
193 Compare LeCompte, 131 F.3d at 769–70 (noting the highly prejudicial nature of the
prior offense evidence, but finding that it was nonetheless admissible under Rule 413, even
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edges that propensity itself is no longer unfair prejudice, there are
other dangers, which should be deemed unacceptable, even under
this new regime.
In Old Chief v. United States, a majority of the Supreme Court held
that a district court abused its discretion when it rejected the ac-
cused’s offer to stipulate to a prior conviction.194  Instead of forcing
the prosecution to accept the stipulation, the district court admitted
the full record of a prior judgment even though the nature of the
prior offense raised the risk of a verdict tainted by unfair prejudice.195
The evidence was admitted solely to prove the status of the accused as
a felon, which made the accused’s alleged gun ownership a crime.196
In deciding that the district court had indeed abused its discretion,
the Court explained that the term “unfair prejudice” in the context of
a criminal case “speaks to the capacity of some concededly relevant
evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground differ-
ent from proof specific to the offense charged.”197  In Old Chief, the
majority explained that the prosecution may not introduce propensity
evidence that “generaliz[es] a defendant’s earlier bad act into bad
character and taking that as raising the odds that he did the later bad
act now charged (or, worse, as calling for preventive conviction even if
he should happen to be innocent momentarily).”198
Ironically, Old Chief expresses concerns about propensity evi-
dence that directly conflict with Rules 413 and 414.  Nevertheless, the
Court’s recent proclamations about Rule 403 are relevant, and Old
Chief is instructive about the vital role Rule 403 plays in assuring a fair
trial.  Although Congress has approved propensity reasoning, the col-
lateral damage described by Old Chief—a verdict based on the jury’s
desire to convict someone they perceive as evil or out-of-control, but
who happens to be innocent of the particular crimes charged—still
presents serious concerns.
In perhaps the most famous discussion of the rule against charac-
ter evidence in criminal cases, Justice Jackson explained:
Courts that follow the common-law tradition almost unanimously
have come to disallow resort by the prosecution to any kind of evi-
dence of a defendant’s evil character to establish a probability of his
guilt. . . . The inquiry is not rejected because character is irrelevant;
after performing a Rule 403 balance), with United States v. Fawbush, 900 F.2d 150, 152
(8th Cir. 1990) (noting that even if the prior sexual offense had been relevant to a material
issue in the case, it still would not have survived a Rule 403 balance because “the prejudi-
cial effect of this evidence outweighed any legitimate probative value it may have had”).
194 519 U.S. 172, 177, 191 (1997).
195 Id. at 177.
196 Id.  at 174, 179.
197 Id. at 180.
198 Id. at 180–81.
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on the contrary, it is said to weigh too much with the jury and to so
overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general record
and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular
charge.  The overriding policy of excluding such evidence, despite
its admitted probative value, is the practical experience that its disal-
lowance tends to prevent confusion of issues, unfair surprise and
undue prejudice.199
In dissecting the quotation, it is apparent that some of its reasoning
regarding “overpersuasion” no longer applies to people accused of
sexual crimes.  But other aspects of Justice Jackson’s critique still ap-
ply.  So long as propensity evidence was forbidden, there was no need
to tease out, or as the postmodernists would say, “unpack,” the various
dangers and inquire whether the law could tolerate one (propensity
thinking) without necessarily incurring others (juror anger, distrac-
tion, or confusion).  Today, Rules 413 and 414 require us to confront
this question.  Courts can no longer conflate the various dangers asso-
ciated with propensity evidence.  They must distinguish propensity—
which is now, by Congressional fiat, deemed admissible and fair—
from fellow-traveling dangers which remain forbidden.  It is essential
to delineate the various types of potential prejudice and to limit them
as much as possible, consistent, of course, with the new rules’ intent to
allow propensity.  Three separate concerns remain viable as important
and avoidable Rule 403 dangers: (1) verdicts based upon juror emo-
tions fueled by the prior sexual offenses, (2) distraction and confusion
of the jury by the other uncharged offenses, and (3) waste of time.
Rule 403 unfair prejudice may arise if the jurors become so horri-
fied by the prior acts admitted under Rules 413 and 414 that they
loathe the accused and desire to punish him for past deeds, even
though they may not believe he committed the currently charged
crime.  More subtly, jurors could begin thinking of the accused as
guilty, finessing the standard of proof, and convicting him because
moral abhorrence of his guilty past assuages their reasonable doubts.
The court in Guardia, one of the very few cases to affirm a denial of
Rule 413 evidence under a Rule 403 balancing, expressed these
concerns:
While Rule 413 removes the per se exclusion of character evidence,
courts should continue to consider the traditional reasons for the
prohibition of character evidence as “risks of prejudice” weighing
against admission.  For example, a court should, in each 413 case,
199 Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475–76 (1948) (citations and footnotes
omitted).  This language has been quoted extensively by courts and litigants in cases involv-
ing Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414. See, e.g., United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018,
1025 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 880 (10th Cir. 1998); United
States v. Guardia, 135 F.3d 1326, 1328 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d
1427, 1430 (10th Cir. 1998).
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take into account the chance that “a jury will convict for crimes
other than those charged—or that, uncertain of guilt, it will convict
anyway because a bad person deserves punishment.”200
Rule 403 includes other dangers in addition to unfair prejudice.
For instance, prior uncharged acts might confuse and distract jurors
who are uncertain of what the charges actually are and what evidence
supports which proposition.201  The dangers with which I am con-
cerned—punishing the accused for past misdeeds, finessing the stan-
dard of proof, using the present trial to achieve a preventive detention
of someone who might be a menace but did not commit the acts cur-
rently charged, confusing the jury, or wasting time—will often appear
in combination.  For instance, evidence that is distracting might also
be time-wasting.  Yet, it is essential to view these dangers as important
and distinct sources of concern.  It is wrong to believe that once pro-
pensity rules have been passed, fretting over these other dangers is
pointless. Under the new regime, it remains possible—and more de-
sirable than ever—to limit prejudice if judges adequately dissect the
evidence.
D. Process Required of the District Courts
At the very least, the courts must go through the motions of con-
ducting a balancing test under Rule 403.202  Failure to do so is almost
always reversible error.203  Interestingly, appellate courts often engage
in the reverse inference and use the fact that the district court did not
admit all of the prior bad acts as an indication that the trial court
properly used its Rule 403 discretion.204  For instance, in Mound, the
Eighth Circuit viewed the district court’s rejection of an uncharged
200 Guardia, 135 F.3d at 1330–31.
201 See id.  (“A court should also be aware that evidence of prior acts can have the effect
of confusing the issues in a case.”).
202 People v. Campos, No. H024425, 2004 WL 352665, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 26,
2004) (finding “no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s admission of evidence of defen-
dant’s uncharged conduct” because “the court executed its duty by carefully weighing the
probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect”).
203 See, e.g., Blind-Doan v. Sanders, 291 F.3d 1079, 1083 (9th Cir.  2002) (reversing a
verdict for a police officer because the trial court did not “disclose how it evaluated the
factors, and its one-line order of exclusion [was] not ‘a clear record’ of why it decided as it
did”); United States v. Velarde, 214 F.3d 1204, 1211–12 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v.
Mann, 193 F.3d 1172, 1173 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting that a previous appeal “concluded
that the district court’s explanation of its decision to admit the Rule 414 evidence was
insufficient for our review”); United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 884 (10th Cir. 1998)
(finding that the district court judge’s conclusion that “‘if I have to make a finding under
403, then I find it’s relevant and the probative value is not substantially outweighed by any
prejudice,’” fell short of the minimum requirements).
204 See, e.g., United States v. Tyndall, 263 F.3d 848, 850 (2001) (“The district court,
furthermore, was well aware of the requirements of Rule 403, since it excluded evidence of
a prior rape conviction because of the potential for unfair prejudice.”).
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offense as proof that the district court carefully weighed the Rule 403
factors and made considered judgments.205
The actual process required varies significantly among the cir-
cuits.  The Tenth Circuit demands a display of the process and the
reasoning behind the district court’s Rule 403 balance.206  Although
no detailed findings are necessary, it is “ ‘particularly important for a
district court to fully evaluate the proffered Rule 413 evidence and
make a clear record of the reasoning behind its findings.’”207  Because
courts must conduct the Rule 403 balance between probative value
and unfair prejudice in the context of the actual facts of the case, the
courts cannot inalterably decide the question of admissibility of evi-
dence in limine.208
205 United States v. Mound, 149 F.3d 799, 801–02 (8th Cir. 1998)(“At that time, [the
district court] found that evidence of the uncharged offense was inadmissible under Rule
403, but the prior conviction was admissible . . . . Clearly, contrary to Mound’s assertion,
the Court was aware of its duty to apply Rule 403, and performed it.”).
206 See United States v. Koruh, No. 99-2138, 2000 WL 342252, at *4 (10th Cir. Apr. 3,
2000) (“Because of the nature of character evidence, we require the district court to ‘make
a reasoned, recorded statement’ of its balancing under Rule 403 when admitting evidence
under Rule 414(a).”); see also Guardia, 135 F.3d at 1331 (“Because of the sensitive nature of
the balancing test in these cases, it will be particularly important for a district court to fully
evaluate the proffered Rule 413 evidence and make a clear record of the reasoning behind
its findings.”); United States v. Dewrell, 52 M.J. 601, 609 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1999) (“The
Tenth Circuit appears to be the lone holdout attempting to adhere to the pre-413, 414
Rule 404(b)-type balancing test, its rhetoric to the contrary notwithstanding.”).  For in-
stance, in Castillo, 140 F.3d at 884, the Tenth Circuit reversed a conviction and remanded
because the district court had failed to conduct a Rule 403 balance at all. It ruled that the
district court’s ipse dixit finding that the probative value was not substantially outweighed by
unfair prejudice, accompanied by the judge’s observation that “‘I’m not at all certain that
under 413 I have to make a decision on 403,’” was inadequate. Id.; see also Velarde, 214 F.3d
at 1212 (
The government agrees with Mr. Velarde that the record reveals no Rule
403 balancing of the Rule 414 evidence admitted in this case, and concedes
that a remand to the district court is necessary. . . . On retrial, should the
government seek again to present [evidence of a prior molestation by the
accused], the court must, on the record, conduct the necessary Rule 403
balancing.
); United States v. Mann, No. 96-2283, 1998 WL 171854, at *2 (10th Cir. Apr. 13, 1998)
(“‘Without any reasoned elaboration by the district court we have no way of understanding
the basis of [this] decision. . . . Instead, we require an on the record decision by the court
explaining its reasoning in detail.’” (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Rob-
erts, 88 F.3d 872, 882 (10th Cir. 1996))).
207 Castillo, 140 F.3d at 884 (“Because of the unique nature of character evidence, it is
important that the trial court ‘make a reasoned, recorded’ statement of its 403 decision
when it admits evidence under Rules 413–415.” (quoting United States v. Guardia, 135
F.3d 1326, 1332 (10th Cir. 1998))).
208 See United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1434 (10th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he court
deferred ruling [on the admissibility of evidence] until it ascertained at trial what other
evidence the government would produce and, presumably, whether the [other sexual of-
fense] evidence was needed. The court [correctly] forbade mention of the alleged prior
rape in the government’s opening statement.”); see also United States v. King, No. 99-2363,
2000 WL 1028228, at *7 n.4 (10th Cir. July 26, 2000) (“[A]ny final decision as to the admis-
sibility of Rule 413 evidence depends on the outcome of the Rule 403 balancing test. This
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All this would sound very encouraging, but for two things.  First,
it is clear that the Tenth Circuit’s approach is unique and not ob-
served in other circuits.  In fact, evidence in other jurisdictions’ case
law suggests a rejection of the Tenth Circuit’s attempts to breathe
some life into the Rule 403 balance.209  Second, what actually passes
for balancing, including in the Tenth Circuit, is not always
commendable.
Even in the Tenth Circuit, the Rule 403 balance can break down
into canned formulas, circular reasoning, and empty gestures.  In
United States v. Charley, the court reiterated its commitment to conduct
a “‘case-specific inquiry’ into whether the district court ‘should have
excluded the Rule 414 evidence’ under Rule 403.”210  However, the
balance appeared pro forma, and the district court seemed disinter-
ested in the individual facts of the case.211  In conducting the Rule 403
balance, the Charley district court (with obvious approval from the
Tenth Circuit panel quoting and affirming the district court’s balanc-
ing) simply quoted a statement by Rep.  Molinari reprinted in the ad-
visory committee’s note.212  The district court noted Rep. Molinari’s
arguments regarding the high probative value of such prior acts evi-
dence and the compelling need for such evidence in cases of child
abuse.213  The district court then concluded: “ ‘So I have conducted
that balancing test.  As I previously stated to you I found it was more
probative than not under 4[0]3.’”214
Interestingly, the district judge subjected the uncharged miscon-
duct to a higher standard than that required by Rule 403.215  To admit
evidence under a Rule 403 balance, the judge need not believe that
is a very fact-specific determination which could only properly have been made in light of
the other evidence brought forth at trial.”).
209 See, e.g., Dewrell, 52 M.J. at 609 (noting that only the Tenth Circuit adheres to the
standard of balancing applied before the rules).
210 See 189 F.3d 1251, 1259–60 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting Castillo, 140 F.3d at 883–84).
211 See id. at 1260.  The court noted:
By invoking the stated general reasons for the Rule’s enactment, the district
court was implying that those reasons were particularly important in this
case. Specifically, the district court alluded to the similarity between Defen-
dant’s prior crime and the present charges, and to the fact that there was
little direct corroborating evidence.
Id.  The district court did not, however, explicitly note any of the facts of the case before it.
See id. See also Major Victor M. Hansen, New Developments in Evidence 1999, ARMY LAW., Apr.
2000, at 54, 63 (critiquing the balancing in Charley and deeming it “a very cursory Rule 403
balancing by the trial judge”).
212 See Charley, 189 F.3d at 1260.
213 Id.
214 Id. (quoting from the record of the district court’s opinion with editorial amend-
ment of the rule number by the appellate court).
215 See id. (“‘I find the testimony of the previous sexual activity by the defendant to
outweigh any harm to come to him under 403.’” (quoting from the record of the district
court’s opinion)).
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the evidence is more probative than prejudicial; the judge need only
believe that the unfair prejudice does not substantially outweigh the
probative value.  At first blush, one could imagine that the judge in
Charley was being extra scrupulous.  However, I believe that the judge
was just being sloppy, conducting a “balance” while ignoring the spe-
cific facts of the case and failing to imagine, let alone articulate, what
the unfair prejudice might be.
In many courts, what should be a highly fact-based and contex-
tual weighing of the relative merits of the evidence is instead trans-
formed into pat incantation—a boilerplate intended to insulate the
opinion from reversal on appeal.  Courts conduct the balancing in an
arid, acontextual environment, where the only necessary proof is ab-
stract, general justification for Rules 413 and 414, often rooted not in
the facts of the cases, but in the legislative history.
Courts also mention the use of limiting instructions as a procedu-
ral protection.  Judges instruct jurors that they must focus on the evi-
dence and may convict only if they are convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt that the accused committed the crime charged.216  Some limit-
ing instructions, however, seem downright mysterious.  For instance,
216 See, e.g., United States v. Dewrell, 52 M.J. 601, 610 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1999)
(“[T]he military judge must be alert to instruct the members that they may not convict an
accused solely on the basis of propensity, . . . and that, on the basis of all the evidence, they
must be convinced of the accused’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”); Feld v. Gerst, 66
P.3d 1268, 1275 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (“‘You are permitted to consider evidence of other
similar sexual offenses by the defendant only to the extent they show a propensity for
sexual molestation or sexual aberration.  Such evidence should not be considered for any
purpose other than the defendant’s state of mind.’” (quoting Revised Arizona Jury Instruc-
tions 14.101)).
California has adopted its own version of Rules 413 and 414, and the California courts
have engaged in significant discussion concerning the constitutionality of its limiting in-
struction.  The current and third version of this limiting instruction clarifies that evidence
that the accused committed a prior sexual offense “is not sufficient by itself to prove be-
yond a reasonable doubt that [she] committed the charged crime[s].”  CALJIC No.
2.50.01.  California provides the following limiting instruction when sexual offenses are
offered for propensity:
If you find that the defendant committed a prior sexual offense, you may,
but are not required to, infer that the defendant had a disposition to com-
mit sexual offenses.  If you find that the defendant had this disposition, you
may, but are not required to, infer that [he] [she] was likely to commit and
did commit the crime [or crimes] of which [he] [she] is accused.
However, if you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the de-
fendant committed [a] prior sexual offense[s], that is not sufficient by itself
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [he] [she] committed the charged
crime[s].  If you determine an inference properly can be drawn from this
evidence, this inference is simply one item for you to consider, along with
all other evidence, in determining whether the defendant has been proved
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the charged crime.
Id.; see Darn v. Knowles, No. C 02-2892 SI (PR), 2003 WL 21148412, at *10–12  (N.D. Cal.
May 14, 2003) (analyzing the use of the instructions in a federal habeas court); People v.
Reliford, 62 P.3d 601, 607 (Cal. 2003) (approving of an earlier version of the instruction).
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in Mound, the district court gave the jury the following fairly incom-
prehensible limiting instruction:
This defendant was convicted in 1988 of sexual abuse of a minor.
This does not mean that he is guilty of any of the charges of aggra-
vated sexual abuse or any other offense as to which he has pled not
guilty in this case which you will be deciding.  You may give such
evidence and the testimony of this witness no weight or such weight
as you think it is entitled to receive . . . .  [T]his evidence is being
received for a limited purpose only.217
Courts seem sanguine about the healing powers of limiting in-
structions.218  In contrast, I hold little hope for their viability.219  Typi-
cally, juries do not understand the limiting instructions, which are
usually as obscure as the above-quoted instruction. Did the jurors have
a clue what limited purpose the Mound court had in mind?  Further-
more, even if understood, such instructions are almost impossible to
follow.  Essentially, while the jurors are being asked to use the fact that
the accused has raped other women as evidence that he is a rapist and
has the character of a person who attacks women, they are also being
told not to use the other sexual offenses admitted at trial to prove that
the accused is a bad person or deserves to be locked away.  The ac-
cused’s propensity to rape can be used circumstantially to prove he
committed this rape, but the jury must be convinced beyond a reason-
able doubt that he committed all elements of the crime charged.  Not
only are such instructions tough to understand and tougher to follow,
but such instructions sometimes have the opposite of their intended
effect, because they draw attention to the prior act evidence.220
217 Id. at 802 (omission in original).
218 See, e.g., United States v. Gabe, 237 F.3d 954, 959 (8th Cir. 2001) (noting with ap-
proval that “[t]he district court expressly applied Rules 413, 414, and 403 in admitting this
evidence with a cautionary instruction”); People v. Banjo,  No. B147527, 2002 WL 1752829,
*9 (Cal. Ct. App. July 30, 2002) (“Moreover, any danger that the jury would misuse this
evidence to punish defendant for the uncharged offenses was cured by jury instructions.”);
People v. Frazier, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 100, 109 (Ct. App. 2001) (noting that the risk of juror
prejudice “is counterbalanced by instructions on reasonable doubt, the necessity of proof
as to each of the elements of a lewd act with a minor, and specifically that the jury ‘must
not convict the defendant of any crime with which he is not charged’”).
219 See, e.g., Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Pinney, 967 F.2d 912, 918 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding
that in a trial for charged rape, the prior act of rape by the defendant was unduly prejudi-
cial, despite the limiting instruction, and that a “realistic view of the capabilities of the
human mind” requires courts to acknowledge that in some situations there may be an
unacceptable risk that jurors cannot follow limiting instructions). But see Erik D. Ojala,
Propensity Evidence Under Rule 413: The Need for Balance, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 947, 976 (1999)
(arguing that a “clearly written and effectively timed instruction from the judge” will help
mitigate the damage of propensity evidence).
220 Cf. Molly Walker Wilson & Barbara A. Spellman, Objection!  The Unintended Conse-
quences of Attorney Interruptions (investigating the hypothesis that objections and interrup-
tions highlight contested evidence and that jurors are unable to completely disregard
inadmissible testimony), at www.fiu.edu/~apls2004/APLS%202004%20Abtstracts.pdf. See
generally J. Alexander Tanford, Thinking About Elephants: Admonitions, Empirical Research and
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Therefore, even clear limiting instructions that attempt to refocus the
jury on the charged offense and remind the jurors of the burden of
proof, may be worse than no instructions at all.
E. The Standard of Review
There is nearly universal agreement that the appellate standard
of review for trial court Rule 403 determinations is abuse of discre-
tion.221  Consequently, it is generally hard for an appellate court to
overturn a district court’s decision if the district court judge bothered
to conduct even a perfunctory balance.222  Indeed, according to my
research, there is only one case in the Eighth and Tenth Circuits in
which the appellate court has overturned a district court’s admission
of prior act evidence under the new rules when the trial court actually
conducted the required Rule 403 balance.223  Generally, the appellate
court will allow the balance to stand, even when it would have bal-
anced the evidence differently.224  There are, however, cases in which
the refusal to admit such evidence is reversed as an abuse of discre-
tion.225  Most often, though, given the standard of review, the ex-
pected result is affirmance.  Thus, the power to administer the new
rules rests with the trial court, as gatekeeper and weigher of evidence.
Legal Policy, 60 UMKC L. REV. 645 (discussing the psychological futility of limiting
instructions).
221 See, e.g., United States v. Withorn, 204 F.3d 790, 794 (8th Cir. 2000) (“We will not
reverse a district court’s evidentiary rulings unless they constitute a clear and prejudicial
abuse of discretion.”); United States v. Guardia, 135 F.3d 1326, 1331 (10th Cir. 1998)
(“The decision to exclude evidence under Rule 403 is within the sound discretion of the
trial court, and will be reversed only upon a showing of a clear abuse of that discretion.”);
United States v. Valentin-Nieves, 57 M.J. 691, 694 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2002) (“A military
judge’s evidentiary rulings are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.”). But see
United States v. Blue Bird, 372 F.3d 989, 991 (8th Cir. 2004) (Arnold, Morris, J.) (holding
that “our review in cases like the present one is more accurately characterized as de novo”
rather than as an abuse of discretion, and applying that standard to the trial judge’s deci-
sion on sexual propensity evidence).
222 When the trial court neglects to conduct a sufficient balance (which happened
particularly when Rules 413 and 414 were new), the appellate court remands, stressing that
the balance must be performed by the trial court in the first instance. See United States v.
Sumner, 119 F.3d 658, 662 (8th Cir. 1997) (“We decline to uphold the admission of the
challenged evidence on the theory that it was admissible under 414, for we believe that it is
for the district court to conduct the Rule 403 balancing test in the first instance, which it
will do if the government chooses to offer the evidence under Rule 414 on retrial.”).
223 See Blue Bird, 372 F.3d at 994–96.  Interestingly, Blue Bird was authored by Judge
Morris Arnold, who also dissented to the denial of rehearing en banc in Mound. See supra
notes 108–10 and accompanying text.
224 See, e.g., Feld v. Gerst, 66 P.3d 1268, 1273 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (opinion ordered
depublished by the Arizona Supreme Court) (questioning the court’s admission of a thir-
teen-year-old past act of sexual misconduct, for which the defendant was acquitted, but
concluding that “[w]e will not, in this special action, substitute our judgment for that of
the trial court concerning these issues”).
225 See, e.g.,  United States v. LeCompte, 131 F.3d 767, 769–70 (8th Cir. 1997).
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F. Harmless Error
Appellate courts rely on harmless error and jury acquittal on
some of the charges to prove that admission of prior sexual offense
evidence did not result in unfair prejudice.226  However, even known
perpetrators do not commit every atrocity of which they are accused.
The fact that the jury was able to distinguish among various charges
speaks well of the jurors’ deliberative process and indicates that they
did not just throw the book at the accused because he had committed
horrible deeds in the past.  But this does not eliminate the possibility
that unfair inferences infected the jurors’ thinking, making a shaky
case more credible and feeding the jurors’ desire to convict on some-
thing in order to punish the accused for being such a bad, dangerous
person.  In fact, to the extent that the verdict appears to be a compro-
mise, one can imagine a situation in which the evidence is shaky, but
the jury, incensed by prior bad acts, agrees to convict on some of the
charges.
IV
PROPOSALS FOR LIMITING THE UNFAIRNESS OF RULES 413
AND 414 AND REINVIGORATING RULE 403 TO MAKE IT A
MEANINGFUL CHECK ON THESE NEW PROPENSITY RULES
Rules 413 and 414 are here to stay, and opponents of the new
rules must not be tempted to make their loss more dramatic than nec-
essary.227  Although the Supreme Court has not considered the sub-
226 In United States v. Mann, for instance, the court concluded that testimony concern-
ing prior molestation created no danger of unfair prejudice because the accused was not
convicted on all counts against him. See 193 F.3d 1172, 1175 (10th Cir. 1999).  As the court
explained:
The jury convicted defendant on the charges involving S.Y., but acquitted
him on the charges involving K.C.  Thus, we agree that R.K.’s testimony did
not cause the jury to improperly convict defendant based on his prior un-
charged sexual abuse of R.K. or distract the jury from the central issues of
the trial.
Id.
Courts tend to believe that in cases in which the jury acquits on some of the charges,
the jury was not infected by unfair prejudice or otherwise did not compromise the stan-
dard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  For example, in United States v. Gabe, 237 F.3d
954 (8th Cir. 2001), the accused was tried for adult rape and child molestation in the same
case.  The district court admitted testimony of another sexual offense by the accused, simi-
lar to the charged offense against the adult victim.  See id. at 960.  Gabe was convicted of
the crime against the child and was acquitted of the charges against the adult woman.  The
court concluded that “obviously the jury was not unfairly prejudiced in considering the one
count to which [prior sexual offense] testimony was relevant.  That testimony could not
have unfairly prejudiced Gabe’s defense of the totally unrelated charge that he sexually
abused V.G. as a child.” Id.
227 Occasionally, scholars making their recommendations regarding the new rules sim-
ply advocate abolishing them. See, e.g., Landrum, supra note 14, at 337 (“Because these
new rules are unnecessary, arguably unconstitutional, and alarmingly inquisitorial, I rec-
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ject, given the unanimity of the appellate courts, the fight to declare
that Rules 413 and 414 violate due process seems all but over.  Propen-
sity evidence that scholars and evidence mavens overwhelmingly be-
lieved to be unfair is now regularly admitted and praised by Congress
as uniquely probative.  However, this cannot mean that anything goes.
In accepting the reality of the new rules, we must be vigilant in
preventing unnecessary collateral damage to the accused.  Below I
suggest how courts can limit the unfairness of Rules 413 and 414 while
remaining respectful of Congressional intent (but not necessarily the
entire legislative history).  In doing so, I will attempt to avoid attacks
on prior offenses that rely on misogynistic or antichild assumptions.
A. Changes Congress Should (But Won’t) Make to Rules
413 and 414
There are many alterations that I would fashion to the new rules
if I thought that I had a prayer of capturing Congress’ attention, inter-
est, and will.  Two important changes include limiting the application
of the rules to prior convictions only, rather than to all prior offenses,
and adding time limits, both of which I discuss in detail below.
1. Limiting Sexual Offense Evidence to Convicted Conduct
By allowing propensity evidence only where there is a prior con-
viction, we significantly enhance the likelihood that the prior offense
occurred.228  To the extent that we insist that the accused face up to
his past misdeeds, it seems more reasonable to do so when the ac-
cused received a formal judgment for those serious offenses.  It is
clear that courts feel more comfortable admitting convictions and that
they value convicted conduct as highly probative.229
ommend that the President exercise his executive authority to remove them from the Mili-
tary Rules of Evidence.”); Paul R. Rice, The Evidence Project: Proposed Revisions to the Federal
Rules of Evidence, 171 F.R.D. 330, 346 (1997).  Much as I am in sympathy with these authors,
we must deal with the reality of Rules 413 and 414 as a change in the evidentiary landscape.
See Scallen, supra note 15, at 861 (criticizing unrealistic calls for the abolishment of the new
rules and noting that such arguments “‘stink of the lamp’ of impractical legal
scholarship”).
228 Currently, the law does not distinguish between prior convictions and prior un-
charged sexual offenses that were not the subject of a conviction. See, e.g., People v.
Sanchez, No. H022638, 2002 WL 31492732, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2002) (
In Falsetta, the evidence consisted of prior convictions; here the evidence
consists of recanted accusations of unprosecuted prior sexual misconduct.
We disagree that this distinction makes the evidence inadmissible on due
process grounds. The fact that there were no prior convictions is simply one
additional factor the trial court must consider when applying the balancing
test . . . .
).
229 See United States v. Granbois, 119 Fed. Appx. 35, 38 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Also weighing
in favor of admitting the evidence of [the accused’s] prior conviction was the fact that the
evidence was highly reliable because [the accused] had pleaded guilty to the charges.”);
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Practically speaking, because convictions are easier to prove, lim-
iting the admission of prior sexual offenses to those that resulted in
convictions would avoid mini-trials about uncharged conduct.  There
could be no controverting the prior offense; hence, the process of
proof would be quicker and less distracting because the evidence
would usually be uncontested.230  Limiting prior act evidence to con-
victions would also relieve the accused of defending many different
offenses at trial.231
Most importantly, limiting the prior sexual offenses to convicted
conduct would reduce the possibility of the jurors trying to punish
prior bad acts of the accused.  Because the accused has already been
punished, the jury is less likely to want to punish him again.232  This is
very different from what a jury might feel after hearing about unpun-
ished, unconvicted conduct.233  Under this stricter standard, prosecu-
tors might lose very credible evidence that only comes to light because
of the current accusations, and hence was never the subject of a prior
prosecution.  Nonetheless, the guarantee of reliability of the convic-
tion, as well as the administrative and time benefits of the stricter stan-
dard, warrant such an amendment.
People v. Falsetta, 986 P.2d 182, 190 (Cal. 1999) (“We [have] also observed that the preju-
dicial impact of the evidence is reduced if the uncharged offenses resulted in actual convic-
tions and a prison term, ensuring that the jury would not be tempted to convict the
defendant simply to punish him for the other offenses . . . .” (citing People v. Balcom, 867
P.2d 777, 785 (Cal. 1994))).
230 See id. (providing that introduction of convicted conduct ensures that “the jury’s
attention [will] not be diverted by having to make a separate determination whether defen-
dant committed the other offenses”); see also People v. Banjo, No. B147527, 2002 WL
1752829, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. July 30, 2002) (quoting Falsetta).
231 See Falsetta, 986 P.2d at 189 (“[T]he present case involves only admission of defen-
dant’s prior rape convictions arising from his guilty pleas in both cases.  Accordingly, defend-
ants in similar circumstances will not be burdened unduly by having to ‘defend’ against
these charges.”).
232 See id. at 194–95 (pointing out that because of evidence of prior rape conviction “it
is unlikely that the jury would be tempted to convict him again of these crimes”); cf. People
v. Harris, 60 Cal. App. 4th 727, 738 (1998) (expressing concern that the jury would learn
that the accused was not convicted for his prior sexual offense, introduced under EVID.
CODE § 1108, but was “merely convicted of burglary, leaving the rape victim unrevenged”).
233 See Banjo, 2002 WL 1752829, at *8 (“‘[T]he prejudicial impact of the evidence is
reduced if the uncharged offenses resulted in actual convictions and a prison term, ensur-
ing that the jury would not be tempted to convict the defendant simply to punish him for
the other offenses . . . .’” (alteration in original) (quoting Falsetta, 986 P.2d at 190)); see also
People v. Ewoldt, 867 P.2d 757, 771 (Cal. 1994) (“[T]he prejudicial effect of this evidence
is heightened by the circumstance that defendant’s uncharged acts did not result in crimi-
nal convictions[,] . . . increas[ing] the danger that the jury might have been inclined to
punish defendant for the uncharged offenses, regardless whether it considered him guilty
of the charged offenses . . . .”).
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2. Adding a Time Limit
Although there are arguments against an absolute time limit, the
current rules could be amended to resemble Rule 609.  The new rules
could apply only to offenses where more than ten years has elapsed
since the date of the conviction or release (whichever is longer).234
Judges could admit older offenses only upon a very high standard,
which would include the interests of justice and require the probative
value to substantially outweigh unfair prejudice.  This would be a tre-
mendous change from the current system in which judges routinely
admit prior offenses, some even decades old.  Even though it is very
clear that Congress rejected any formal time limits in drafting Rules
413 and 414,235 some states have provided such limits in their varia-
tions on these rules.236
Courts applying the new rules seem unimpressed by the prejudice
caused by the passage of time.  For instance, in People v. Frazier the
court argued, without a trace of irony, that the passage of time en-
hanced the reliability of the propensity evidence, noting that “the evi-
dence shows defendant has a pattern of molesting his young female
relatives going back 20 years.”237  In addition, the court argued that
the passage of time mattered less where there was no physical evi-
dence anyway.238
Changes such as requiring convictions or setting time limits are
unlikely.  Politically, victims are popular, even trendy,239 while sexual
predators are despised and have no organized voice before Con-
234 See supra notes 161–62 and accompanying text (discussing Rule 609).
235 “No time limit is imposed on the uncharged offenses for which evidence may be
admitted; as a practical matter, evidence of other sex offenses by the defendant is often
probative and properly admitted, notwithstanding very substantial lapses of time in relation
to the charged offense or offenses.”  140 CONG. REC. H8992 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994)
(statement of Rep. Molinari); see also 140 CONG. REC. S12990 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1994)
(statement of Sen. Dole).
236 Alaska has a ten-year limit. See ALASKA R. EVID. 404(b).  Arizona, under its common
law, required the prior sexual offense to be close in time to the offense charged or, barring
that, the prosecution had to present expert medical testimony that established the ac-
cused’s continuing emotional propensity to commit the act charged.  See State v.
Treadaway, 568 P.2d 1061, 1065 n.2, 1067 (Ariz. 1977) (
A prior, separate sex offense (particularly a dissimilar one) with a different
victim (possibly excepting a similar relationship between defendant and the
victim, such as father-daughter) as remote as three years earlier is almost
never admissible and especially not for the purpose of showing only defen-
dant’s propensity to commit the crime charged.
); see also Feld v. Gerst, 66 P.3d 1268, 1272  (Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (withdrawn and
depublished) (quoting Treadway).
237 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 100, 108 (Ct. App. 2001).
238 Id. at 108–09.
239 See, e.g., Sue Anna Moss Cellini, The Proposed Victims’ Rights Amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States: Opening the Door of the Criminal Justice System to the Victim, 14 ARIZ. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 839 (1997). But see generally Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim’s
Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937 (1985) (analyzing the effects of the victim’s rights movement).
\\server05\productn\C\CRN\90-6\CRN603.txt unknown Seq: 58 13-SEP-05 12:03
1544 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:1487
gress.240  Any legislative retrenchment would be a hard sell on the
merits and impossible politically.
B. Changes Courts Can Make in Interpreting the New Rules
Reform of the new rules, if it is to come at all, must emerge from
the courts.  Some of the changes I recommend must come from the
courts of appeals, and some must come from the district courts—most
must involve both.  I suggest two specific changes in the way the courts
approach and interpret Rules 413 and 414 neither of which requires
legislative action.  First, I propose a new, more demanding standard of
proof for demonstrating that the other offenses actually happened.
Second, I implore the courts to reject the “403-lite” standard, and in-
stead require that district courts conduct a genuine, fact-specific bal-
ance, as opposed to a test that is satisfied by merely uttering the magic
words of Rule 403 with a bit of legislative history thrown in.  In con-
ducting this balance, courts must carefully weigh the probative value
of the prior act evidence (taking into account issues of timing and
method of proof) and screen this evidence to limit unfair prejudice,
distraction, confusion, and waste of time.
1. Requiring a Higher Standard of Proof that the Other Offenses
Occurred
In determining the standard of proof necessary to demonstrate
that the prior sexual misconduct occurred, courts borrow the stan-
dard announced by the Supreme Court in Huddleston v. United States, a
Rule 404(b) case.241 Huddleston held that the government need not
prove the prior bad acts by a preponderance of evidence, but must
provide “sufficient evidence to support a finding by the jury that the
defendant committed the similar act.”242  The appellate courts have
applied this Huddleston standard to Rules 413 and 414, a suggestion
included in the legislative history.243  Thus, prior sexual offenses ad-
240 See Scallen, supra note 15, at 861 (“Defendants who are accused of heinous crimes
have a poor lobby in Washington.”).
241 485 U.S. 681 (1988).  In Huddleston, the Supreme Court emphasized that the evi-
dence must be relevant and must pass a Rule 403 determination of whether “‘its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.’” Id. at 687.  The
Court rejected the notion that the judge must first find that the prior act occurred by a
preponderance of evidence and instead insisted that the question be left to the jury under
Federal Rule of Evidence 104(b) (conditional relevance). Id. at 689–90.
242 Id. at 685; see United States v. Wright, 53 M.J. 476, 483 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (citing Hud-
dleston and “requiring the judge to conclude that the jury could find by preponderance of
the evidence that the offenses occurred”); United States v. Hughes, 48 M.J. 700, 715 (A.F.
Ct. Crim. App. 1998).
243 See United States v. Beaulieu, 194 F.3d 918, 922 (8th Cir 1999) (“We observe that
note five to the official commentary for Rule 414 states, ‘Evidence of uncharged child
molestation is admissible if the prosecution provides enough evidence to support a find-
ing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant committed the act.’”); United
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missible under Rules 413 and 414 need not have resulted in a convic-
tion or even an arrest.244  The evidence need not pass a clear and
convincing standard, or even, in the judge’s assessment, a preponder-
ance of the evidence standard, but need only be capable of being ac-
cepted by the jury as more probable than not.
It is vital that courts rethink this standard of proof for admitting
prior offenses under Rules 413 and 414.  Although the Huddleston
standard arose in the context of Rule 404(b),245 so far courts have
accepted David Karp’s suggestion that Huddleston should provide the
standard of proof for the sexual offenses admitted under Rules 413
and 414.246  Although the analogy is a reasonable one, its conse-
quences are unfortunate and unnecessary because there are ample
grounds for distinction.
The revolutionary departure of Rules 413 and 414 from the tradi-
tional approach to prior act evidence also calls for new thinking in
terms of the standard of proof.  Rules 413 and 414 rest on the notion
that despite the unfair prejudice that propensity evidence might gen-
erate (both in overvaluing the probativeness of past misdeeds and in
the attendant dangers of jurors’ punitive desires, irrationality, confu-
sion, and distraction), such evidence is justified by its high probative
value.247  Given that we are offering the jury a window into the ac-
cused’s character and arguing that acts committed in the past are par-
ticularly probative in circumstantially proving guilt of the offenses
charged, it is reasonable to demand a fairly high standard of proof
that those prior acts actually happened.  A judge’s belief that a jury
could find, more likely than not, that the prior offense occurred is
simply not sufficiently protective to shield the accused from rumor
and unsubstantiated tales of misconduct.
States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1433 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that “[t]he district court
must make a preliminary finding that a jury could reasonably find by a preponderance of
the evidence that the ‘other act’ occurred”). But cf. Johnson v. State, No. A-7867, 2003 WL
1070324, at *4 (Alaska Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2003) (applying a clear and convincing evidence
standard to the admission of prior sexual offenses under Alaska evidence law).
As with many other questions concerning the new rules, the original force behind
them, David Karp, is cited for the proposition that Huddleston applies. See Enjady, 134 F.3d
at 1433 (“We agree with David Karp, who drafted Rule 413, that similar acts must be estab-
lished by ‘sufficient evidence to support a finding by the jury that the defendant commit-
ted the similar act.’” (citing Huddleston)); Karp, supra note 32, at 19 (“While [Huddleston]
was directly concerned with admission under Rule 404(b), its reasoning on these points is
also applicable to the proposed new rules for sex offense cases.”).
244 In fact, the prior act evidence can be based on conduct resulting in an acquittal.
See, for example, supra note 6, discussing state cases in which acquitted conduct was used
to demonstrate sexual propensity.
245 Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 682.
246 See, e.g., Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1433.
247 See 140 CONG. REC. H8992 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari).
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Therefore, I propose that the courts require the higher standard
of clear and convincing evidence before admitting other sexual of-
fenses.248  Such a standard would enhance the probative value of the
character evidence, if not in its logic and assumptions, at least in the
facts upon which it is premised.  The standard of proof is a quintessen-
tial judicial question.  It does not subvert the theory or policy behind
the new rules for courts to insist on a high standard of proof that the
other offense actually occurred before tarring the accused with it.
This suggestion faces two strong objections, and I acknowledge
that, in the words of my mentor and friend, Judge Edward R. Becker, I
am charging up San Juan Hill on this one.249  The first argument
against a heightened standard of proof emerges from the legislative
history of Rules 413 and 414, which clearly cites the Huddleston stan-
dard with approval as the means for admitting evidence under the
new rules.  I will deal with this concern after presenting my second
proposal for courts to adopt, which, not surprisingly, is also at odds
with the legislative history.250
With respect to the second objection, the Supreme Court, after
Huddleston and an earlier case, Bourjaily v. United States,251 fixed the
preponderance standard for all preliminary evidentiary questions in
both civil and criminal cases.  Indeed, in Huddleston, the Court re-
jected the petitioner’s argument—that the judge, not the jury, must
be able to find that the accused committed the prior act by a prepon-
derance—as “inconsistent with the structure of the Rules of Evidence
and with the plain language of Rule 404(b).”252  The Supreme Court
further observed: “Petitioner’s reading of Rule 404(b) as mandating a
preliminary finding by the trial court that the act in question occurred
248 Arizona, which adopted a sexual propensity rule in December 1997, requires that
in criminal cases “the relevant prior bad act must be shown to have been committed by the
defendant by clear and convincing evidence.” ARIZ. R. EVID. 404 cmt. 1997 amendment
(citation omitted).
249 Judge Becker, former Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals of the Third Circuit, and
now on senior status, always used this historically evocative phrase to caution his clerks
against making arguments that are sure to fail.  I wish to acknowledge the problems with
my suggestion and honor him, even though I may be ignoring his good advice.
250 As I argue below, the legislative history is not an insurmountable objection, both
because there have been questions raised about the legislative history of evidence rules
generally, and because in the case of Rules 413 and 414, the legislative history is particu-
larly suspect. See infra Part IV.C.
251 483 U.S. 171, 175–76 (1987) (discussing the standard for proving evidence of con-
spiracy under Federal Rules of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) and 104(a), in a case in which the
petitioner did not challenge the standard of admissibility, and observing that there is
“‘nothing to suggest that admissibility rulings have been unreliable or otherwise wanting in
quality’” under the standard of a preponderance of the evidence).
252 Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 687 (1988).  The petitioner in Huddle-
ston conceded that after Bourjaily the standard of review was preponderance of the evi-
dence and merely argued that the judge rather than the jury should be charged with
applying that standard. See id. at 687 & n.5.
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not only superimposes a level of judicial oversight that is nowhere ap-
parent from the language of that provision, but it is simply inconsis-
tent with the legislative history behind Rule 404(b).”253
There are strong arguments for distinguishing the standard for
admission of preliminary evidence in Bourjaily and Huddleston from
that of admission under the sexual propensity rules.  Without discuss-
ing whether it is fair in the Rule 404(b) context (sometimes it is not),
I nevertheless propose that the Huddleston standard is particularly ill-
suited to Rules 413 and 414.  Rule 404(b) admits evidence under a
regime that affirmatively eschews propensity.254  Indeed, the first line
of Rule 404(b) explicitly prohibits propensity thinking, providing that
“[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove
the character of a person in order to show action in conformity there-
with.”255  Because of this built-in limitation, evidence admitted under
Rule 404(b) is less likely to cause unfair prejudice to the accused.256
Bourjaily, which involved traditional co-conspirator evidence, is
even less persuasive as support for the standard of proof for evidence
admission, because the issue concerning the standard of review was
never contested.257  Instead, the Court merely assumed that the pre-
ponderance standard applied.258  Additionally, like Huddleston,
Bourjaily involved a traditionally accepted type of evidence (co-con-
spirators’ statements), not the departure from tradition that marked
Rules 413 and 414.259
Furthermore, even if one reads Huddleston as announcing a gen-
eral standard of admissibility for all evidence, so much has changed in
the evidence landscape since the dicta in Huddleston—for surely it is
merely dicta in the context of new rules that were not yet contem-
plated when Huddleston was handed down—that courts must rethink
the standard. Huddleston was premised on a complex, but internally
coherent, system of character evidence that provided internal controls
253 Id. at 688.
254 As the Supreme Court in Huddleston explained: “The threshold inquiry a court
must make before admitting similar acts evidence under Rule 404(b) is whether that evi-
dence is probative of a material issue other than character.”  Id. at 686 (emphasis added).
255 FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
256 Under Rule 404(b), to allow proof of other crimes, wrongs, or acts, there must be a
legitimate nonpropensity purpose to prove an independent fact element, such as motive,
knowledge, or absence of mistake—any relevant purpose other than propensity. Id.
257 See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175–76 (1987) (establishing a Huddle-
ston-like standard for conspiracy cases, even though the petitioner never contested the
lower court’s application of the preponderance of evidence standard).
258 See id.
259 Although there was debate about the scope of the co-conspirator exception in
Bourjaily, the Supreme Court majority emphasized that it was applying rules firmly rooted
in evidence tradition. See id. at 183 (describing co-conspirator evidence as firmly rooted).
But see Becker & Orenstein, supra note 95, at 869–76 (criticizing the Court’s characteriza-
tion of its holding regarding admission of co-conspirator evidence as firmly rooted).
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(both via the antipropensity rule as well as Rule 403 balancing)
against unfairness.  Hence, Huddleston’s reliance on the “structure of
the Rules of Evidence”260 for explanation does not apply with equal
force to Rules 413 and 414, which represent a break with traditional
evidence policy, presumptions, and structure.  Relatedly, the rules ap-
plied in Huddleston had received careful vetting via an extensive
rulemaking process.261  The argument for additional judicial oversight
is therefore weaker for traditionally passed evidence rules than in the
case of Rules 413 and 414, which did not go through the rulemaking
process but instead arose directly from Congress, over vociferous ob-
jection from scholars, lawyers, and judges.262  Certainly, the federal
courts have the power to demand the higher standard of clear and
convincing evidence for sexual offenses introduced under Rules 413
and 414, and they should exercise it.263
A variant on this proposal to use a higher standard than Huddle-
ston would be to incorporate into the Rule 403 assessment of probative
value a more demanding showing that the prior offense actually oc-
curred.  The theory is that the probative value of a sexual offense di-
minishes if it is less likely to have occurred.264  The level of certainty
that the other acts occurred has occasionally been a contested issue in
the case law.  For instance, in United States v. Hughes, the court held
that the military judge plainly erred by admitting statements regard-
ing uncharged allegations of abuse against the witness’s nephew,
niece, and friend’s child.265  The court reached this decision because
the prosecution presented no evidence other than what Mrs. Hughes
had heard to support a finding that the appellant had committed
those purportedly similar acts.266
260 See Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 687.
261 See 140 CONG. REC. H8990 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Hughes)
(discussing the Rules Enabling Act and the minimum of six levels of scrutiny normally
involved in rulemaking compared to Rules 413–15, which were proposed as amendments
with maybe twenty minutes of debate).
262 See supra Part I.B.2.
263 Some circuit courts, prior to Huddleston, did demand a higher showing of proof for
admissibility of evidence, even under Rule 404(b).  See, e.g., United States v. Leight, 818
F.2d 1297, 1302 (7th Cir. 1987) (discussing 404(b) challenges with respect to child abuse
prosecutions and the circuit’s four-part test to determine admissibility, including a require-
ment that the evidence be clear and convincing); United States v. Weber, 818 F.2d 14 (8th
Cir. 1987) (noting that evidence of prior drug transactions is admissible under 404(b) if
there is clear and convincing evidence); United States v. Vaccaro, 816 F.2d 443, 452 (9th
Cir. 1987) (noting that for the admission of other criminal conduct the evidence must be
clear and convincing); United States v. Lavelle, 751 F. 2d 1266, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(similarly applying the clear and convincing standard).
264 Johnson v. Elk Lake Sch. Dist., 283 F.3d 138, 155–59 (3d Cir. 2002) (applying a
Rule 403 balance under Rule 415 in a civil case and incorporating uncertainty about
whether other acts of harassment occurred into the Rule 403 balance).
265 48 M.J. 700, 716 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1998).
266 Id.
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If the courts refuse to depart from the current understanding
that all prior act evidence is subject only to a standard of jurors’ ability
to find by a preponderance, and refuse to factor the likelihood that
the crime actually occurred  into the calculus for probative value, then
any change in the standard would indeed have to come from Con-
gress.  Like those who battled for the Alamo, proponents’ chances are
slim.
2. Requiring a More Rigorous and Contextualized Rule 403 Balance
The trial judge determines credibility, evaluates demeanor, and
sits in the best position to judge all of the evidence in context, includ-
ing the probative value and unfair prejudice of the accused’s prior
sexual offenses.  The trial judge’s power to do so predates the Federal
Rules of Evidence; Rule 403 merely codified a long and venerable tra-
dition of judicial discretion exercised by courts in the admission of
evidence.267
Courts must abandon the notion that Rules 413 and 414 dilute,
or render inconsequential, the Rule 403 balance.  Not only is the ob-
servation that the Rule 403 balance should “normally” lead to admissi-
bility268 (what I call “403-lite”) incorrect, but it is also subversive of the
courts’ authority and independence.269  The “403-lite” approach strips
the courts of their quintessential discretionary role as arbiters of
fairness.
For instance, in United States v. Withorn, the Eighth Circuit ex-
plained that courts are “obligated to take into account Congress’s pol-
icy judgment that Rule 413 was ‘justified by the distinctive
characteristics of the cases it will affect,’ and that Rule 414 evidence is
‘exceptionally probative’ of a defendant’s sexual interest in chil-
dren.”270  By focusing on Congressional intent and looking to the “dis-
tinctive characteristics”271 of rape cases and the “exceptionally
probative” Rule 414 evidence in child molestation cases, the Eighth
267 See Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 104 (1933) (noting the extent of judicial
discretion to admit or exclude evidence: “When the risk of confusion is so great as to upset
the balance of advantage, the evidence goes out.”).
268 See, e.g., Karp, supra note 32, at 19 (“‘It is not expected, however, that evidence
admissible pursuant to proposed Rules 413-15 would often be excluded on the basis of
Rule 403.’” (quoting an unpublished analysis statement for the Proposed Sexual Assault
Prevention Act)).
269 A very fine student comment makes the point that deferential application of Rule
403 “complete[s] the circuitous adoption of Rules 413 and 414, effectively removing any
judicial influence in the drafting, adoption, or implementation of these rules.”  King, supra
note 74, at 1192.
270 204 F.3d 790, 794 (8th Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Mound, 149 F.3d 799, 801
(8th Cir. 1998) (quoting 140 CONG. REC. H8991 (daily ed.  Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of
Rep. Molinari))).
271 Mound, 149 F.3d at 801.
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Circuit makes a crucial mistake: It confuses the justifications for the
deviation from the traditional antipropensity rule with the valid
method of applying that deviation.  It is one thing to announce a rule
change based on a broad policy consideration that a group of offend-
ers is so different from others that propensity arguments are particu-
larly probative.  It is quite another, however, to use this legislative
judgment to bypass what must be a highly contextualized, case-based
analysis of the probative value of the evidence versus its dangers.  The
Tenth Circuit in Meacham observed this phenomenon, but seemed in-
adequately alarmed or outraged, and ultimately upheld the district
court’s understanding of Congressional intent: “[E]vidence admissi-
ble pursuant to the proposed rules is typically relevant and probative,
[and] its probative value is normally not outweighed by any risk of
prejudice or other adverse effect.  That’s a judicial decision to be
made.  But they have made that as a legislative generalization.”272
When federal appellate courts give district judges abstract instruc-
tions about how prior sexual offense balancing tests should come out,
they are sending those judges the wrong message. The Eighth Circuit,
in particular, has adopted an approach that misconstrues the role of
the district judge and misleads the district courts into believing that
only in truly exceptional cases should they exclude prior sexual of-
fenses. Similarly, military appellate courts have instructed that the
Rule “‘403 balancing test is to be applied in a broad manner which
favors admission.’”273  The Tenth Circuit’s approach is better, insofar
as it requires that district judges engage in a specific balance, consid-
ering various factors that might mitigate against the probative value or
exacerbate the unfair prejudice.274  Nevertheless, there is ample evi-
dence that, even in the Tenth Circuit, the balance is insufficiently
contextual.275
The “403-lite” presumption of admissibility is quite separate from
the observation that, as a practical matter, the Rule 403 standard
tends to favor admission.276  Although it is true that Rule 403 only
272 See United States v. Meacham, 115 F.3d 1488, 1493 (10th Cir. 1997).
273 See United States v. Roberts, 55 M.J. 724, 730 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2001) (quoting
United States v. Dewrell, 52 M.J. 601, 609 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1999)); Hansen, supra note
211, at 65 (observing that Military Rule of Evidence 403 “should not be much of a hurdle
for the government to overcome” in admitting evidence under Military Rules of Evidence
413 and 414, and that “[e]ven if the court’s logic is not clear, the message is undeniable:
propensity evidence should be routinely admitted in child molestation and sexual assault
cases”).
274 See, e.g., United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1433 (10th Cir. 1998); United
States v. Guardia, 135 F.3d 1326, 1331 (10th Cir. 1998).
275 See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
276 Professor Scallen explains:
[I]t simply makes no sense to speak of a presumption of admissibility when
Rule 403 is applied to evidence being considered under Rules 413-415.
Rule 403 is already “tilted” in favor of  admissibility; there is no need to
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excludes evidence when the unfair prejudice substantially outweighs
the probative value, the test assumes that, in conducting that balance,
the district court will look at the evidence in the case, not at the ab-
stract, general directive of Congress.  One cannot presume, based on
legislative judgment, how the balance will come out in any individual
case or category of cases.277  The appellate courts’ didactic use of
“403-lite”—their presaging how the balance should come out—re-
flects a serious flaw in the understanding of the role of Rule 403.
On the probative value side of the Rule 403 balance, courts must
continue to insist on similarity between the prior offenses and the
crimes charged.  In addition, although a concrete time limit on prior
act admissibility would have to come from Congress, courts should still
consider the lapse of time between the current charges and the prior
offense as a serious factor in assessing the probative value of the evi-
dence.  If the district court performs its obligations—assessing the evi-
dence in context of the nature of the evidence—the judge can weigh
whether older convictions are too stale.  Currently, the courts are sim-
ply playing a numbers game; when the accused attempts to argue that
the prior offense is too old, the court cites a case that admitted an
even older offense.278
Furthermore, in assessing the dangers of propensity evidence,
judges must use Rule 403 to shield the accused from preventable dan-
gers.  Instead of the “403-lite” approach, courts must carefully screen
for avoidable unnecessary “unfair prejudice” (as opposed to the una-
voidable congressionally mandated variety).279  The fact that propen-
sity evidence used to serve as the quintessential example of unfair
prejudice, but now constitutes acceptable, even lauded, evidence,
does not mean that all arguments against unfair prejudice must be
abandoned.280  If courts are careful in dissecting the evidence, they
can distinguish prior sexual offenses that are admissible from those
graft on an additional “Congressional” presumption of admissibility in the
context of Rules 413-415.
See Scallen, supra note 15, at 880.
277 This point was also forcefully made by Professor Scallen, who argued that “[t]he
crucial point” is that Rule 403 demands a “case-specific, fact-intensive balancing process
that the drafters of Rule 403 thought should be left to the one impartial expert in the
courtroom—the trial judge.” Id. at 882.
278 See, e.g., United States v. Gabe, 237 F.3d 954, 960 (8th Cir. 2001) (admitting evi-
dence of the defendant’s twenty-year-old offense and citing the twenty-five- to thirty-year-
old prior offenses admitted in United States v. Meacham, 115 F.3d 1488, 1485 (10th Cir.
1997), and the sixteen- to twenty-year-old offenses admitted in United States v. Larson, 112
F.3d 600, 605 (2d Cir. 1997)).
279 Unnecessary unfair prejudice in this context is like unnecessary roughness in foot-
ball.  Some unfair prejudice, just like some roughness, is to be expected, but should be
limited to no more than necessary.
280 As I discussed above, there has been a tendency to see all the evils of propensity as
inexorably bundled together.  See supra Part III.C.
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that are not, because some prior act evidence will present additional
dangers that may result in unfair prejudice beyond the given
prejudice caused by propensity-type thinking.  One such additional
danger is the emotional reaction of the jury—wanting to jail a bad,
dangerous person, not because the jurors believe he is guilty of the
crime charged, but for retribution or safety of the community.281
Courts must also carefully screen for the related dangers of distrac-
tion, confusion, subversion of the jury’s ability to focus on the specif-
ics of the charges, and waste of time.
Under Rules 413 and 414, some dangers are simply unavoidable.
For example, under the new regime, it is very difficult to circumvent
the danger that jurors will illogically overvalue the evidence, that is to
say, give it more credence than it is worth.  The challenge for the
courts, however, is to analyze the particular dangers under the new
regime and to separate those that are inevitable from those that, with
careful judicial management and wise use of discretion, might be
avoided.  In teasing out these dangers, I will focus on three intercon-
nected issues: (1) the potential emotional impact of the evidence in-
troduced under Rules 413 and 414, (2) the manner in which the
evidence is introduced, and (3) the potential for prior sexual act evi-
dence to waste time and to confuse and distract the jury.
First, courts should evaluate probative value and prejudice on a
case-by-case basis, assessing the emotional impact of the propensity ev-
idence on the jury.  Courts should deem as unfairly prejudicial prior
offense evidence that is highly emotional, particularly gruesome, or
more troubling than the charges against the accused.  For instance,
the Ninth Circuit in United States v. LeMay admitted evidence that the
defendant, who was accused of forcing two young relatives to perform
oral sex on him, had, at the age of twelve, raped a toddler eight years
earlier.282  By admitting this prior act evidence through a highly emo-
tional witness—the mother of the toddler LeMay had raped283—the
court purported to even out the credibility contest between the ac-
cused and the young victims.284  Although it is impossible to know
what the jury might have found without the mother’s emotional testi-
mony of the uncharged sexual misconduct, it is fair to speculate that
the defendant’s chances of acquittal were hurt by the heart-rending
prior acts evidence admitted under Rule 414. LeMay thus illustrates
281 Not surprisingly, the prosecution sometimes encourages such misuse of propensity
evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Peters, No. 96-2286, 1998 WL 17750, at *3 (10th Cir.
Jan. 20, 1998) (noting the defendant’s claim that “in closing argument the prosecutor
improperly referred to defendant,” whose prior sexual offenses had been admitted under
Rule 413, “as a ‘serial rapist who must be stopped’”).
282 260 F.3d 1018, 1022–23 (9th Cir. 2001).
283 Id. at 1024.
284 Id. at 1028.
\\server05\productn\C\CRN\90-6\CRN603.txt unknown Seq: 67 13-SEP-05 12:03
2005] FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 403 1553
the dangers of propensity evidence in that the emotional impact of
the evidence may have led the jury to choose to punish the accused
for the molestation of the toddler, and relatedly, may have distracted
them from the case charged.
Some courts recognize the possibility that the nature of other sex-
ual offenses can create unfair prejudice if those other offenses are
significantly more upsetting or heinous than the charged offense.285
In admitting prior bad acts, courts will emphasize the prior act’s lack
of emotional pull on the jury, and hence argue that the lack of  preju-
dicial emotional impact favors admission under the Rule 403 bal-
ance.286  Still, other courts seem wildly oblivious to the dangers that
evidence of other, more troubling sexual offenses might present.287
In the extreme example of People v. Robins, involving the alleged sex-
ual assault of a prostitute, a California court admitted prior act evi-
dence that the accused raped, beat, attempted to silence, and
threatened to kill his half sister.288  The court found that the
“[d]efendant’s attack on [his half-sister] was not so much more brutal
285 See, e.g., People v. Banjo, No. B147527, 2002 WL 1752829, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. July
20, 2002) (“The prejudicial effect is increased if the uncharged crime is more serious than
the charged offense.  To reduce potential prejudice from admitting evidence of other sex
offenses, the trial court may exclude irrelevant and inflammatory details surrounding the
other offenses.”(citation omitted)); People v. Frazier, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 100, 109  (Ct. App.
2001) (conceding the risk that “a jury might punish the defendant for his uncharged
crimes regardless of whether it considered him guilty of the charged offense especially
where, as here, the uncharged offenses . . . were much more serious than the charged
offense”).
286 See, e.g., United States v. Granbois, 119 Fed. Appx. 35, 38 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The
evidence of the prior acts was not introduced through emotional and highly charged testi-
mony of a victim or a victim’s relative, but, rather, was conveyed through the testimony of a
criminal investigator.”); United States v. Butler, 56 F.3d 941, 944 (8th Cir. 1995) (“Because
the evidence [of prior abuse] was so similar to the acts charged, it would not be so facially
inflammatory as to unduly divert attention from the issues of the case.”), quoted in United
States v. Walker, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1157 (D.N.D. 2003); United States v. Valentin-
Nieves, 57 M.J. 691, 694–95 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2002) (admitting evidence of the ac-
cused’s sexual grabbing of another woman to prove rape of the victim, and explaining that
because the grabbing was “‘relatively minor in nature,’” the victim of the prior act seemed
“‘more angered and disgusted by the accused’s alleged behavior than anything else,’” and
because a limiting instruction was given, the unfair prejudice would be minimal).  All of
these examples involve cases in which the court approves of the evidence, noting that it
does not contain the deficiency of overly appealing to juror horror or emotion.  This is
different from excluding evidence that does so.
287 For instance, in Frazier, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 108, the accused unsuccessfully argued
that uncharged evidence admitted—sodomy and forced oral sex with a relative fifteen or
sixteen years earlier—was unfairly prejudicial because, among other reasons, “the alleged
crimes were far more serious than the crimes for which he was presently charged.”  The
court’s answer to the accused’s concern was nonresponsive, observing that under the new
propensity rule, charged and uncharged prior crimes need not be sufficiently similar to
qualify for admission under California’s version of Rule 404(b). See id.  The court, in es-
sence, reaffirmed the probative value of the prior act evidence without even addressing the
issue of unfair prejudice. See id. at 109.
288 No. B158439, 2003 WL 109609, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2003).
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than his attack on [the prostitute] as to blind the jury to the task
before them.”289  Remarkably, the court failed to consider the poten-
tial effect of the accused’s relationship with his prior victim.  It is un-
fathomable that a jury would not be more outraged by an incestuous
rape than by rape of a prostitute.290  However, the court’s only re-
sponse to this difference was a procedural one, noting that the “defen-
dant did not suggest at trial, and does not argue on appeal, that a less
prejudicial alternative existed, such as limiting the details of the attack
on Deanna or excluding the fact Deanna was defendant’s half-
sister.”291
Second, and relatedly, courts should carefully consider the man-
ner in which prosecutions introduce Rule 413 and 414 evidence.  Pro-
pensity evidence should be presented in the most neutral form
possible; the focus must remain on the fact of the accused’s character
and tendency to be a sexual predator, not on the specific emotional
or physical harm suffered by victims of the other acts.292  If, for in-
stance, a prior conviction exists, the fact of that conviction alone
should be sufficient.  Additionally, rather than face live testimony
about other incidents, the courts should always allow the accused to
stipulate to prior sexual offenses.  Finally, where the offense is dis-
puted, trial courts should go out of their way to ensure that the un-
charged offense testimony is presented as neutrally as possible, and
not, unless absolutely necessary, with a tearful witness on the stand.
This approach is in harmony with the Supreme Court’s holding in Old
Chief v. United States: “If an alternative were found to have substantially
the same or greater probative value but a lower danger of unfair
prejudice, sound judicial discretion would discount the value of the
item first offered and exclude it if its discounted probative value were
substantially outweighed by unfairly prejudicial risk.”293
In United States v. Fool Bull, the Eighth Circuit addressed the scope
of the Old Chief holding.294  The accused, relying on Old Chief, argued
that prior offenses could have been proven less prejudicially, in a way
289 Id. at *5.
290 More troubling, but undoubtedly true, the jury (or the trial court itself) would
probably be less concerned with the rape of a prostitute than the rape of an ordinary
stranger, let alone a sibling. Cf.  Sherry F. Colb, When a Prostitute Kills: The Execution of Aileen
Carol Wuornos (“Wuornos was at best a prostitute who refused to retreat from danger.  For
too many people, that is still not good enough for her to deserve the law’s protection from
rape.”), available at http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/colb/20021023.html (last visited
July 28, 2004).
291 Robins, 2003 WL 103609, at *5.
292 See, e.g., United States v. Peters, No. 96-2286, 1998 WL 17750, at *3 (10th Cir. Jan.
20, 1998) (“Potential prejudice was reduced by excluding details that would most likely
inflame a jury, such as information about the victims’ physical injuries.”).
293 519 U.S. 172, 182–83 (1997).
294 32 Fed. Appx. 778 (8th Cir. 2002) (unpublished opinion appealed from the District
of South Dakota).
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other than by calling witnesses to testify about them.295  In the unpub-
lished opinion, the Eighth Circuit deemed the accused’s reliance on
Old Chief as “misplaced.”296  The Fool Bull court held that, absent the
abstract question of felon status that was presented in Old Chief, pro-
pensity evidence should not be limited by an accused’s insistence that
the prosecutor present the evidence in a less prejudicial manner since
it “tells [a] colorful story with descriptive richness.”297
It is correct to say that Old Chief’s precedential value is affirma-
tively limited to the narrow question of a defendant’s ability to stipu-
late to his status as a felon in cases in which felonious status is an
element of the offense.  However, I believe that the Eighth Circuit was
incorrect in summarily dismissing the notion that the policy of Old
Chief applied. Old Chief’s concern with avoiding unnecessary
prejudice, while still informing the jury of essential facts, seems partic-
ularly apt in Rule 413 and 414 cases, where the essential information
for the jury is the accused’s status as a sexual predator.  While evi-
dence of the number of prior offenses can be relevant to show the
accused’s propensity more convincingly than stipulation, multiple wit-
nesses describing numerous prior offenses, in explicit detail, may
emotionally affect the jurors and confuse them as to which incidents
are on trial.
Third, courts should be particularly careful to ensure that the evi-
dence of prior sexual offenses, by their sheer number or time taken to
prove, do not overwhelm the trial, thus wasting time, and confusing
and distracting the jury.298  Especially in California courts, defendants
have raised the “waste of time” balancing factor, which is specifically
mentioned in Rule 403.  The California courts have struggled with the
question of how much prior offense evidence is too much.  For exam-
ple, in People v. Frazier, the court held that 182 pages (or, by its calcula-
tion, twenty-seven percent of the total trial transcript) devoted to
propensity evidence of uncharged sexual offenses did not constitute
an undue consumption of time.299  The court conceded that
295 Specifically, the accused argued that the information about his prior offenses and
propensities could have been introduced via the victim of the current charged offenses.
Therefore, the other five witnesses to the accused’s propensity did not have to testify. See
id. at 779.
296 See id.  (citing United States v. Hill, 249 F.3d 707, 712 (8th Cir. 2001), and explain-
ing that Hill stands for the proposition that “absent stipulation going to [the] fact of felon
status, [the] rationale for [the] limited rule of Old Chief disappears, as defendant’s stipula-
tion cannot give government everything evidence could show”).
297 See id. at 780.
298 See generally Duane, supra note 66, at 124 (“That danger of wasting time and jury
confusion would rarely be greater than it will inevitably be under the new rules, which
allow evidence that a defendant has committed similar crimes of sexual assault in the
past.”).
299 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 100, 109 (Ct. App. 2001).
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“[c]onceivably a case could arise in which the time consumed trying
the uncharged offenses so dwarfed the trial on the current charge as
to unfairly prejudice the defendant.”300  Nevertheless, the court con-
cluded that the accused failed to demonstrate unfair prejudice, and
explained that it could not “say spending less than a third of the total
trial time on these issues was prejudicial as a matter of law.”301  The
court in People v. Banjo came to a similar conclusion, holding that 317
pages of the trial transcript devoted to other sex offenses (which the
court estimated to constitute thirty-three percent of the transcript)
was not prejudicial.302
In People v. Falsetta,303 the court raised another potential concern
implicating the “waste of time” factor.  The court acknowledged that
“[j]udicial efficiency theoretically could suffer if the courts permitted
trials to be unduly sidetracked while the parties litigated allegations
that defendants had committed other sex offenses.”304  However, it
expressed confidence that “trial courts will exercise sound discretion
under section 352 [California’s equivalent to Rule 403] to preclude
inefficient mini-trials of this nature.”305  Thus, California courts have
taken judicial efficiency, as well as unfair prejudice to the accused,
into consideration in conducting the propensity evidence balance, but
have yet to find propensity evidence to be a waste of time.306
In addition to lengthening the trial, prior sexual offense evidence
may confuse the jury as to what the actual charges are or distract the
jury from what should be its main focus. United States v. Guardia307 is
illustrative of these concerns.  In Guardia, the court excluded evidence
of four other women willing to testify about a doctor’s sexual impro-
prieties.308  The district court, using Rule 403 to reject admission of
evidence under Rule 413, indicated that “its overriding, if not exclu-
sive, concern was the danger that the proffered testimony would con-
fuse the issues in the case, thereby misleading the jury.”309  The Tenth
Circuit court also expressed concern that the evidence would compli-
cate the case exponentially, because of the need for expert testimony
on the nature of proper gynecological examination and the differ-
300 See id.
301 See id.
302 No. B147527, 2002 WL 1752829, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. July 30, 2002).
303 986 P.2d 182 (Cal. 1999).
304 Id. at 189.
305 Id.
306 See, e.g., People v. Robins, No. B158439, 2003 WL 103609, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan.
13, 2003) (“[T]here was no undue consumption of time or danger of distracting the jury
from its main inquiry.  [Other sexual offense] testimony comprised only fifteen pages of a
total trial transcript that exceeded 400 pages.”).
307 135 F.3d 1326 (10th Cir. 1998).
308 Id.
309 Id. at 1331.
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ences in the types of improper touching the various women al-
leged.310  Additional witness testimony presenting new narratives
unrelated to the charged acts may particularly confuse and distract
the jury.311  These concerns may also arise when longer jury instruc-
tions and admonitions are given for evidence admitted under Rules
413 and 414.312
C. Limiting the Role of Legislative History
I concede that my two suggestions for how courts can improve
their application of the new rules—a higher standard of proof and the
rejection of “403-lite”—both disregard the legislative history of Rules
413 and 414, upon which the courts rely heavily.313  Both the Huddle-
ston standard and the application of “403-lite” arise out of the courts’
slavish adherence to comments in the legislative history of the new
rules.  Yet, perhaps legislative history is not that important after all.
Members of the Supreme Court, particularly Justice Scalia, have ex-
pressed much distrust of legislative history and reliance on advisory
committee notes in general, and on the notes accompanying the evi-
dence rules in particular.314  There is a strong argument for support-
ing a plain meaning approach to interpreting the Federal Rules of
Evidence.  The Rules are generally considered clear and have been
subject to modification when Congress was sufficiently interested.315
Therefore, since Congress can always change the rules if courts are
mistakenly interpreting them, the advisory committee notes and legis-
310 See id. at 1332.
311 In Fool Bull, 32 Fed. Appx. 778, 779 (8th Cir. 2002), the accused argued that the
court erred by allowing five witnesses to testify under Rule 413, because the alleged un-
charged acts discussed were dissimilar and old, and the testimony was prejudicial and
confusing.
312 See People v. Harris, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 689, 696 (Ct. App. 1998) (“[T]he actual testi-
mony occupies but twenty-five pages of transcript and therefore cannot, standing alone, be
viewed as protracted.  But the evidence necessitated lengthy instructions and admonitions
and occupied a good portion of the closing arguments.”).
313 See King, supra note 74, at 1191 (criticizing the courts’ “[e]xtreme [d]eference to
the [l]egislative [i]ntent [c]oncerning Rules 413 and 414”).
314 In Tome v. United States, Justice Scalia argued:
More mature consideration has persuaded me that [it] is wrong [to consult
advisory committee notes].  Having been prepared by a body of experts, the
Notes are assuredly persuasive scholarly commentaries—ordinarily the most
persuasive—concerning the meaning of the Rules.  But they bear no special
authoritativeness as the work of the draftsmen, any more than the views of
Alexander Hamilton (a draftsman) bear more authority than the views of
Thomas Jefferson (not a draftsman) with regard to the meaning of the
Constitution.
513 U.S. 150, 167 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
315 See Becker & Orenstein, supra note 95, at 867–68 (stating that the Federal Rules of
Evidence are generally considered clear and well-written, but asserting that “[w]here Con-
gress purposefully left a point open or vague, attempts to justify various interpretations by
resort to plain meaning are disingenuous”).
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lative history are arguably less important and valid than plain meaning
interpretation.316
Distrust of legislative history in evidence interpretation is particu-
larly apt when considering Rules 413 and 414.  The legislative history
of the new rules purports to instruct judges on how to perform their
discretionary judicial functions. This instruction borders on intrusion
and, if taken too far, raises separation of power concerns.317  Further-
more, the legislative history in this instance is truly troubling both in
its content and origin.  There is strong reason to doubt the integrity of
how Congress generated the legislative history of the new rules.  State-
ments made from the floor of the House and the Senate by the main
sponsors of the new rules have a surreal sameness about them, mim-
icking the actual language and arguments of David Karp’s law review
article.318  Perhaps the height of the chutzpah319 surrounding the engi-
neering of this legislative history is Rep. Molinari’s statement that
David Karp’s speech to the Evidence Section of the Association of
American Law Schools constitutes part of the Rules’ legislative his-
tory.320  Remarkably, some courts have accepted this startling and un-
316 For instance, after United States v. Roberts, 88 F.3d 872 (10th Cir. 1996), Congress
amended Rules 413–415 to clarify their applicability. See supra note 77.
317 Professor Scallen identified the problem as appellate courts’ interference with the
discretion of the trial courts, arguing that particularly in the context of Rules 413–15,
“[t]he appellate courts should respect the discretion of trial judges . . . leaving them alone
to do what they do best.” See Scallen, supra note 15, at 883.  Professor Scallen believes that
the discretion placed in the hands of the trial courts reflects a proper balance of power.
She notes that it is plausible that by not specifically creating a special 403-type balancing
test for the new rules, “members of Congress realized that federal district court judges, who
do not have to run for re-election, would retain the discretion to make the hard calls—the
decisions to exclude evidence in situations where it will be politically unpopular, but legally
and practically correct to do so.” See id.
318 Compare Karp, supra note 32, at 33 (“Prior offenses of this type by the defendant
show an unusual disposition—a sexual or sado-sexual interest in children—that does not
exist in ordinary people.”), with 140 CONG. REC. H8991 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (state-
ment of Rep. Molinari) (“In child molestation cases . . . a history of similar acts tends to be
exceptionally probative because it shows an unusual disposition of the defendant—a sexual
or sado-sexual interest in children—that simply does not exist in ordinary people.”).  Sena-
tor Dole repeated Rep. Molinari’s above statement verbatim in 140 CONG. REC. S12990
(daily ed. Sep. 20, 1994) (statement of Sen. Dole). See also 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra
note 1, § 5412 n.12 (calling the congressional sponsors “mouthpieces” and observing that
comparing the various statements provides convincing evidence that statements from the
House and Senate floors “are potted legislative history”  and the sponsors “are reading
from the same script”).
319 Chutzpah comes from the Yiddish language and means audacity, but not always in a
complimentary way.  It often has the connotation of brazenness or gall. See BRYAN A. GAR-
NER, GARNER’S MODERN AMERICAN USAGE 146 (2003) (defining chutzpah as “a curious word,
having both negative and positive connotations”); see also Alex Kozinski & Eugene Volokh,
Lawsuit Shmawsuit, 103 YALE L.J. 463, 463 (1993) (noting the proliferation of Yiddish in
published opinions and stating that a LEXIS search retrieved 112 reported cases that used
the term chutzpah).
320 Rep. Molinari said that David Karp’s statement “provided a detailed account of the
views of the legislative sponsors and the administration concerning the proposed reform,
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supported assertion.321  If we dare to observe how this sausage was
made,322 we must wonder about the inordinate influence one individ-
ual exercised in conceiving, drafting, and shepherding these new con-
troversial rules and the judicial instructions on how to interpret them.
It is a dangerous practice to import controls over judicial discretion
through the placement of some scripted comments in a legislative
history.
CONCLUSION
Judicial application of Rules 413 and 414 is subject to the follow-
ing parody, which is uncomfortably close to the truth, especially in the
Eighth Circuit: (1) There is no facial due process problem with Rules
413 and 414 because Rule 403 prevents fundamental unfairness.  (2)
If the district court judge takes the trouble to conduct a Rule 403
balance (reciting some legislative history will do), as a practical mat-
ter, such evidence will never be excluded; this is so because, by defini-
tion, evidence of prior offenses is highly probative, and what used to
count as unfair prejudice—propensity—is now the raison d’etre of the
evidence.  (3) Therefore, all admissions of prior sexual offenses pass
Rule 403 muster and none violate due process.  Under this line of
reasoning, Rule 403 begins to look less like a bulwark and more like a
perpetually open door for the admission of propensity evidence.  The
so-called guarantee against fundamental unfairness stemming from
Rule 403 rings hollow.  Furthermore, the appellate courts’ reliance on
“403-lite” also annuls the trial courts’ essential function of monitoring
evidence admission through the exercise of discretion.
In assessing and fine-tuning Rules 413 and 414, even critics must
acknowledge the rules’ potential utility and popular appeal.  There-
fore, it is imperative that we analyze the application of these rules
carefully, honestly, and realistically.  The best case for allowing the
admission of prior sexual offenses under Rules 413 and 414 arises
when there is a credibility gap between the accused and the victim,
and when the more powerful or presentable accused may rely on rape
and should also be considered an authoritative part of its legislative history.”  140 CONG.
REC. H8991 (daily ed. Aug. 24, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari).
321 See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 53 M.J. 476, 483 n.8 (C.A.A.F. 2000); cf. Scallen,
supra note 15, at 877–80 (criticizing the Third Circuit in Johnson v. Elk Lake School Dis-
trict, 283 F.3d 138, 154–55 (3d Cir. 2002), for using David Karp’s speech, memorialized
later in a law review article, supra note 32, as legislative history in interpreting a Rule 415
question).
322 It is unthinkable that there could be a law review article discussing legislative his-
tory that does not allude to Bismarck’s famous dictum. See Tracey E. George & Robert J.
Pushaw, Jr., How Is Constitutional Law Made?, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1265, 1265 & n.1 (begin-
ning the article by quoting Bismarck’s remark: “Laws are like sausages.  It’s better not to
see them being made.” (citing 1,911 BEST THINGS ANYBODY EVER SAID 232  (Robert Byrne
ed., 1988))).
\\server05\productn\C\CRN\90-6\CRN603.txt unknown Seq: 74 13-SEP-05 12:03
1560 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:1487
myths or discredit a troubled, traumatized child.  Rules 413 and 414
present the jury with evidence that the accused is among the subset of
the population (number unknown and subject to dispute) that is will-
ing to prey sexually on often weaker individuals.  Jurors can use that
information to counter their inappropriate suspicion of victims and
their inaccurate sense that the powerful and respectable-looking ac-
cused is incapable of committing such a horrible act.  This scenario is
the best possible face one can put on Rules 413 and 414, and it is
essential that courts strive to limit the rules’ application to attain these
benefits, while screening for the dangers that tend to accompany pro-
pensity evidence.
In promoting a realistic response consonant with the Congres-
sional mandate, I have proposed concrete measures, some requiring
action from Congress (restriction to convictions and time limits) and
some that can be implemented by the courts themselves.  Indeed, the
key to any successful outcome in the controversy surrounding these
rules will stem from the behavior of the district courts.  While respect-
ing Congressional intent, courts, especially the trial courts, must take
a brave stand and use their wide discretion to limit the damage of
these new rules.
The issues raised by Rules 413 and 414 are significant not only in
protecting the accused, but also in ensuring the integrity and power of
the courts.  Courts must not abandon their duty to act as gatekeepers
and guarantors of fairness.  While Congress can pass new rules of evi-
dence, it cannot pre-balance prejudice and probative value in each
case.323  District courts must exercise their discretion carefully and
guard it vigilantly; appellate courts must insist that the trial courts do
their jobs.  This will help ensure that the trials of those accused of
sexual crimes (not the most sympathetic or popular folks) are fair and
constitutional.  Given the highly deferential standard of review, if trial
courts assert themselves, they can conduct meaningful Rule 403 bal-
ances that are fairly well insulated from reversal.  They can limit the
dangers of Rules 413 and 414 testimony by carefully monitoring the
emotional aspects of the evidence and the methods of proof, and the
time spent on such uncharged offenses, all with an eye to diminishing
jury confusion, distraction, and prejudice.
I note with satisfaction that the outlook is not entirely bleak.  Oc-
casionally, trial courts have used Rule 403 to limit evidence under the
new rules, and appellate courts have affirmed those decisions.  In
United States v. McHorse, for instance, the Tenth Circuit approved the
323 Arguably, Congress could eliminate Rule 403 balancing altogether, as it apparently
has in Rule 609(a)(2). See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text.  If Congress did so,
however, then the courts’ determination that Rules 413 and 414 are not fundamentally
unfair and do not violate due process would have to be revisited.
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district court’s admission of similar acts by the accused against two
children, but did not admit evidence regarding the accused’s half-sis-
ter because it was too dissimilar, remote, and potentially confusing.324
And, of course, in United States v. Guardia, the court refused to allow
admission of evidence from other women who claimed that the ac-
cused acted inappropriately during their gynecological exams.325  The
court excluded this evidence on the grounds of confusion, dissimilar-
ity, and waste of time.326  Additionally, state courts that have adopted
their own versions of the new rules have, on occasion, excluded other
sexual offense evidence under their versions of a Rule 403 balancing
test.  In People v. Harris, a California appellate court reversed admis-
sion of a violent rape committed twenty-three years earlier as an abuse
of discretion because of the inflammatory nature of the graphic evi-
dence, which was very different from the circumstances surrounding
the charged offense.327
Although I strongly disagree with the premises of Rules 413 and
414, I believe it is possible for courts to protect the rights of the ac-
cused while respecting Congressional intent, if not all of the legislative
history.  By retaining the crucial judicial functions of weighing evi-
dence and exercising discretion, courts can achieve a balance between
the Congressional mandate to admit such evidence and the crucial
judicial role of ensuring a fair trial.
324 179 F.3d 889, 894, 899 (10th Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Mound, 149 F.3d
799, 802  (8th Cir. 1988) (excluding evidence of other uncharged sexual abuse because “‘it
would simply confuse the issues in this case, none of which are similar to the case of the
witness,’” but  permitting evidence of prior convicted conduct (quoting the district
court)); United States v. Walker, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1157–58  (D.N.D. 2003) (admitting
some prior act evidence, but restricting evidence of other uncharged allegations of child
molestation committed by the defendant against the victim, explaining that “[a]lthough
relevant, the probative value of such evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, and by other considerations enumerated in Rule
403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence”).
325 135 F.3d 1326 (10th Cir. 1998).
326 See supra notes 307–10 and accompanying text (discussing Guardia).
327 See 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 689, 695, 697 (Ct. App. 1998).
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